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ABSTRACT
This thesis applies the neo-functionalist theory of integration to a study of the European 
technology policy, taking the BRITE-EURAM programme as a case study. A three- 
level mode of analysis is used to examine actor behaviour: actors at the micro-level, 
national technology systems, and the European-level institutions. The study makes a 
comparative analysis of participation by two of the European member states, the United 
Kingdom and Spain, to examine the community building processes that operated in 
each.
The national institutional system in which economic actors operate influences their 
behaviour, and the analysis of the European technology collaboration identified the 
political changes that took place within the context of particular national institutional 
systems. One variable that is key to the process of integration is the technological 
capability of the national system. At the supranational level, the ideology and ideas 
underpinning technology policy created a market-based community, excluding other 
interests. The effect is to compromise any attempt to upgrade the common interest 
through directing technology policy towards economic and social cohesion.
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CHAPTER 1
INTEGRATION THEORY AND EUROPEAN R&D COLLABORATION
1.1.1 Introduction
Business circles, after initial reactions ranging from cautious support to outright 
hostility, had accepted the Common Market as a fait accompli and jumped in with 
almost breathtaking speed to form a network o f agreements within the Six. An 
acceleration o f the realisation o f the Common Market, far from exceeding the pace 
desired by business groups, would only catch up with the pace they had already se t... it 
was from business circles that much o f the political pressure for acceleration 
originated.
(Lindberg, 1963).
Leon Lindberg's description could be almost as appropriate to describe the pace and 
momentum of the European integration process established during the 1980s, following 
the Single European Act of 1986. By then, the six had become twelve in a three-stage 
process of enlargement which spanned two decades. Lindberg's emphasis, however, on 
the business enthusiasm for the Common Market and its expression through a network 
of agreements found an echo in the developments within Europe more than two decades 
later.
The echo was enough to revive integration theory which had for long been buried under 
the resistance of national governments struggling with the intemational turmoil of the 
1970s, and the burden of balancing domestic economic objectives in the face of 
inflationary pressures and a slow-down in economic growth. With the announcement of
11
the Single Market Programme, and the enthusiasm which the economic programme to 
unite Europe generated, analysts returned once more to the neo-functionalist theory of 
integration as an explanatory tool/
They were encouraged to do so by a clearly observable set of circumstances affecting 
the institutional structure of the European Community (EC), the attitudes of the national 
governments, and the behaviour of the economic actors in the Community/ Much 
debate has taken place regarding the source of the initial impetus and the precise point of 
departure of the integration phase, which has not been finally resolved/
The conflicting arguments regarding how the process began and how best it should be 
explained have not, however, obscured the central position of the White Paper, 
Completing the Internal Market, presented by the European Commission in 1985 and 
which led shortly afterwards to the legislation of the Single European Act (SEA).
The White Paper had set out a series of proposals to be implemented so as to give effect 
to the internal market envisaged by the Rome Treaty."  ^ These included liberalisation 
measures designed to abolish the physical, technical, and fiscal barriers to the free 
movement of goods, services, capital, and labour by 1992.
An essentially neo-liberal economic programme, it was given legal effect by the SEA 
which also made several institutional changes at Community level. For the first time the 
European Community had responsibility for regional policy, some aspects of social 
policy, and for research and technology policy. The latter was identified in Article 13 Of, 
which stated 'the Community's aim shall be to strengthen the scientific and 
technological base of European industry and to encourage it to become more 
competitive at the intemational level.' This thesis is concerned with the operation of 
technology policy.
European technology policy has developed throughout the 1980s into a series of multi­
annual rolling programmes that were directed to the broad objectives of strengthening 
the European technological base, while creating a technological community.^ The
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Framework Programme comprised a series of constituent programmes directed at either 
individual sectors or multi-sectoral, and were mainly directed towards the 
encouragement of research and technology collaboration among European firms, 
universities and research centres throughout the Community. The current Fourth 
Framework Programme covers the period 1994-1998, and following the Maastricht 
Treaty was extended to encompasses all the research activities of the European Union in 
addition to industrial research with a greatly enlarged budget as a consequence of the 
treaty agreement.
Specifically, the thesis will examine the implementation of technology policy to 
determine the extent to which a technological community is created as a result. The 
examination will identify actors at the micro-level who participated in one of the 
constituent programmes within the Framework Programme, namely the BRITE- 
EURAM programme. BRITE-EURAM is, unlike the more well-known ESPRIT 
programme, multi-sectoral, directed towards the support of cross-border technological 
research by European manufacturing in general. The general objective of the 
programme is to increase the competitiveness of manufacturing industry, and to do so 
by a concerted effort to improve the technological base. What is involved in the 
programme is, therefore, the active support for the creation of intemational alliances 
among economic actors at the European level.
Two other institutional changes were brought about through the SEA - changes to the 
co-decision procedure and a codified procedure for Political Cooperation on foreign 
policy. The latter change has no direct relevance for the present research, but has 
obvious implications for the long-term with regard to creating a common foreign policy 
and for national sovereignty. The changes to the decision-making procedures gave 
greater majority voting powers to the European Council (and less opportunity for a 
member state to use the power of veto) and gave the European Parliament greater say 
and the formal right to consultation under what was termed the 'co-decision procedure'. 
This change would enable the European Parliament to make an input into the 
technology policy proposals of the European Commission under the so-called
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Framework Programme, and later chapters will consider the role of supranational 
institutions in creating a technological community.
In addition to the two levels of analysis identified - the micro-level pertaining to the 
economic actors participating in the programme, and the supranational institution, a 
third level of analysis is considered in addition. The national level provides a context in 
which the economic actors operate, and the thesis considers the process of community 
building as it affected national institutional systems in two of the member states of the 
European Community, Spain and the United Kingdom.
The analysis of the national institutional system is intended to find an explanation for 
the behaviour of the economic actors towards integration, and uses a method of analysis 
located within historical institutionalism. Using the definition given by Steinmo, Thelen 
and Longstreth, institutions are defined as 'the whole range of state and societal 
institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and that structure their 
relations of power to other groups.'.^ Borrowing fi-om institutionalist analysis, the 
behaviour of micro-level actors is examined in the context of the national socio­
economic and political structures, holding to the assumption that political interests are 
formed by the institutional system in which actors find themselves.
Similar analyses have been made of the policy context of economic policy making in 
individual countries. Hall (1986) uses this approach to compare economic policy in 
Britain and France, and uses the same method to look at the spread of Keynesianism 
throughout the post-war period.^
As the thesis is concerned with one functional area, the institutions that are under 
review in this particular context refer largely to those associated with technology at both 
the national and the supranational level. Consequently, the institutional system under 
examination is narrowed down to this functional area, and represents what has been 
described elsewhere by Nelson (1993) as the national innovation system.* Nelson uses 
the term national innovation system to define a set of institutions whose interactions 
determine the innovative performance .... of national firms'. He regards the industrial
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firms and public laboratories as part of the system. More broadly, 'the character and 
effectiveness of a nation's system of schooling, training, and retraining not only 
determine the supply of skills from engineer to machine tender, but also influence the 
attitude of workers towards technical advance'.
Here, industrial firms, research centres, governments, national and supranational 
technology policies are considered part of the institutional system, together with 
technological interests at both the national and the supranational level. National 
innovation systems differ in terms of both the overall structure and the general 
capability. One of the arguments which the thesis will make is that the different 
capabilities of the innovation systems will determine the attitudes towards a European 
technological community, and will affect the progress towards creating such a 
community. Capability is used, therefore, in the sense of technological intensity and 
expertise in industry, and at the level of technology policy. It has also a subjective 
interpretation, especially when comparisons are made with other countries as much as a 
quantifiable one, although more quantifiable evidence of technological capability will 
also be provided.
As mentioned above, the research focuses on two of the member states of the European 
Community, Spain and the UK, and examines through the implementation of the 
BRITE-EURAM programme the development of a European technological community 
through the experience of these two member states. The Spanish innovation system is, 
by comparison with the UK, of relatively recent origin, and partly as a result has a much 
lower technological capability. It has, however, seen significant changes at the 
institutional level over the past decade, particularly following a government decree in 
1986, and these are examined in chapter five. The changes, which included the 
introduction of a national technology policy, were initiated partly through the general 
drive towards European integration managed by the Spanish government and supported 
a programme of industrial modernisation and restructuring.
The UK's innovation system is a more mature one, and benefited from technical 
expertise built up since the industrial revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth
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centuries that enabled the country to extend a network of intemational trade to support 
the empire. More recently in this century, the post-war period saw a state-directed 
management of the innovation system, which provided resources for investment in 
research and development in key areas, often of a strategic and/or military nature, that 
allowed a spillover into commercial activities. This mission-oriented system, described 
by Ergas (1986), enabled investment in technology to be turned into irmovations by UK 
manufacturing.^
The UK also saw certain changes to the system in the 1980s, which are the subject of 
examination in chapter four of the thesis. In an ideological shift by the government, the 
innovation system was subjected to the principles of free enterprise, with the market 
being given the sole right to decide the allocation and distribution of resources, 
including technological resources. As part of this shift in government belief, many areas 
of the institutional system that had formerly received significant public support for 
research and technological activities were now obliged to find private financing. The 
more general consequence of this ideological shift was in terms of the effect on the 
organisation of the innovation system, and the nature of the technological activities 
undertaken within the innovation system.
The two countries may not seem immediately comparable, and in fact UK government 
statistics on research and technology invariably include comparisons with other 
European member states, such as Germany, France, and Italy, and seldom include Spain 
in the comparisons. Spanish government statistics, on the other hand, invariably provide 
a comparative picture that includes UK, as well as Germany and France. An 
intemational comparative perspective is important for any country in assessing its 
technological capability, even when the view is essentially a subjective one. 
Nevertheless, even the European Community has used this comparative perspective to 
illustrate the region's position in the intemational technology stakes so as to secure 
support for the Framework Programme, as we shall see later. But more immediately, 
the comparative view shows that both the UK and Spanish innovation systems have a 
number of common problems.
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In the two countries there is a heavy, and growing dependence on imported technology, 
and an internationalisation of the innovation systems through foreign direct investment. 
However, the manufacturing sectors which are the main target areas for the BRITE- 
EURAM programme, have large numbers of small- and medium- sized enterprises 
(SMEs) with limited resources for research and technology. These organisations tend to 
devote fewer resources to technological development, with the result that both countries 
have experienced growing problems in terms of innovation through the application of 
new technology to manufacturing processes and products. At the same time, the 
internationalisation of technology has implications for the competitive position of 
domestic industry and created political tensions.
National responses to the deficiencies of the innovation systems have been made at 
several levels in the two countries, largely corresponding to the nature of the innovation 
system and to more general attitudes towards policy-making. One response has been 
through participation in the European Community technology programmes, in the 
Spanish case with very direct involvement by the government, and in the case of the UK 
with the government maintaining its customary aloof position on European integration.
The pro-integration position taken by the Spanish state was not adequate alone by itself 
to counter the institutional weaknesses of the innovation system, while in the UK 
government foot-dragging did not prevent domestic organisations from taking 
significant part in European technology collaboration programmes. The thesis will 
examine the different experiences faced by members of the two national innovation 
systems, and will evaluate how the processes operated to 'europeanise' the technology 
community.
1.1.2 The European collaborative bandwagon
In extending the scope of Community policy making to the area of research and 
technology, the SEA gave legal effect to a series of activities to promote collaborative 
research and development that had been building up for some years. Since the efforts 
made by Commissioner Davignon towards the end of the 1970s to bring the large
17
information technology firms of Europe together to discuss an industrial technology 
strategy under the aegis of the European Round Table, the Commission had been 
extending its efforts to foster research collaboration.
The European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information 
Technology (ESPRIT) was the model for a series of collaborative research and 
technology programmes, instigated by the European Commission, which brought 
together firms, universities and research centres throughout the European Community, 
financed partly by the European authorities and partly by industry.
Following the success of ESPRIT, as measured then by the reception given to the 
programme by industry and by national governments, there followed other programmes 
promoting industrial collaborative research. The 'collaborative bandwagon' included in 
the telecommunications sector, the Research and Development in Advanced 
Communications Technologies (RACE) programme, and the non-sectoral BRITE- 
EURAM programme, directed at European manufacturing industry in general. This 
thesis concentrates analysis upon the BRITE-EURAM programme's contribution to the 
creation of a European technological community, but the findings do have wider 
relevance to the other programmes.
The first half of the 1980s witnessed a growth in intemational business alliances that 
coincided with the initiatives being conducted by the European Community authorities, 
but which also existed independently of them. In an effort to maintain advantage in an 
increasingly competitive intemational market, made even more so by the rapid pace of 
technological change, business enterprises were pursuing alliance strategies on an 
intemational basis to a greater degree than ever before.
The turmoil of the 1970s had not only adversely affected the European integration 
process, it was also having a gradual and perhaps unrealised impact on Fordist systems 
of production. New competitive strategies included a greater volume of intemational 
alliances, in systems of production that were changing rapidly away from mass-
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production for a stable market, to smaller volume, differentiated products for a more 
sophisticated market.
Changing and unstable patterns of demand were combining with the competitive threat 
from industries in the newly industrialising countries, and new technologies, to force a 
response from traditional industries in Europe and the United States. Rapid 
technological change contributed to the instability, but also to the perception that the 
acquisition of technology was key to maintaining a competitive advantage.
Given the cost of internally-generated technology, and the risks associated with making 
such an investment under unstable conditions and rapid demand changes, the alternative 
of intemational alliances was eagerly seized upon. Intemational alliances were entered 
into for a whole host of reasons that were not simply related to technology acquisition, 
such as market expansion, diversification, capital investment, cost reduction. But in 
any event, the European Commission was able to launch the technology policy initiative 
at a time when the culture of collaboration was gaining ground in the business 
community.
The other factor contributing to this permissive climate was the increasing concem of 
the European member state governments with the competitiveness of domestic industry. 
Greater intemational competition, and the stmctural changes associated with the 
emerging post-Fordist systems of production had contributed to the pressures for 
manufacturing industry in particular. Constrained by a variety of factors from giving 
direct support, European technology programmes were an appealing altemative.
1.2 The lesson of historv
The European technology policy that emerged during the 1980s set out to create a 
technology community in a way that differed significantly to the earlier technology 
collaboration projects of the 1960s and 1970s. Second time around, the policy that was 
introduced proved the Commission had leamed a valuable lesson, and was prepared to 
try a new approach to technology collaboration and to integration.
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Certain aspects of the context of the 1980s, and of the policy itself, lend themselves to a 
neo-functionalist analysis. To understand this more clearly it is useful to take a brief 
look at the earlier experiences in technology collaboration. After this, the following 
sections will consider how and to what extent neo-functionalist theory can contribute to 
an analysis and understanding of how technology policy, specifically in the BRITE- 
EURAM programme, could contribute to the integration process.
The previous experience of European technology collaboration centred upon large-scale 
projects, where a combination of financial resources, advanced technical knowledge, 
and a long-term view beyond the resources and capability of any one state made joint 
activity economically desirable. The political feasibility of collaboration raised other 
questions, but for a time at least there developed a consensus on joint projects in areas 
such as the nuclear, space, and aviation sectors.
The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was set up alongside the 
European Community under the Treaty of Rome, with the intention of creating a 
European nuclear industry based upon the joint efforts of the member states. Euratom 
sought to co-ordinate the diverse activities of individual states, and also to provide a 
regulatory framework for the standards and safety of civil nuclear energy and materials 
at a time when a variety of civilian uses for nuclear energy was foreseen.
Four research laboratories were set up to co-ordinate activities - at Petten (Holland), 
Ispra (Italy), Geel (Belgium) and Karlsruhe (Germany) - and to foster collaborative 
work in areas such as fast breeder reactors, high temperature gas reactors, nuclear 
applications in medicine and other areas. Gradually the research agenda was broadened 
by the Euratom authority to take account of societal concerns over reactor safety, 
radioactive waste disposal, environmental protection, and increasingly the area of 
industrial standards, and satellites.
In the aviation industry, the Concorde and Airbus projects provided two examples of 
sectoral collaboration which produced very mixed results. The Concorde project was
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the result of Anglo-French collaboration to produce a high-technology long-range 
aircraft that would rival anything produced by US competitors in the aviation industry.
It was a project which exemplified the type of mission-oriented technology projects 
favoured by both the UK and France to sustain intemational strategic leadership and 
where resources were concentrated on a few areas identified by the central 
governments.*^ The Concorde project produced a small number of technically 
sophisticated aircraft for the French and British governments, but the experiment was 
dogged by the adverse market conditions of the 1970s, together with the growing 
disagreements of the two governments over the escalating financial costs of the project.
The Airbus industrial consortium was the outcome of joint discussions in 1966 by the 
governments of France, Germany and Britain with aircraft producers and airlines. The 
consortium, composed of one company from each country, set out to carve a particular 
market niche in the civilian aircraft sector with the production of the A-300 twin- 
engined wide-bodied plane, which was intended for medium- to long-range, and 
capacity up to 270 passengers. Soon afterwards, it followed its US competitor, Boeing, 
to produce a family of aircraft and by the mid-1980s had made significant inroads into 
the market. The most recent additions to the fleet, the A-320, the A-330, and the A-340, 
incorporated state-of-the-art technology.*^
Collaboration in space exploration and exploitation offers the strongest economic case 
for intemational collaboration, even though it is also the area where sovereignty and 
political prestige is perhaps most valued. However, in Europe pragmatism won out over 
nationalism, and the conventions for the European Launcher Development organisation 
(ELDO) and European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) were ratified in 1964. 
There was some difference between the two in terms of organisation and orientation - 
ELDO was concerned with applied science to produce a European launcher, and 
required a two-thirds majority approval for its budget, while ESRO concentrated on 
basic science and operated with a simple majority vote, each member state holding one 
vote.
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Each organisation experienced a variety of problems during the 1960s - from 
disagreements over costs, technical failures, to political differences (in the case of 
ESRO) over whether to concentrate on scientific satellites, or more market-oriented 
applications satellites. Eventually the two organisations were merged in 1973 to form 
the European Space Agency (ESA) which became a platform for the national 
programmes of the members.
ESA proved itself successful in collaboration on a functional basis, bringing together 
scientists from Europe and beyond to work on advanced technological activities of a 
non-commercial nature. The prime movers in this collaborative model were the national 
governments, whose budget contributions were linked to their national income. Apart 
from the obligation to contribute a certain amount to the mandatory activities of the 
agency, the national governments could elect what projects to participate in, and were 
able to secure contracts for their respective national firms from the ever-expanding range 
of activities.
European technological collaboration of the 1960s and 1970s was essentially sectoral, 
involving either high-technology industries or mature industries. In many respects, the 
policy was an extension of the 'national champions' approach at the European level, 
with mixed results across the various experiments.
In some cases, the lack of commitment by national governments and disagreements over 
priorities, financing, or the management of the ventures hindered collaboration. 
National strategic considerations and conflict with national programmes proved the 
stumbling blocks to further collaboration. Nevertheless, these early experiments in 
technological collaboration provided certain lessons that were to prove useful in the 
1980s.'*
One of the lessons was that European collaboration was possible, but it had to be based 
on identifiable common interests which could be sustained over the long term. A 
second and important lesson was that the involvement of industry was key to creating a 
technological community. The mixed results of the early collaboration projects were
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partly attributable to the focus of the collaboration - it often centred on areas of activity 
that governments, during the 1960s and the 1970s at any rate, regarded as the proper 
responsibility of national authorities, and they were reluctant to cede such authority. 
Intergovemmentalism could still operate as a force to hinder the integration process as 
far as some areas of technological collaboration were concerned.
The economic crisis of the 1970s, and the new economic orthodoxy that resulted, forced 
a reappraisal of the role of government. The view that markets were the most efficient 
means of allocating resources, including technological resources, came to be widely 
accepted by the beginning of the 1980s throughout the member states. Substantial 
public spending on large science and technology projects was no longer feasible, while 
at the same time greater levels of intemational competition put increased pressure on 
industry, and the gains went to those with the superior technological advantage.
1.3 Competitiveness in the 1980s and 1990s
The European Commission presented the case for a European technology policy in 
political-economic terms that stressed the need to improve the competitiveness of 
European industry. Through this political goal the interests of industry and of the 
national governments found a common expression. Competitiveness was presented by 
the European Commission in a memorandum published in 1985, entitled Towards a 
European Technological Community, in the general sense of Europe's relative position 
with the United States and Japan. It did not given any specific quantitative definition, 
but saw the encouragement of cooperation on research and technology between 
European industry and the academic community as key to improving the technological 
base of industry. In so avoiding more specific definitions of competitiveness, the 
Commission steered clear of any challenge to either national government philosophy 
and sovereignty, or to particular industrial interests.
A recent report fi"om the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD, 1996) pointed to the fact that there has been no agreement on how to define 
competitiveness, and noted that contradictory meanings can be found in the same report
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(p. 17). Part of the problem in assessing competitiveness is the tendency to apply the 
term at different levels - at the level of the firm, the industrial sector, the region, the 
national and supranational level. Some analyses have tried to examine several levels, 
for example Porter (1990). However, a key difficulty is that objectives differ depending 
on the particular level under consideration, and not all objectives will be given similar 
priorities by different actors. The question then must be, in evaluating outcomes, the 
extent to which we can or should decide that competitiveness has been achieved if there 
is a fundamental conflict between differing objectives.
The OECD report summarised the various approaches to the study on competitiveness 
into four categories, depending on their objectives and methods. In the ‘engineering’ 
approach competitiveness depends on the capability of firms to adopt the organisational 
and technical best practice (Dertouzos, 1989). The country’s competitiveness comprises 
the total competitiveness of its businesses, but in this approach is not measured 
explicitly. International trade theory would tend to examine differences in productivity 
and factor incomes as a guide to national competitiveness.
In the second category, the ‘environmental/systemic’ approach sees competitiveness as a 
function of the environment in which firms operate, rather than the internal processes 
and activities of the organisations themselves. This approach therefore focuses on the 
need to optimise the environment for industry - in terms of the in&astructure, the 
resources, the efficiency of market structures and the quality of the inputs (Ergas, 1984, 
Porter, 1990).
In the third category the ‘capital development’ approach applies at a broader level of 
analysis, to identify a country’s capacity to accumulate human and physical capital as 
key to its long-term competitiveness (Thurow, 1992, Tyson, 1992). This approach is 
less quantifiable than the previous two, and includes an element of subjective judgement 
in making international comparisons. Nonetheless it has the potential to generate a lot 
of debate, and has been used as a basis for policy proposals in recent years, not least in 
the United States (Reich, 1991).
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In the ‘eclectic/academic’ approach, subjectivity becomes much more prominent in the 
analysis, recognising the difficulties of measuring something 'which may not lend itself 
to precise quantification in the way that economic variables such as inflation, 
unemployment, or productivity can be measured. It views competitiveness as an area in 
which many variables can be contributing factors, not the least being the opinions, 
attitudes and expectations of economic and political actors (annual competitiveness 
reports. World Economic Forum). The OECD notes this category as pointing to the 
need for new research, using new analytical tools.
The European Community technology policy was aimed at improving the 
competitiveness of European industry, but until 1992 there was no attempt to offer a 
precise definition of competitiveness. There will inevitably be problems in evaluating 
the extent to which a programme meets a particular outcome, if the outcome is not 
defined 'with some degree of clarity. In the case of European Community technology 
collaboration programmes where support was confined to ‘pre-competitive’ 
collaborative research, the difficulties of evaluating the contribution to competitiveness 
are increased. In the Commission’s evaluation of the Second Framework Programme 
(SEC (92) 675) it commented ‘the transformation of scientific and technological 
progress into economic advantage is very difficult to measure..., whilst the effect of 
European collaboration has been clearly demonstrated in many areas, the measurement 
of direct effects on industrial competitiveness are more problematic, since R&D is only 
one element contributing to competitive advantage.’ Similar views were expressed by 
CREST, the advisory committee to the Council of Ministers and the Commission in its 
report on the programme, also published in 1992 - ‘the impact of the second Framework 
Programme on competitiveness is difficult to assess in view of the multi-faceted nature 
of international competitiveness, of which R&D is only one factor.’
Almost a decade after the European Framework Programme was launched, an attempt 
was made to provide some workable definition of competitiveness that could be used in 
the evaluation of the programme’s impact on European industry (Metcalfe, 1991). In 
some respects its findings advocated a form of eclecticism later on identified by the 
OECD. Competitiveness was viewed as a dynamic rather than a static concept, which
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could only be understood in its relative context, and could only be measured on a multi­
dimensional level. Technological advantage, as a source of competitiveness, must be 
seen as changing levels of knowledge, skills and artefacts among firms in international 
competition. An important conclusion of the Metcalfe et al. (1991) study was the 
emphasis on competitiveness as a process. The report’s conclusion, and indeed the 
findings of the OECD report, suggest that neither have offered the final word on 
competitiveness, and that it must remain an ever-moving target both for firms and for 
policy-makers.
What comes out of all of this is the subjectivity that is inherent in the analysis of 
competitiveness - so that actions and policies are often the result of perceptions and 
expectations of firms and policy-makers as to what the competitors are doing or might 
do in the future. This subjective assessment proved a major impetus in establishing the 
case for European common action on technology - the existence of a European 
technology gap which had to be closed in order to improve the competitiveness of 
industry. The political significance of this linkage for the integration process was 
enormous, both at the immediate level and in the longer term. At the immediate level, 
the technology policy found support with the diverse sectors of European industry, 
including those ill-served by earlier European policies that were designed to meet the 
priorities and security concerns of government more than those of industrial enterprise. 
In addition to the ESPRIT programme, directed at the information technology industry, 
and RACE, at the telecommunications sector, the BRJTE-EURAM programme singled 
out manufacturing industry at large.
Through the various collaborative technology programmes that gradually appeared, first 
as individual initiatives under the direction of the Commission, and from the mid-1980s 
under the umbrella of the Framework Programme, it seemed that industry was at last 
being specifically targeted by the supranational authority and brought more directly into 
the process of policy formulation. To all intents and purposes this was a market-based 
programme, bringing together economic actors in a network of technological alliances 
on a cross-border basis.
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Under the successive Framework Programmes that emerged during the 1980s and the 
1990s, organisations were invited to submit collaborative research projects for support 
under the formal programme. Both the culture of collaboration, and the particular trend 
towards technological alliances that had been appearing in the international economy at 
large were now to be formally supported by the supranational authority. In a sense, the 
approach to technology policy adopted during the 1980s sought to build the community 
from the bottom up. The following chapters, and particularly chapter three, will 
examine how this approach operated in practice.
The market-based approach also found support with the national governments for a 
number of reasons. In particular, the stated objective of industrial competitiveness 
struck a chord with member states regardless of their political persuasion or the specific 
domestic economic policies. As the neo-liberal economic climate spread throughout 
Europe bringing a convergence of economic policies, it also brought with it a greater 
focus on macro-economic management aimed at general stability, combined with a set 
of micro-economic policies to create an enabling environment for economic activity.
Membership of the European Community brought with it the obligation to observe 
community policies, including competition policy. This meant that national 
governments were unable to provide aid to domestic industry to the degree that had been 
done in the past. Even if governments wished to do so, however, the constraints 
imposed on them by the pursuit of anti-inflationary policies prevented it. The particular 
form of the policy adopted in the 1980s therefore placed a smaller financial burden on 
the individual member states than was the case a decade earlier. As such, European 
policy countered the limits to integration identified by Taylor in respect of the 
experience of the 1970s.^^
One of these limits concerned the question of finance. As the experience of technology 
collaboration in the 1970s, and the British position on budgetary rebates at the 
beginning of the 1980s showed, the risk of an escalating financial burden for member 
states acted as a brake on the process. It operated again in the Community negotiations 
on the overall Framework Programme budget, but this time the technology programmes
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avoided the type of research projects prone to cost escalation, and most were jointly 
funded by industry and the Commission. Once the actual Framework programme 
budget was agreed therefore, member state governments were assured that their 
financial contribution limit was set.
Another limit to the integration process identified by analysts was the extent of authority 
and sovereignty transfer. Clearly a problem for integration during the 1970s, and likely 
to recur in the future given the nature of states, the issue of sovereignty transfer was not 
addressed directly by the development of European technology policy because of the 
nature of the programme, and the approach adopted by the European Commission.
As a market-based programme, it targeted organisations in the private and public sectors 
so as to foster technology collaboration. But it offered little direct challenge to the 
national technology policies. Although the Commission had promised in 1985 to 
coordinate national policies with those of the Community, in fact it did not do so. 
Instead, it concentrated on establishing the broadest possible base of support for the 
technology community, at the grass roots level of the market.
The limits imposed on the integration process during the 1970s by the 
internationalisation of economic activity have been well documented by integration 
theorists of different persuasion.** Ernst Haas spoke of the turbulence in the 
international economy which could stop the process, while other analysts considered 
that interdependence would overshadow and ultimately subsume the integration 
process.*^ At that time, national governments responded to the internationalisation of 
economic activity by a fiill-scale retreat en masse on the domestic front, reducing the 
integration process to a trickle.
In the 1980s, the Community turned internationalisation to its own advantage by 
working with the trends towards international alliances rather than against them. The 
collaboration culture became the basis for Community-based activity through the 
Framework Programme, and more generally through the European Commission's 
pursuit of technology collaboration agreements with non-member countries. Instead of
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exerting a divisive influence, internationalisation was used as a basis for uniting the 
European Community partly by providing the conditions around which the Commission 
policy was structured.
The longer term political significance of the Community policy is perhaps only now 
becoming apparent. It stems from the essential nature of the policy which was defined 
in terms of the competitiveness agenda. In so doing, the supranational authorities 
determined the type of interests represented, and ultimately the community that would 
develop as a result. It represented the value system of the market, and was linked to 
economic interests rather than broader social interests. In effect, a particular path 
dependency was established that would present problems for policy development in the 
wake of the Maastricht treaty and the introduction of economic and social cohesion as 
policy objectives. Moreover, a community created on the basis of the market-related 
objective of competitiveness does not suggest stability unless it is integrated within a 
broader institutional framework.
This thesis is concered with the integration process developing through the European 
Commission’s attempts to establish a technological community. As such it is concerned 
with the subjectivity of the actors involved, and the material presented in the following 
chapters (particularly the empirical evidence from chapter six) attempts an ex post 
analysis of community building. The final chapter reviews the evidence, and also offers 
an ex ante analysis of the technology policy in terms of the potential for contributing to 
European economic and social cohesion.
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1.4 Theorising integration
The methodological approach taken to examine the process of community building 
through the involvement of actors from two of the member states of the European 
Community, Spain and the UK, in the BRITE-EURAM programme is borrowed and 
adapted from the neo-functionalist theory, because it featured a number of elements 
believed to be useful for the explanatory model. This section provides a brief 
examination of the various theoretical approaches to integration, examines the renewed 
attempt to theorise from the second half of the 1980s, and offers a critique of the various 
approaches.
1.4.1 Functionalism
David Mitrany's exposition of functionalism provided an early explanation for the 
integration process with its focus on private actors at sub-national and supranational 
level who saw benefit in cooperation on functional issues.^^ The cooperation would 
take place through the mechanism of a supranational institution which operated on the 
basis of the transfer of authority by states over the functional issue. Repeated 
cooperation would create a learning effect, and the actors would identify the institution 
as the most effective and appropriate means of carrying out the functional task.
Cooperation was directed at 'making use of the present social and scientific 
opportunities to link together particular activities and interests, one at a time, according 
to need and acceptability, giving each a joint authority and policy limited to that activity 
alone.’^  ^ In this way functionalism was regarded as the best way of meeting the 
common interest. Mitrany argued that international cooperation would work, since there 
was an evident identity of every-day social aims and policy', and close similarity of 
ways and means'.^^
Functionalism minimised the importance of sovereignty, claiming that the functional 
approach does not offend against the sentiment of nationality or the pride of
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sovereignty'.^^ The transfer of authority would not challenge national sovereignty, and 
it was even considered that states would not be concerned about the possibility of losing 
sovereignty. In fact, as states came to see the value of the supranational institution's 
actions in carrying out the functional task, and the ensuing benefits accruing for all, 
further tasks would be assigned to the supranational institution, with an increasing 
disregard by states for the loss of authority over the additional tasks assigned. The 
outcome of the social cooperation was predicted to be the creation of a political 
community.
A certain idealism may be identified in the functionalist explanation, which was not so 
readily identifiable through empirical studies. "^  ^The main criticism of this approach was 
that it gave insufficient attention to the political aspects of cooperation and sovereignty 
transfer. Critics argued that the technical could not, as the theory proposed, be separated 
from the political.^^ Neo-functionalism borrowed certain ideas from functionalism and 
added a political element to explain the experience of integration.
Three elements were adopted by neo-fimctionalism - the upgrading of common interests 
which the supranational institution fostered through its operation, the institutionalised 
procedures that were necessary for consensus, and the functional tasks around which 
cooperation was based.^^
1.4.2 Neo-frmctionalism
The process of integration began, according to the theory, in pressures within the 
economic sector to which national interest groups responded by supporting a transfer of 
authority to a central institution to carry out the necessary assigned tasks. At the 
national level the interest groups acted on the basis of common interests, and where the 
success of the initial task prompted further pressures in related areas this gave rise to 
additional claims and demands on the central authority, in other words a spillover 
process operated. Where the initial task assigned is inherently expansive, and the 
integrative success established, a process of task-expansion develops which is marked 
by a shift of demands, expectations and loyalties to the central authority.
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In the neo-fimctionalist analysis, Ernst Haas stated that the elite groups 'have a decisive 
manipulative role' since they encourage the spillover mechanism, creating what he saw 
as the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and 
larger centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting 
national states.'^^
According to neo-functionalism, the integration process developed through three 
possible forms of spill-over dynamics. In this apparently simple and ultimately artificial 
concept lay the key to the process. Functional spill-over stemmed from the assumption 
of an interdependent economic sector, where integration initiated pressures in related 
areas and created demands for further integration if only to protect the original gain, 
leading in turn to further pressures and so on. The neo-functionalist school tended to 
accept this assumption of interdependence without examination or questioning of the 
exact nature of this interdependence. Changes in the structures of production and the 
location of economic activity make it difficult to hold up this assumption.
The second type of spill-over, political spill-over, inevitably followed from the 
assumption of interdependence and functional integration. It suggested the gradual 
shifting of expectations, demands and loyalties to the supranational level and to the 
reformulation and articulation of interests at this level. In addition, it presupposed that 
the supranational elites would not only work together to establish common interests, but 
also that they continued to articulate the disaggregated interests of those below the 
national level. Whether this can in fact be the case is really a matter not simply of 
debate but requires empirical investigation. The discord that attended the political 
debates surrounding the Maastricht treaty suggested there were many groups and 
individuals who felt themselves excluded from the process both at the national and the 
supranational level.
The third type of spill-over, the upgrading of common interests, resulted from the 
mediating role of the supranational authority. Under this category, the European
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Commission could provide the solution to differing positions and interests of member 
states, and suggest a compromise in the negotiated positions that in effect represents a 
common interest while in all probability extends the power and influence of the 
supranational authority.
The extension of the political agenda of European technology policy beyond industrial 
competitiveness to economic and social cohesion, which is examined in chapter eight, 
could be considered in terms of the upgrading of common interests. More generally, the 
role played by the European Commission under Jacques Delors, from 1984 onwards, 
suggests such type of spill-over, and it was facilitated further through the legislative 
impact of the Single European Act and the Maastricht treaty. Yet, the extension of the 
agenda in European policy by the early 1990s from a concern with competitiveness to 
economic and social cohesion must inevitably mean a shift in the configuration of 
interests, and an introduction of a new set of actors, such as public and regional 
authorities, education bodies and social groups, with non-market based priorities. In 
effect, there is a whole new set of social relations beyond the narrow base established by 
the competitiveness agenda.
One of the responsibilities of the supranational institution was to upgrade common 
interests in order to create consensus and a political community. But a political 
community was more feasible according to Haas where the task or tasks assigned to it 
were functionally specific.^* Hoffinan identified greater opportunity for integration in 
areas of low politics that did not challenge the sovereignty of national governments, 
rather than high politics.^^ The creation of the political community would, in any 
eventuality, take place on a gradual basis through a process of incremental decision­
making by the supranational institution, a view of the integration process that was 
shared by economists.^®
Focusing on economic actors, neo-fimctionalism attributed the motives behind their 
behaviour to rational self-interest, thus borrowing from orthodox economic theory to 
explain and understand the behaviour of economic agents. Similar motives were 
ascribed to the other actors in the process, the elite groups who represented the interests
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concerned and additionally the supranational institution. In the context of the latter, the 
implication is that the supranational institution will seek to expand its own capacity to 
influence and direct the community.
Neo-functionalist theory considered the main actors in the process to be economic 
actors, interest groups and elite groups at the national and the supranational level, who 
represented the economic interests, together with the supranational institution or central 
authority. The integration process is constituted by the interaction between these 
groups, with the state being regarded, certainly in the early formulations of the theory, as 
being secondary. According to Haas, 'integration is conceptualised as resulting from an 
institutionalised pattern of interest politics played out within existing international 
organisations.'^^
This theoretical formulation viewed community building as a process of managing 
competing interests, and in this sense offered a more detailed view of interests and 
cooperation than was presented by functionalism. Neo-functionalism acknowledged the 
possibility of a conflict of interests, and of the need to manage the process to reach a 
consensus through some agreed framework provided by the supranational institution.
Elite groups became socialised through a learning process associated with greater 
interaction among other elites at the supranational level, and bound together by the self- 
interests referred to earlier. As a result of learning, the groups responded to integrative 
pressures by following up this interaction, provided that the further integrative step did 
not threaten their interests. In effect, the theory considered the elite group as a rational 
actor, and capable of recognising the potential of spillover so that all political action is 
purposively linked with individual or group perception of interest.'
Private interest groups were considered to extend their lobbying activity beyond the 
national level, as the range of activities undertaken by the supranational institution 
broadened. In addition, the number of interest groups at the supranational level (peak 
associations) was expected to increase, as groups see that an increasing amount of 
decisions are made at the European level. In order to ensure that their own interests.
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demands and expectations were met, more private interest groups were expected to 
locate in Brussels to become closer to the centre of influence/^
A difficulty arises in this view of interest group behaviour where the elites and interest 
groups cannot channel the expectations and demands of their members, or seriously 
miscalculate the extent to which they do in fact represent the broader interests of their 
constituents. Such was the case in the recent experience of the European Community, 
notably within the individual member states in the conduct of referenda on the 
Maastricht t r e a ty R e ce n t  research also suggests that in fact elite groups may be less 
influential at the European level than the theory assumes.^^
One reason for the limited influence of interest groups may be the fact that groups are 
smaller in organisation, and operate on a more dispersed basis, with many continuing to 
articulate interests and seeking to influence policy at the national level.^^ In the 
economic sector, for instance, internationalisation and the competitive pressures of the 
market may contribute to division rather than to collective interest representation. The 
lack of homogeneity in the economic sector does not provide for an easy identification 
of common interest as the basis for interest group activity.
Weak interest representation need not mean that integration is therefore impossible, but 
it does highlight the need to find ways of representing such disaggregated interests. In 
the context of technology policy, there was a very weak representation of interests by 
the business peak associations, so that the European Commission stepped in to create an 
industrial interest group in the Industrial Research and Development Advisory 
Committee (IRDAC).
Neo-fimctionalism need not fail in the attempt to explain integration simply because of 
the fact that interest groups are not observed to behave as the theory would suggest. 
There has been, as was noted above, a change in the structure of interest groups. 
Technological change has had an enormous impact on communication in general, 
eliminating distance and facilitating instant, face-to-face communication on an
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individual basis over a global space. As a consequence, the hierarchical organisation of 
interests is less evident than a more diffused system of representation.
Even before the introduction of a European technology policy promoting cross-border 
collaboration, a pattern of international alliances had begun appearing from the late 
1970s. So there was less immediate perception of a need to establish additional interest 
representation channels. There is another side to this point about the relaxed nature of 
interest representation at the supranational level towards the technology policy, 
however. International technological alliances involve risks and transaction costs for 
those involved - finding partners, allocating and distributing resources, protecting the 
results of collaborative research, and commercialisation of the results.^^ The 
supranational institution can reduce the transaction costs and cover the information 
requirements that increase with the level of cross-border activity by economic actors. 
As chapter three shows, this was an important element in the development of technology 
policy. The policy in general, and the BRITE-EURAM programme in particular, 
involved economic actors directly and the Commission often bypassed national 
governments in the implementation of the policy. Consequently, reducing the 
transaction costs was a vital aspect to the supranational institution's responsibility 
towards creating a technological community.
In addition, the internationalisation of economic activity left national governments less 
able to influence economic actors, while the latter sought more appropriate 
supranational institutional support for business activity. As the success of the European 
technology policy depended totally on the direct involvement of economic actors, and 
on the extent to which they were prepared to participate in collaboration under the 
various programmes, the 'privileged position of business' facilitated their access to the 
European authority. Charles Lindblom had identified, in 1977, the ability of business to 
extract benefits and incentives from government in return for merely carrying out 
market activities, an aspect of firm behaviour not recognised by the neo-classical 
economic view of the market.^*
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1.5 Contending theoretical perspectives
By the end of the 1980s, integration theory had revived with the renewed activity in the 
European Community, following the Single European Act of 1987, which led to 
institutional changes at Community level, and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, various 
contending theories were put forward to explain the processes. It is not the intention 
here to provide a detailed evaluation of these different approaches, although reference 
will be made to studies that have done so. Instead, this section will provide a brief 
sketch of the theoretical areas to highlight areas of difference and to indicate why neo- 
fimctionalism remains the most useful approach.
Neo-fimctionalist theory was criticised for giving a secondary role to the state. By the 
end of the 1970s states came to be seen as effectively operating a brake on the process of 
integration.^^ From the mid-1970s interdependence theorists argued that the growing 
web of economic links among countries had created a dense pattern of interaction, 
making individual national economies susceptible to external forces that could act as a 
counterweight to the particular economic policies of the state. Increasing levels of 
economic transactions need not lead, according to the interdependence school, to 
pressures for integration.
Keohane and Nye, two of the leading interdependence theorists, argued that the effect 
could even be to diffuse integration pressures."^  ^Undoubtedly, the uncertainty that was a 
feature of the international economic system throughout the 1970s, following the 
collapse of the international monetary system and a slowdown in growth together with 
general stagflation gave a sense of pessimism that left countries unwilling to take risks 
on the international front, preferring to adopt defensive domestic policies. Haas was 
forced to conclude that the turbulence in the international economy had led to the 
obsolescence of regional integration theory."*^  Webb suggested that the best contribution 
of the interdependence approach had been to show up the incomplete nature of the EC 
as an integrated regional structure."^  ^More generally, interdependence writers were not 
interested in cooperation or institution-building in the way envisaged by neo- 
fimctionalism.
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However, interdependence did not go away during the 1980s, while the renewed 
integration forced some attempt at explanation. Keohane and Nye had suggested that 
external forces could have an influence in promoting integration, even unwittingly."^  ^ In 
1991 Keohane and Hof&nan offered a similar argument, based on the belief that the 
institutional changes were a response to international challenges and threats."^ "* The 
evidence in chapter three suggests that European technology policy was introduced by 
the Commission on the basis of the need to strengthen the industrial base and close 
Europe's technology gap with the United States and Japan. In this sense it was a 
defensive strategy. But in effect the design of technology policy was more nuanced, 
recognising that business interests would be directly and actively involved in order to 
ensure the success of the policy. But it had to be an open policy, with possibilities for 
European firms to also collaborate with non-European, so as not to foreclose on 
potential profits.
During the 1980s theorists sought to give the state a much more direct and active role in 
the way that the integration process was moving."*  ^ Ultimately, this polarisation of the 
theoretical views regarding the role of the state is not helpful in that the views adopt 
contradictory positions that often do not accord with practice. The logical implications 
of internationalisation and interdependence could be that states are ineffectual, which is 
to a large extent what the neo-fimctionalist analysis was saying. Yet, states have also at 
various times given positive support to the integration process, the Single Market 
Programme being one of those times.
Relaunching the neo-fimctionalist debate, Tranholm-Mikkelsen saw in the Single 
European Act and the resulting programme to create a unified market the re-emergence 
of the logic of spill-over."^  ^ The programme extended its pressures into the social space, 
and to the notion of a single currency. Alongside the extension of the scope of the 
supranational authority, there was a shift in the institutional balance, with the 
introduction of the co-decision procedure allowing more involvement by the European 
Parliament in decision-making. The functional spill-over would be acknowledged by
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both neo-fimctionalists and by their neo-realist critics, while disputing the precise nature 
of the cause-effect relationships involved.
Moravcsik regarded the Single European Act as the outcome of a bargaining process 
between the powerful member states, with each bargaining from the position of the 
interests determined within the state."^  ^ The particular approach which he used 
inevitably led back to domestic interests, and particularly to state interests. However, 
there is no guarantee that state interest and society's interest will necessarily coincide.
The eventual outcome of the Single European Act was really the culmination of a 
convergence of political and economic interests among the major states of the 
Community, 'establishing the essential conditions for reform.'"^* It may be more useful 
therefore to look at the consequent process in order to establish where or indeed whether 
there is evidence of community building. Moravcsik's conclusion suggests some unease 
with the view that 'the primary source of integration lies in the interests of the states 
themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels' when he goes on to add that 
the intergovernmental approach demonstrates that even this explanation is incomplete.' 
Certainly, focusing on sources of power, and relative power differences can go only 
some way to clarifying integrative forces and trends, in a world where power sources 
change with such rapidity and frequency."^^
In an effort to refine his approach, Moravcsik proposes a liberal intergovemmentalist 
conception which recognises the role of states, while giving some place to the 
supranational institution in supporting the inter-state bargains made by sovereign 
governments.^® He uses this analysis of inter-state bargains and institutional activity to 
study the outcome of the Single Market and other major decisions in the Community. 
The analysis makes much use of relative power, using a strongly neo-realist concept that 
must inevitably rule out any consideration of smaller and less powerful actors in the 
process, whether state or non-state actors.
Cameron viewed the Single European Act as the result of a combination of forces, with 
some of the elements in the outcome explained by the neo-fimctionalist framework, and
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others by a neo-realist interpretation of events/^ In particular, the role of the European 
Commission was construed as the supranational authority exercising a leadership role 
following from the grant of initial responsibility for tasks that were inherently 
expansive. The commitment to create the single market, followed by the commitments 
made at Maastricht to proceed towards monetary union within the target date, suggested 
the kind of incremental gradualism of neo-functionalist theory.
However, a review of the part played by the European Council in the few years before 
the signing of the Single European Act led Cameron to conclude that states still exerted 
a deal of influence, as neo-realist arguments would conclude.^^ He places the 
responsibility for the form of the Community 'with the air of a forum in which member 
states pursued their particular national interests and bargaining, negotiating and forming 
coalitions and alliances with other member states' firstly on the attitude of the British 
prime minister, and from 1990 on the tensions and pressures within the Community as a 
result of widening and relations with Eastern Europe.^^
Cameron, like Moravcsik, identified domestic economic circumstances within the 
member states as key to the eventual agreement on the single market programme, which 
created political pressures at national level to which the national governments could not 
respond. At the supranational level, there was a balance between the European 
Commission, as policy entrepreneur, and the European Council, as gatekeeper. It was, 
according to Cameron, the council which consistently provided the policy leadership in 
the early 1980s necessary for the development of the internal market, by expressing its 
alarm over the present state of the market, by continually requesting reports from the 
Commission, and by occasionally prodding the Commission and the Council of 
Ministers to work more expeditiously in preparing proposals that would contribute to 
the creation of a single market.' "^^
Both Cameron and Moravcsik adopt a retrospective view, taking account of the 
historical circumstances that led to the eventual outcome. This approach is a favoured 
one among integration analysts. But it tends to give only a partial view, and fails to 
offer any insight into the actual integration process that follows the initial integrative
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step. There is no examination of how or to what extent domestic structures are 
integrated into the supranational structure. Nor is there any examination of the adaptive 
changes in the social and political relations at the national level. This surely is an 
important part of the integration process, and a useful indicator of the possibility for 
further integrative pressures.
Instead, we are left with the focus on either the member states as negotiating and 
bargaining towards a least threatening outcome, or on the European Commission as an 
influential policy entrepreneur. In Cameron's analysis, the decision by the member 
states to push forward with the internal market could be equally seen as a form of 
upgrading of the common interest, particularly given the increased level of trade 
between them. And there has never been a suggestion that early Commission proposals 
for a unified market would lead to a higher level of integration, and greater loss of 
sovereignty among the member states than that eventually agreed to by the European 
Council.
Certainly there was a great deal of theoretical debate over the developments in the 
European Community, but little agreement on the precise causes. A number of studies 
arrived at different conclusions. Sandholtz and Zysman regarded the SEA as the 
outcome of elite bargains that were prompted by the changes in the international 
economy and in the domestic political structure, identifying it as a defensive strategy.^^ 
In a study of environmental policy, Huelshoff and Pfeiffer concluded that the member 
states played a gatekeeping role in the political process associated with the development 
of policy, fighting against any loss of national sovereignty.^^ But they also note that the 
Commission was determined to achieve the single market at all costs, and that this 
determination had a detrimental effect on environmental policy.^^
Even if the Commission had focused more on environmental policy it would have made 
little difference, as there was little shared concern among the EC members. Their 
conclusion that the impetus for change in the EC comes from elite groups such as 
business or from heads of state, and not from nationally-based environmental groups 
accords with the stance of Sandholtz and Zysman.^*
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A similar pessimistic conclusion regarding the integration process was arrived at by 
Leibfried and Pierson, in a study of the Social Policy of the Community/^ The role of 
the member state continued to determine the pace of policy development, with 
governments seeing the EC as a mechanism for overcoming their own incapacities, so 
that only where national solutions fail will supranational options be considered.^® The 
authors identify the likelihood of a path dependency stemming from initial social policy 
choices and that 'options chosen - or rejected - now will influence the competencies of 
EC administrators, the resources and strategies of political actors, and the development 
of norms governing EC activities.'^ ^
With such pessimism being centred upon the theoretical inadequacies of existing theory, 
some analysts sought to achieve the best of all worlds through combining several 
existing theories. In efforts to address the perceived inadequacies of existing theory, 
Cornett and Caporaso applied a mix of neo-classical economic theory, neo-realism, 
neoliberal institutionalism, and functionalism and neo-functionalism to explain the 
renewed integration process - using the theoretical combination to explain the observed 
events rather than to test the theories chosen.^^ This type of approach only serves to 
illustrate the complexity of the processes that are operating alongside changing domestic 
and international political and social structures.
The perception of reluctance by the national governments to concede sovereignty has 
given the centre stage, for now anyway, to theoretical explanations that emphasise the 
neo-realist view of the state as primary actor. These explanations centre upon relative 
power and bargaining strategies, with states retaining their domestic goals which are 
determined on the basis of domestic interests and preferences. Neo-liberal 
institutionalism starts from these premises and extends the analysis to include the role of 
international institutions in promoting order.^^
No doubt, the European Commission has played a key role as a policy entrepreneur 
which, as Ludlow pointed out, was developed 'without any major redefinition of the 
constitutional role of the Commission, or any fundamental restructuring of the
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organisation itself.'^ In his insightful review of the supranational institution's structure 
and operation, Ludlow refutes the idea of the 'adversarial' model of Commission- 
Council relations. Instead, the Council needs the Commission for the latter's leadership 
role and to implement policy in the general European interest. The Commission could 
not carry out these roles without regular interaction with national governments.
This is probably a more accurate, if ultimately less exciting view of the Council- 
Commission interaction than neo-realists are prepared to credit. In the case of European 
technology policy, the encouragement and management of cross-border technological 
alliances could not have been conducted effectively with the remit of the national 
government. On the other hand, the management role of the European Commission 
may not be sufficient in itself to deliver the interest group support, and the requisite 
change in attitudes, expectations, and demands that neo-fimctionalist theory predicted.
Upgrading the common interest may in practice mean a continuation of the status quo, 
through a failure of the Commission, with or without the member state governments, to 
ensure the adequate representation of a diverse range of interests. Again, with reference 
to technology policy, extending the range of policy objectives to include economic and 
social cohesion raises the question of creating a whole new set of political and social 
relations. Unless this can be achieved, the policy merely serves to maintain the existing 
stage of the integration process.
Some neo-fimctionalist analyses have begun to address the question of the linkage 
between the supranational and national structures, beyond the purely supranational- 
national government level. Burley and Mattli examined the operation of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) from a neo-fimctionalist perspective, looking at the way in which 
the operations of the Court created a community encompassing private litigants, 
lawyers, and the lower national courts, the national law associations and community law 
professors.^^ Their argument was that the community thus created had strong micro­
foundations, with strong self-interest motives binding the national and supranational 
level actors. Legal integration was observable through 'the gradual penetration of EC 
law into the domestic law of its member states.'^^ In the context of the approach used in
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this thesis, what Burley and Mattli observed was a gradual integration of the (legal) 
institutional systems.
In particular, the operation of the ECJ gave individual litigants a personal stake in 
community law and in doing so strengthened its own legitimacy. The decisions of the 
Court, nonetheless, always advanced community goals. But crucial to the community- 
creating role was the 'social contract' which the Court established with the citizens of 
the European Community - that in becoming citizens of the EC, with the duties that such 
citizenship imposed, they were also entitled to corresponding rights.^^
In giving actors at the grass roots such a stake in the process, the ECJ on occasion gave 
judgements that were not in the national interest. Yet, the conflict between national 
interest and citizen's interest was recognised, and decided on in favour of the citizen. 
Other analysts from neo-functionalism and from neo-realism have not tended to address 
this question, and so avoided an examination of the interaction between actors at the 
micro, national and supranational level.
Yet, if neo-functionalism proposes an integration process that is based on actors 
interests, and the changes in actors expectations and demands, it is necessary to look at 
other interests besides those of the member state. The failure of the revised neo­
functionalist theory to adequately make use of the frill range of its conceptual 
methodology, including the micro-foundations, has prevented a proper test of the theory 
and its predictions.
There is a tendency among integration analysts to discard particular theories if the 
process does not appear to accord v^th the predictions of the theory.^^ Or to look for 
one-way flows of sovereignty, expectations, demands and so on, giving again a limited 
perspective that ignores the multi-level interactions emerging within the European 
Community.^^ A recent contribution to the theory makes the case for adopting a longer- 
term perspective in assessing the integration process, so as to take account of the ebbs 
and flows that are a part of the process, rather than simply discounting the theory with 
the first ebb of the integrative tide.^° National political structures have themselves
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evolved gradually over time. There is no reason to expect otherwise in the context of 
the European Community.
1.5.1 Applying the theory
Much of the theoretical analyses of integration have as the starting point the state as the 
primary actor, and concerns are focused largely on the aspects of power, shifts in power 
between state actors and associated bargaining strategies used to arrive at particular 
outcomes. These theoretical approaches suffer, therefore, from one of the weaknesses 
that has been identified in the political unit that is now known as the European Union - 
that is, the exclusion of large numbers of individuals and groups from the political 
processes in existence. It is in many respects a static analysis, telling us very little about 
changes over time. Instead, the focus is upon a particular outcome or outcomes.
None of the analyses referred to in the preceding section was concerned with smaller 
actors, or with non-state actors. This thesis attempts to redress the balance by choosing 
a less powerful actor, in the case of Spain, and also organisations outside the frame of 
supranational interest groups. The aim is to examine a process of integration, to assess 
whether changes in attitudes, expectations and loyalties occur as a result of the 
collaborative experience which is here regarded as a form of political process.
Furthermore, outcomes are of less immediate concern than the examination of the on­
going process of integration. To focus simply on an outcome has the effect of 
narrowing the perspective. In studying the implementation of policy rather than the 
policy outcome, it will be possible to isolate the social relations at the national and the 
supranational level. Although the behaviour under scrutiny involves a set of economic 
activities, these activities form part of a broader set of social relations at the national and 
supranational level. The economic activities of the market are in fact supported, or 
constrained, by a set of relations which comprise the institutional system.
To illustrate, an organisation's research and technological development is a function of 
the internal resources, but also of external aspects such as government support for
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technology and the particular form of that support, the availability and range of outside 
research and technology organisations, and the state of technological knowledge and the 
possibility of access to that technological knowledge. Each of these comprise a further 
set of relations in what is essentially an overlapping, and hierarchical system. 
Government support for technology, for instance, can be directed at basic research, or 
applied research, or towards the diffusion of technical knowledge over a wide area of the 
economy. Financial support can also take various forms, from direct subsidy to capital 
grant, low-interest loan, training grants and various financial resources on a short or 
long-term basis covering a variety of purposes.
The state of technological knowledge is a function of the individual, independent efforts 
in research and development, and of the more general educational system, together with 
less formal aspects such as international collaboration, conferences, journals and 
research reports. The increased volume of transactions in an increasingly competitive 
international economy has been matched by rising flows of international technology. 
One risk for some economies and organisations is centred upon the loss of new 
knowledge created, the traditional free-rider problem, with the consequent, rapid erosion 
of technological and competitive advantage. Under such conditions, it is important to 
have some system of protection for the owners of new knowledge in its various forms - 
intellectual property rights and patent law are two aspects of the institutional system that 
help to guarantee the ownership, and also that encourage the initial efforts in research 
and development. Where new technological knowledge is created through international 
collaboration on a cross-border basis, it then becomes necessary to develop 
supranational institutional systems that provide a framework for these activities.
The risks may not centre upon the possible loss of the ownership of knowledge, but 
upon an inability of the technological system to create new knowledge, or to access 
technology to the extent of meeting all the needs of the system. Where organisations 
engaged in research and technological development, industrial or otherwise, have 
limited internal technological resources, and limited access to such resources on an 
external basis either at present or for the foreseeable future, the technological capability 
of the system is restricted. Like the organisation that secures competitive advantage on
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the basis of being the sole owner of a particular technology, the institutional system 
which possesses technological capability can secure advantage and maintain that 
advantage.
Applying this analysis to the context of European technology policy, and the market- 
based R&D collaboration programmes that comprise it, the more advanced national 
technological systems will secure an advantage over those that are less well placed. The 
result will be an evolving community with uneven and unequal participation by the 
members. Weak technological capability effectively excludes certain members from an 
equal position in the community, from securing a greater share of the benefits and the 
chance to improve the technological capability. The stronger the national institutional 
system, in terms of technological capability and resources, the better-placed the 
institutional system is within the integration process and thus more likely to benefit from 
it.
Moving from the national to the supranational level, certain observations can be made 
about the nature of the integration process and the form of the evolving community. 
While the review of theoretical approaches to integration suggests there is little 
agreement on the form and nature of the political community, generally there is an 
unwillingness to abandon either the national or supranational as the main level upon 
which integration processes operate, or to target one level over the other. Taylor's 
conclusion that what is being observed represents 'a  paradoxical assertion of 
separateness at the same time as a determined adhesion to the collectivity', while at the 
same time acknowledging the reemergence of neo-functionalist dynamics reflects the 
general uncertainty over the form of the community.^*
The empirical work carried out on policy developments in areas such as environmental 
policy and social policy, and referred to in the preceding section on theoretical 
approaches to integration, indicated the market-bias that affected the type of policy 
actually implemented, and consequently the form of environmental and social 
communities that began to emerge. In both cases, the desire to secure the single market 
at all costs influenced the European Commission and the national actors, to the extent of
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including some actors and excluding others. The ideology of the market and the idea of 
a perfectly operating market influenced the eventual form of the community. So long as 
such ideas, with their underlying ideology, continue to form the views of the political 
interests at the supranational and national level then the community will include those 
who hold those ideas and exclude those who do not.
In the context of a European technology policy, which is market-based and operates 
alongside a well-developed pattern of international alliances among the international 
business community, similar observations may be made. While it is conceivable for the 
Commission, and the national authorities to want to establish a market-based 
technological community at the European level, not all member states and organisations 
may be able to secure the maximum benefit from it without at the same time having the 
necessary technological capability. The latter depends on more than market-based 
activities, instead taking into account broader aspects of the national institutional system 
discussed above. In effect, national level activity continues to be important, not simply 
on the basis of the state's desire to protect something as nebulous as sovereignty, but 
because national level activity remains essential to securing the capability to take full 
advantage of Community-level developments. National level activity in the area of 
technology remains important because a market-based technology community cannot 
secure all the needs of the national innovation system.
1.5.2 The hypotheses
Taking account of the foregoing critique of integration theory, this thesis undertakes an 
application of the theory to the implementation of one of the European technology 
programmes - BRITE-EURAM. Neo-fimctionalism provides a useful framework of 
analysis, in that it identifies the role of non-state actors and changing interests in the 
process of integration. As a functional issue which is largely, but not exclusively, 
located in the realm of low politics technology policy is a very appropriate area for 
analysis at both the level of the market and the technological institutional system. 
Again, Burley and Mattli viewed the neo-functionalist theory as having 'enduring
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relevance as a description of the integrative process within a sector', with its theoretical 
analysis that was based upon 'actors, motives, process, and context.'^^
In the application of the theory, some effort is made to address the omissions and 
weaknesses already identified. The thesis accepts the leadership role of the European 
Commission, and goes on to consider how the Commission sought to build a 
community from the grass roots level. The particular nature of the community that did 
in fact result through the programme is questioned, as the Commission introduces the 
concept of economic and social cohesion, with an implicit new value system that is 
thereby entailed.
The research identifies the inadequate role of interest groups in the representation of 
diverse interests, and sees the Commission exercise its management skills to fill the 
resulting vacuum by acting as a policy entrepreneur and cultivating spill-over through 
the upgrading of common interests.
The assumption underlying this approach is that institutional structures determine the 
technological capabilities of the micro-level actors, and thus have an important role to 
play in the process of creating a technological community. At the same time, structures 
differ across the member states and while community building does not require a full 
convergence of structures towards a Community model, certain adaptation of the 
structures are observed.
In particular, some attention is given to the micro-level actors so as to identify changing 
attitudes and demands associated with the integration process. One of the difficulties 
that has been associated with integration was the degree to which ordinary individuals 
did not feel part of the process. In their study of the European Court of Justice, Burley 
and Mattli offered some indication that it was possible to integrate such actors, just as 
the Maastricht referenda highlighted the necessity of so doing.^^
Two hypotheses will be tested against the empirical evidence presented in the following 
chapters. The first hypothesis is that national institutional capability is a key
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determinant in the integration process. The second hypothesis centres upon the nature 
of the supranational community that is envisaged and in the process of formation. It 
states that the underlying ideology and ideas influence the nature of the community, 
creating in the case of European technology policy, a market-based community. The 
effect is to largely exclude other interests from the technology community, and to lock 
in the community to a particular form. The difficulty then arises when the European 
Commission attempts to upgrade the common interests. Technology policy may not be 
able to secure broader objectives such as economic and social cohesion on the basis of a 
community serving purely market-related goals.
The methodological approach adopted to test these two hypotheses uses a three-level 
mode of analysis which examines the behaviour of supranational groups, including the 
European Commission as the supranational authority; the national authorities operating 
within national technological systems; and at the micro-level, the firms, universities and 
research centres that participate in the European Community’s BRITE-EURAM 
programme. The three-level analysis is intended to identify patterns of behaviour as a 
result of the Community initiative to suggest changes in attitudes, expectations, and 
loyalties on the part of actors, along the lines suggested by the neo-functionalist 
hypothesis. The micro-level actors, participants in the European Community 
programme from the United Kingdom and Spain, are surveyed over a three-year period 
and the results of both surveys are presented in chapter six. A key concern of the 
inquiry is the nature of actors expectations and attitudes towards the national and the 
supranational authorities. Additional supporting material relating to the national 
technological institutions is put forward in chapters four and five.
Supporting evidence for the second hypothesis comes from an examination of the 
BRITE-EURAM programme, the particular path of its development and the priorities of 
the actors involved in programme evolution and management. Interviews were 
conducted with personnel in the European Commission, supranational groups such as 
UNICE, ETUC, European Parliament, and the Economic and Social Committee. In 
addition, interviews were conducted at the national level with government officials and 
various personnel involved in the national technological systems of the two countries
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under consideration. The concluding chapter will argue on the basis of the evidence that 
the European Community has developed a market-oriented programme, serving market- 
led goals, and created in the process a narrow-based technological community unable 
and unwilling to consider broader goals such as economic and social cohesion.
This first chapter concludes with a brief overview of the organisation of the remainder 
of the thesis. Chapter two examines the trends in international alliances during the 
1980s, which provided a ready made culture of collaboration that the European 
Commission turned to its advantage in formulating a policy to encourage technological 
collaboration. As the chapter shows, a variety of motives for alliances were identified 
that did not rest solely with the technological, so that the Commission had still some 
way to go to convince the industrial interests of the benefits of a technological 
community.
Chapter three examines the development of the BRITE-EURAM programme, and the 
role played by the Commission and other supranational interests in policy formulation. 
The evidence of the chapter points to the increasing capacity of the supranational 
authority, and to its desire to build the community fi*om the base. How well it 
succeeded is examined in chapter seven and eight.
Following the examination in chapter three of the policy developments at the 
supranational level, the next two chapters return to the national level. Chapter four 
looks at the development of the UK national technological system, and identifies the 
major actors within the institutional structure that played a significant part in exerting 
pressures for changes to this structure over the past decade. Chapter five offers a 
contrast to the UK technological system, and to European integration generally, in the 
context of the newly-developing Spanish technological system and in the role played by 
national elites, including the leadership role adopted by the Spanish government.
Based on the conceptual firamework of neo-functionalism, chapter six assesses the extent 
of changes in the attitudes, expectations and demands of the UK and Spanish 
participants under the BRITE-EURAM programme from the evidence of a survey
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conducted over a three-year period. The first survey was carried out in September 1992, 
just before the re-appearance of tensions within the European Community, and the 
second one in September 1995, just after the European Union ratified the Fourth 
Framework Programme. While the time period is not very long in terms of obtaining 
detail on substantive changes, the preceding chapters four and five adopt a slightly 
longer time-frame to examine the institutional structures in the United Kingdom and 
Spain.
The concluding chapters seven and eight evaluate the progress towards the technological 
community that was envisaged by the European Commission in the early years of the 
1980s, and assesses the real nature of the evolving technological community. While the 
thesis notes some success in terms of what has been achieved, it questions the ultimate 
stability of a market-based community, held together solely by the members common 
interest in competitiveness, once the Commission seeks to extend the objectives of the 
technological community to economic and social cohesion.
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CHAPTER 2
INTERNATIONALISATION OF RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
Technology is becoming the leitmotif o f the modern world and a linchpin o f the 
international economy. Businesses, governments, community organisations and 
individuals, seemingly everywhere, are looking to technology as the key to the 
attainment o f their goals.
Willoughby (1990)/
From the beginning of the 1980s, the pursuit of technological development was seen as 
a principal way for firms and governments to achieve a variety of goals, varying from 
industrial competitiveness, increased and sustained employment creation, to the broader 
longer-term goal of economic development and growth. Technology became a common 
theme, bringing together actors with otherwise quite separate, and sometimes conflicting 
goals. The European Commission recognised the centrality of technology for these 
diverse groups, and adopted a technology policy that would be the means of unifying the 
interests of individual governments with their distinct national political concerns and 
economic actors pursuing a wide range of market-based strategies. A grooving trend in 
international business alliances combined with the ever-present concern of national 
governments regarding international competitiveness provided the European 
Commission with a basis upon which to develop a European technology policy, and in 
so doing to use prevailing conditions to establish some form of policy consensus.
This chapter examines the general conditions prevailing in the international economy, 
and particularly focuses on the motives of economic actors and of national governments 
with a view to considering whether there was sufficient converging of interests as far as 
technological needs were concerned. International alliances, including technological 
alliances, took place for a variety of reasons. National governments, too, had their 
individual political preferences, but all held to a belief in the need to sustain the
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international competitiveness of domestic industry, European Community competition 
rules constrained the opportunity for national measures to support domestic industry. 
But even if national governments could give more direct support, they were often 
unwilling to do so, prompted by pressures to reduce public spending as part of a 
counter-inflationary strategy, and more recently, by the need to meet convergence 
criteria for membership to the next stage of European Monetary Union. Indeed, 
pressures to cut public spending extended as far as trying to shift the burden of financing 
R&D to the private sector, something all member state governments attempted to do 
during the 1980s, albeit with mixed results.
2.1 Technology in state relations
The confidence of Willoughby's assertion, at the beginning of this chapter, is at odds 
with the treatment of technology in international political economy and international 
relations generally. There was no consistent approach developed to analyse this issue of 
inter-state relations. Either technology was, like law, a technical matter deserving the 
attention of experts and not subject to dispute in the same way as foreign policy, 
security, or even economic policy. Or it attracted the attention of realists, who 
considered technology as a determinant of national power and position. It was the latter 
argument that struck a chord with the member state governments of the European 
Community, and they responded to the argument that Europe needed to take action to 
counteract the technology gap that existed between the region and its main competitors, 
the United States and Japan.^
The realist argument, put most persuasively by Robert Gilpin, was that technological 
change and diffusion would have an impact on international comparative advantage, 
leading to more active forms of economic nationalism as national governments seek to 
appropriate their own technology. According to Gilpin, 'without question, technological 
issues are becoming among the most important ones in the international political 
economy'.^ While inter-firm alliances undoubtedly had a role to play in developing 
technological advantage, in Gilpin's mind such arrangements worked best through the 
directed efforts of national governments.
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There was a certain inevitability in the ebb and flow of technology throughout the 
international economy, under the realist perspective, which could be explained by the 
investment pattern of multinational corporations (MNCs). Gilpin concluded that the 
increased level of international production, and of research and development had meant 
also an improvement in communications, enabling the rapid diffusion and innovation of 
research results. Although the MNCs could play a positive role through their 
contribution to faster rates of technological innovation and diffusion, their investment 
decisions were 'arbitrary', and any loss of comparative advantage from such investment 
decisions had to be reversed through national policies.'*
The response of governments to such arbitrary, and at times capricious behaviour, was 
to use industrial policies 'to make these powerful institutions serve what each perceives 
to be its own national interest'.^ Competitive rivalry between governments to attract 
MNCs, the purveyors of technological advance, could be ultimately damaging, but in 
any event was increasingly not feasible for member states of the European Community 
as the EC competition policy gained in strength and credibility from 1984 onwards.
It could, however, be used by the European Community itself, on behalf of the member 
states, so as to preserve Europe's technological advantage against Japan and the United 
States. An example of international rivalry may be seen in the context of the European 
Community’s technology policy initiatives within the information and communications 
technology sectors in the early eighties, in response to the de-regulatory policies being 
pursued by the US government which saw the break-up of the national monopoly 
AT&T and the removal of the ban on overseas operations by the US company. As it set 
about making inroads into the still largely-protected European market, sometimes 
through establishing alliances with domestic firms, European industrialists were anxious 
to see a public réponse to the perceived competitive threat.  ^ Since technology flows, 
like capital flows, were less subject to the restraints imposed by national governments, 
the European Community might be in a better position to co-ordinate flows to the 
benefit of all.
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It was not easy to present a picture of the technology gap that showed the situation with 
a degree of clarity sufficient to engender support for a common solution, particularly as 
there were such differences within and between countries, and between industrial sectors 
in Europe. Such differences within the European Community obviously complicated 
the task of outlining the comparative position facing Europe.
Inevitably, there was a focus on specific quantitative measures, the proportion of GDP 
devoted to R&D, the distribution of R&D financing between government and industry, 
growth in R&D in the business enterprise sector, and similar quantitative measures. In 
1981, the gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a percentage of GDP for the 
EC as a whole was 1.7%, while the corresponding figures for the US and Japan were 
2.4% and 2.1% respectively. By 1985, the US figure had increased to 2.9%, Japan's to 
2.6%, with the EC still lagging behind at 1.9%.
The picture was worse when account was taken of the average annual growth rate of 
GERD for the period 1981-85, with the US average of 7.3%, Japan at 8.9% and the EC 
average annual growth rate for the period at a much lower 4.3%. Although there was a 
general slow-down in the average annual growth rate for GERD in the period 1985- 
1989, the US average falling to 2.0%, the Japanese to 6.5%, the EC figure remained 
stable at 4.3%, still lagging behind enough to preserve the image of a gap.^
An examination of the trends in industrial R&D during the 1980s showed expenditure 
rising rapidly in the first half of the decade, with a falling off in the second half. The 
pattern of expenditure was similar throughout the OECD area, not simply the European 
Community. In Japan, expenditure on business R&D rose significantly throughout the 
1980s to the end of the decade, but fell by 1992. The average annual growth rate in 
business expenditure for the OECD area as a whole in the first half of the 1980s was 
8%, falling to 3.5% a year in the latter half of the decade. In the US, the annual increase 
in business R&D spending in the first half of the 1980s was just above the OECD 
average, and just below it towards the end of the decade.
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The foregoing description of trends suggests that there was a general increase in 
business spending on research and development internationally, so that European 
Community programmes were effectively responding to competitive developments over 
a wider area. This is confirmed by the average increases in the European Community 
itself, which were in fact below the OECD average. In the European Community, 
industrial R&D increased at about 5% a year during the 1980s, showing a falling off 
towards the close of the decade, and a real decline of 0.3% in 1991.
The national changes in the member states in business R&D also show some 
divergences (see Table 2.1 below). Interestingly, only the UK showed low real growth 
in business R&D during the 1980s, and continued poor performance into the 1990s with 
a fall in real terms in 1990,1991 and 1992. In Spain, the level of business R&D grew at 
a rate above the EC average, until falling in real terms in 1992 and 1993.
Table 2.1 Growth in 
business R&D
Average % change
annual 
growth %
from
previous
1981-85 1985-89
year
1990 1991
US 8.2 1.4 -1.4 -5.9
Japan 11.2 7.4 10.1 3.0
Belgium 4.8 3.4 3.7 n/a
Denmark 9.9 6.9 10.3 8.8
France 4.9 4.7 6.3 2.5
Germany 5.2 3.8 0.6 n/a
Greece n/a n/a n/a 9.3
Ireland 10.0 8.6 16.6 22.4
Italy 8.5 6.6 5.9 3.7
Holland 5.5 4.9 -5.7 -8.6
Portugal 6.5 4.8 19.6 n/a
Spain 14.1 13.8 20.0 1.9
UK 1.9 1.9 -0.5 -9.9
EC 4.9 4.8 2.6 n/a
Source: OECD (1994) Science and Technology 
Policy Review and Outlook, p. 157 
n/a: not available
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It would seem that not only was there a competitive spirit which was forcing this general 
rise in business R&D during the first half of the 1980s, and to which the European 
Community responded, but also that business R&D responds to recessionary forces in 
the national and international economy. The slow-down in economic activity in the 
early 1990s was accompanied by a fall-off in business R&D in a number of the member 
states of the European Community, and was particularly evident in France, Germany, 
Holland, Spain and the UK.
By 1991, the European Community as a whole accounted for over a quarter of total 
OECD business R&D, with Japan having one fifth, and the US the largest share at 
43%.^ Despite the general desire during the 1980s among member state governments to 
shift much of the financial burden of research and development to the private sector, 
reflecting the situation that prevailed in Japan, there was mixed success, and by the early 
1990s a distinct slowing of the long-term shift. Table 2.2 below shows the changes over 
the decade, and a couple of explanatory points may be added.
Only a few of the member states had a steady upward move in industrial sourcing for 
R&D, including Germany, Denmark, Ireland, and the UK. Spain showed a sharp fall by 
the turn of the decade, but that was counteracted to some extent by an increase in the 
funding from abroad - from 2.2% in 1981 to 8.6% in 1985, falling back to 8.1% in 1991. 
The UK also saw increased industrial fimding of R&D from abroad - 8.7% in 1981 to 
11.1% in 1985, and to 16.0% in 1991.
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Table 2.2 Sources of funds for 
business R&D (%)
Ind. Govt. Over­
seas
1981 1985 1991 1981 1985 1991 1981 1985 1991
US 68.4 67.7 75.2 31.6 32.3 24.8 n/a n/a n/a
Japan 97.9 98.0 98.4 1.9 1.6 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.1
Belgium 91.5 90.8 94.4 8.3 8.4 5.0 0.2 0.8 0.5
Denmark 84.4 87.3 86.0 12.4 9.9 7.9 2.8 2.2 2.5
France 68.2 69.6 66.2 24.6 23.4 22.3 7.0 6.9 11.4
Germany 81.7 83.1 85.8 16.9 15.3 10.7 1.2 1.4 3.1
Greece 95.4 n/a 74.0 4.6 n/a 5.5 n/a n/a 20.6
Ireland 80.5 81.5 89.6 13.7 12.4 3.7 5.7 5.9 6.6
Italy 86.9 77.0 79.6 8.8 16.9 11.8 4.3 6.1 8.6
Holland 84.3 83.7 89.6 7.5 12.6 7.5 8.2 3.4 2.4
Portugal 92.3 94.3 88.8 3.3 2.2 6.5 4.3 3.6 4.3
Spain 93.6 83.4 80.4 4.1 7.7 11.3 2.2 8.6 8.1
UK 61.3 65.9 69.4 30.0 23.0 14.6 8.7 11.1 16.0
EC 75.1 76.4 78.0
Source: OECD (1994) ibid., p. 
n/a: not available
20.0
160.
18.2 13.8 4.8 5.3 8.0
Table 2.3 shows that business kept most of the R&D funds for the industrial sector, 
although there was a small growth in the share for performance by non-industrial 
sectors. A principal beneficiary of business-financed R&D during the 1980s was the 
higher education sector. This was particularly the case in Spain, where the share went 
up from 0.5% in 1985 to 4.6% in 1991, and even more so in Ireland, where it rose from 
virtually nothing in 1981 to 9.4% in 1991. In the UK, there was also an increase in the 
business-financed R&D going to the higher education sector, from 1.6% in 1985 to 
2.6% in 1991.
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Table 2.3 Distribution of business R&D by 
sector of performance (%)
Ind.
1981 1985 1991
Govt.
1981 1985 1991
Educ
1981 1985 1991
US 98.6 98.4 97.6 0 0 0 0.8 1.0 1.6
Japan 95.4 95.1 95.8 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6
Belgium n/a 97.5 97.4 n/a 0 0.1 n/a 2.5 2.5
Denmark 98.7 98.6 98.0 0.8 0.9 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.7
France 98.2 98.6 95.7 1.0 0.4 2.5 0.5 0.7 1.5
Germany 99.1 98.3 97.6 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.3 2.0
Greece 100 n/a 88.7 0 n/a 1.8 0.0 n/a 9.4
Ireland 93.1 91.5 93.5 3.8 5.4 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.3
Italy 97.9 98.3 97.5 1.2 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.6 1.7
Holland 96.9 90.9 93.0 2.5 8.2 5.6 0.1 0.5 0.7
Portugal 99.5 90.5 85.8 0.0 7 1.3 0.1 0.4 0.9
Spain 99.5 97.5 93.6 0.5 2 1.7 0.0 0.5 4.6
UK 91.8 89.5 90.0 5.4 5.6 3.5 0.9 1.6 2.6
EC 97.1 96.2 95.5 1.6 1.9 1.6 0.7 1.2 2.0
Source: OECD (1994), 
p. 161 n/a: not 
available
In concluding this section, two further observations regarding the nature of industrial 
R&D in the European Community over the 1980s may be made. In the countries where 
there was a high proportion of foreign direct investment, these companies carried out an 
increasing amount of R&D. In Spain, it was suggested by the OECD that about 40% of 
all industrial R&D was performed by multinationals, while UK also benefited through 
the research activities of foreign-owned subsidiaries, although not nearly to the same 
extent.
The growth in business R&D also resulted in an increase in the number of researchers. 
OECD figures reported a marked increase in the number of business researchers in 
Belgium and Denmark, with an even stronger increase in Spain, Ireland, and Greece. 
Between 1981-85, the average annual growth rate in the number of business researchers 
in Spain was 10.7%, and in the following period 1985-89 the average annual rate rose to 
18.0%, while the corresponding figures for the UK were a much lower 1.3% and 0.2%.
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In the period 1985-89, Spain showed the highest increase of all the member states, 
reflecting its desire to catch up from a lower starting point.
By 1991, there were two million people (equal to 1.4 million in full-time equivalents) 
engaged in research and development in the European Union (excluding Luxembourg), 
vrith 55% employed in the business sector, 26% in the higher education sector, and the 
remaining 19% in the government sector.^ At this time, the situation in the European 
Community began to stabilise, and in the UK there was a real decrease in the number of 
researchers in the business sector each year from 1989 through to 1992.
Taking a look at the overall picture in the European Community during the period 1985 
to 1991, and comparing it with the position in the US and Japan, there is a certain 
convergence in the R&D expenditure trends over the period combined with a certain 
stability (see Table 2.4 below). Both the EC and Japan increased the percentage of 
gross domestic product devoted to research (GERD), and also the share of the total 
financed by business (BERD), while the US experienced a decline on both counts. 
Significantly, in the case of the US the gap in the business R&D was filled by an 
increase in research and development expenditure in the higher education sector 
(HERD). Of the three regions, the US invested more in research and development 
through the higher education sector.
However, in all three regions the business sector played the predominant role in 
financing research and development and also showed the biggest changes over the 
period concerned. Again, the Japanese enterprise sector showed the largest increase, 
from 1.85% in 1985 to 2.16% in 1991. Government sector research and development 
showed the greatest degree of stability in all three regions (GOVERD), but notably so in 
the case of the European Community. Clearly, the changes in research and development 
illustrated in this chapter had the greatest impact at the national level.
What occurred in the European Community was not so much an improvement in the 
overall position, as a shift in responsibilities which showed up at the sectoral level, and 
at the national level. In the case of the UK and Spain, the general shift to business
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financing noted above was also experienced, as was an increase in the number of 
business researchers. The national level will be considered in more detail in chapters 
five and six of this thesis.
Table 2.4 R&D expenditure in EC. Japan, and US. 1985-1991. % GDP
1985 1987 1989 1991
GERD
EC 1.97 2.03 2.02 1.98
Japan 2.58 2.63 2.80 2.87
US
BERD
2.89 2.84 2.76 2.65
EC 1.26 1.32 1.32 1.25
Japan 1.85 1.86 2.08 2.16
US
HERD
2.10 2.05 1.96 1.81
EC 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.35
Japan 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.35
US
GOVERD
0.37 0.41 0.43 0.45
EC 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.36
Japan 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.23
US 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.31
GERD - gross expenditure on R&D 
BERD - business expenditure on R&D 
HERD - higher expenditure on R&D 
GOVERD - government expendiure on R&D
Source; Eurostat, Research and Development Annual Statistics 1994, p. 127.
While the poor economic climate of the 1990s undoubtedly had an effect on research 
and development activities, and consequently on the number of business researchers, it 
may be that a more long-term trend is beginning to show up which reflects a 
stabilisation in the level of applied research in Europe. One consequence of reaching a 
saturated market level is the reduced profit potential from further applied research 
activities. If the business community has indeed reached this conclusion, then it is 
difficult to see how further economic growth based on technological progress can be 
achieved.
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More optimistically, the distinction between basic and applied research has become less 
clearcut with the result that technological advance is becoming increasingly 
incorporated into the techniques and processes of production. Outcomes are the result 
of a careful combination of research and development activities, application and 
experiment, and most importantly, learning by individuals and organisations as part of a 
process of knowledge accumulation that is often tacit rather than codified. Once again, 
the question of technological progress must be addressed, but this time on the basis of 
some alternative to industrial and applied research which encompasses learning 
organisations within a society that is equipped for the challenges which rapid 
technological change inevitably brings.
2.2 Political context of technology policy
At the beginning of the 1980s, the greater level of international competition which was 
partly reflected in a higher number of international business alliances, and partly in 
increased business spending on research and development provided the conditions 
appropriate for a European technology policy that was market-based. It was easier to 
develop a policy that supported the research and technology concerns of business, 
specifically applied and industrial research, in the context of such international 
pressures.
But, given the fact that industry would have to bear much of the cost, the policy had to 
be presented in terms of economic objectives such as the pursuit of competitiveness. As 
industrial competitiveness was also firmly on the agenda of national government 
policies, regardless of their political persuasion, any policy that would support this 
objective was to be welcomed, all the more so if it could shift the financial support for 
R&D to the private sector. The competitive threat from Japanese and US firms, both 
hungry for an increasing share of the European market, and the freedom of movement of 
capital, meant that there was a solid case for positive action to improve the 
competitiveness of European firms if they were to avoid being swamped by external 
competitors. Since the end of the 1970s governments had become increasingly
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disenchanted with policies supporting national champions, so that new competitiveness 
initiatives would have to come very much from the firms themselves.
In effect, the political support of two broad groups for a European technology policy 
was ensured. If economic prosperity depended on industrial competitiveness and on the 
level of technology available within and between countries, then decisions on 
technological resources had a political as much as a scientific basis. But it was a 
political basis that reflected changes in government priorities, a shift away from basic 
science to applied and industrial research with the fimding coming from the firms rather 
than from the government. Since firms were increasing their R&D expenditure, and 
governments wanted to make this switch, there had to be a greater emphasis in 
technology policy-making on economic priorities like competitiveness and innovation. 
In other words, technological change and technology would serve the needs of the 
market, rather than society more generally, or past political goals such as security.
The new political basis for technology policy brought with it a more simplified view as 
to the nature of technology, a view that was to structure how technology policy should 
develop. The particular definition and understanding of technology has always 
determined what form of policy should be used to address technological change. If 
technology is considered as a stock of knowledge, technological change will necessitate 
a change in that stock, calling for greater investment in educational and scientific 
institutions.^^ Or, technology can be seen as another factor of production, alongside 
traditional factors such as labour and capital. In this case, technological availability is a 
matter of market exchange although it is recognised that market failure may occur.
Often technology is viewed as a product, or in terms of the application of new 
knowledge. By the 1980s, the traditional categorisation of activities into science, 
centred upon basic research activities, and technology, encompassing applied and 
developmental work, had been dropped. In its place was the notion of a symbiotic 
relationship among a wide range of activities which give rise to the gradual 
accumulation of knowledge throughout the many aspects of the organisation. Policy­
makers moved inevitably towards policies for technology rather than science, which
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sought to include knowledge accumulation among a broad range of actors - 
collaborative technology programmes at both national and supranational level therefore 
were a good example of this new interpretation/^ Science, in the sense of efforts to 
develop new knowledge, was replaced by efforts to apply knowledge across as wide a 
variety of processes and activities as possible/^ The new political goal of industrial 
competitiveness required this particular definition, with its associated policies for 
innovation and diffusion.
In the European Framework Programme, the goal of industrial competitiveness found its 
best expression, catering as it did to applied, industrial research more than to basic 
science and the discovery of new knowledge. The successive BRITE-EURAM 
programmes exemplified the orientation of policy, the first programme firmly directed 
to pre-competitive research, but each of the follow-up programmes took on an 
increasingly commercial orientation although continuing to remain within the confines 
of broader Community regulations.
Industrial competitiveness and a European technology gap represented a two-sided coin. 
The rhetoric surrounding the technology debate in Europe had made this inter­
connection, regardless of whatever basis it might have in fact. A spirit of rivalry 
prevailed among technology policy-makers, as much as it did among economic actors, 
as the battle for international competitiveness intensified.*"  ^ Indeed, it extended beyond 
industrial technological needs to large science projects.*^
Policy rivalry and the perception of a technology gap with its principal competitors 
combined to provide for a climate receptive to the idea of a European technology policy. 
Time after time, rivalry over technology has led to considerations of new policy that 
would protect technological interests. It worked in Europe during the 1960s, and again 
in the 1980s. More recently, in the United States economists and political scientists 
have argued for policy intervention so as to ensure that the U.S. does not fall behind.*^ 
The rivalry among states has given rise to a perception of a non-military war, and a race 
towards technological supremacy.*^
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It has also led to what has been described as an 'international policy ricochet among the 
United States, Japan and Western Europe and has resulted in an increasing convergence 
of public policies'/^ But while policy rivalry can lead to a creative and constructive set 
of policies, there is also the risk that an intensification of political pressures forces an 
agreement which tries to meet all of the political interests, a lowest common 
denominator which fails to meet the most important objectives/^
While individual states have been engaged in competitive rivalry by introducing 
national technological programmes that foster collaboration among domestic 
organisations, economic actors, for whom competitive rivalry has always been present, 
are engaging in an unprecedented bout of collaboration in the international economy. 
What has been the cause of this? Does it represent a response to the encouragement 
given by policy makers, or a new culture developing in international business 
competition? The following sections will examine the reasons for private technological 
collaboration, and consider where public policy and business strategy coincide.
2.3 The alliance pattern
This section will examine the pattern of alliances that developed during the 1980s, and 
will consider whether the conclusions made earlier about business R&D can be 
explained by the alliance pattern. It should be established at the outset that a wide 
variety of alliance types were created throughout the decade and, despite the academic 
attention given to this form of economic behaviour, it has not been possible to classify 
all of them c l e a r l y T h i s  classification problem offers a difficulty when it comes to 
identifying a particular alliance form, the R&D alliance, for closer examination.
One study which did attempt this classification of cooperation among firms found that 
agreements were often quite complex, crossing the boundaries of a range of activities.^^ 
The general objectives covered not only research and technological issues, but also 
production, marketing and distribution, as the table below shows. The study analysed 
private agreements, made over a number of years.
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Table 2.5 Pattern of inter-firm aareements - range of
objectives
Number %
Simple Agreements
1. Technology transfer 1500 79.6
2. R&D integration 251 13.3
3. Production integration 363 19.3
4. Supply integration 370 19.7
5. Marketing 121 6.4
6. Others 84 4.4
Complex agreements of which 383 20.4
2 & 3 100 5.4
2 & 5 59 3.1
3 & 5 72 3.8
2 & 3 & 5 38 2.0
1 &3 22 1.2
Other combinations 92 4.9
Source: Chesnais (1988), and OECD (1994).
The MERIT-CATI data bank developed at the University of Limburg has become one 
of the largest and most detailed sources of information on international alliances, in 
particular strategic technological alliances/^ In this category of alliance, MERIT 
reported an increase in the number of technology alliances created during the period 
1983 to 1989, with 600 alone being created in 1989. The data did not include those 
created under the European Community technology programmes.
Under this MERIT survey covering alliances within and between blocs, it was found 
that intra-bloc alliances were technology related, while inter-bloc were market-related. 
Out of a total of 4192 strategic technology alliances in the data bank, 37.2% were 
created in the first half of the decade, and 62.8% in the second half.^  ^ But, the higher 
volume of alliances created in this second half was attributable to intra-bloc activity 
rather than inter-bloc. The distribution of alliances between blocs by 1989 (the total for 
the two periods) was 19.2% intra-Europe, with 22.4% Europe-USA, 6% Europe-Japan, 
intra-US 24.4%, US-Japan 13.9%. However, some 24.4% of the total were within the 
US and 13.9% between US and Japan, with the remainder within Japan, the newly 
industrialised countries, and less developed countries.^"  ^ An analysis of the sectoral
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distribution of the alliances in the MERIT-CATI data bank indicated some sectors were 
more alliance-prone than others, while regionally the pattern of alliances favours the 
triad - Europe, US, and Japan - very strongly.
Table 2.6 International distribution of strategic technological 
alliances (DC - developed countries)
Technology area No. %
in
DC
% in Triad
Biotechnology 846 99.1 94.1
New materials 430 96.5 93.5
Computer 199 98.0 96.0
Ind. automation 281 96.1 95.0
Microelectronics 387 95.9 95.1
Software 346 99.1 96.2
Telecomm. 368 97.5 92.1
Misc. IT 148 93.3 92.6
Automotive 205 84.9 82.9
Aviation 228 96.9 94.3
Chemicals 410 87.6 80.0
Food/beverages 42 90.5 76.2
Heavy electronics 141 96.5 92.2
Medical 95 100.0 100.0
Instruments
Other 66 90.9 77.3
Total 4192 95.7 91.9
Source: MERIT/CATI, reported in Hagedoorn (1995), p. 44.
From the point of view of the concerns in this thesis, the MERIT/CATI data bank 
throws some light on the pattern of international alliances that was developing in the 
1980s, forming the backdrop to the European Community technology programmes. But 
it does not elaborate to any great extent on the range of motives behind such alliances, 
which is also one of the concerns of the thesis. The studies of alliances which MERIT 
conducted highlighted the role of multinational corporations in this type of strategic 
activity, and concluded that strategic considerations could also restrict the growth of 
technology alliances as firms took account of transaction costs, and for the need to retain 
control over important resources.^^
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2.4 Motives for collaboration
The foregoing section highlighted the growing volume of international collaborative 
ventures. Given the natural evolution of this pattern, why should economic actors wish 
to engage in the regulated activities under the European Framework Programme? The 
question is relevant to assessing the likelihood of further integrative pressures and 
demands, and to whether the behaviour of economic actors may be extended to transfer 
loyalty to the central authority. Chapter six of this thesis considers the empirical data 
regarding participation in the BRITE-EURAM programme, while this section offers a 
more general analytic framework which will be used later on in chapter six to examine 
the participants behaviour.
In general, there are a number of overlapping objectives which collaboration can help to 
achieve:
risk reduction
economies of scale and/or rationalisation 
technology exchanges 
co-opting or blocking competition 
overcoming trade barriers
facilitating initial international expansion of inexperienced firms 
vertical quasi-integration advantages of linking the complementary contributions 
of the partners in a 'value chain'
One of the more significant risks associated with technology collaboration is that of 
appropriability of the new knowledge. A large firm considering an alliance with a 
smaller partner may fear the knowledge gained through the alliance could be used to 
attack market share, or otherwise gain competitive advantage. More commonly, small 
firms fear losing their knowledge assets to the acquisitive strategies of large, aggressive
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partners. Aspects of European Community policy have been directed at alleviating such 
risks.
Competition policy operates to tackle anti-competitive behaviour. Alliances which are 
supported by the European Commission's initiatives are set up under certain rules and 
conditions, with clearly stated terms of reference. There is no change in the existing 
control structure of the participants' organisations, unless this is the express intention of 
the participants. SMEs may obtain particular advantages from collaborating under the 
protective umbrella of the European Framework Programme - where partners are 
identified, costs shared, and new market contacts created.
Successful collaboration may have other spin-off benefits. Participants may forge 
deeper understandings of the problems and difficulties, as well as the advantages of 
international alliances, and learn to operate within national and cultural differences. As 
a result of the communication involved, other areas of common or potential interests 
may be identified. National authorities may not have the resources, or the wish to 
assist in the creation of joint ventures that span national frontiers, to the same extent as 
the European Commission.
The benefits for organisations that are not major actors in the international economy can 
be substantial. While one partner may contribute certain critical resources, such as 
technological skills and assets, another partner may provide financing, complementary 
technical know-how, or access to the large domestic or international markets for the 
product of the joint R&D effort. The decision to engage in collaborative R&D is 
essentially the result of a cost-benefit analysis. Table 2.7 illustrates the factors affecting 
the joint R&D decision.
Table 2.7 Factors affecting the joint R&D decisions
Potential Benefits Potential Risks
1. Spreading costs and risks of R&D 1. Risk of sharing proprietary R&D
2. Access to technology and know-how 2. Desire for control
3. Access to markets 3. Agreement on design specifications
4. Competitive positioning 4. Minimum efficient scale in R&D
5. Government R&D policies
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Joint R&D has a further advantage over independent efforts, by allowing access to large 
domestic and international markets. Given the fixed costs of innovation, the larger the 
market the higher the joint venture's expected rate of return from R&D activities. 
Immediate access to a large market is especially useful where the product life cycle is 
short. The expected sales from an innovation are dependent on both the market size and 
the length of time over which the produce is sold in these markets.
While the benefits of collaboration may be obvious, the critical success factors needed 
to ensure success are less easy to quantify. One difficulty in technological collaboration 
projects is that of reaching agreement on the size of the project, in terms of the financial 
and technical scale, and hence the design specifications and budget allocations to cover 
the project activities. Even with careful planning, projects do sometimes go over 
budget, as the recent examples of the proposed new British Library and the Channel 
Tunnel exemplify, and the problem then is to maintain consensus among the partners on 
a favourable path towards project completion.^^ Public support programmes must be 
directed to the joint interests of partners, and to creating the necessary synergy to meet 
those interests. An ambiguity of policy outcome may suggest that this synergy has not 
been achieved. Government programmes to promote technical change often try to 
reflect the objectives of firms on the one hand, and more general objectives which 
reflect a societal interpretation of technical change.^^ In this respect, the duality of 
purpose often results in an ambiguous outcome. However, technology policy itself 
remains one of the areas of public policy where the outcome of intervention is perhaps 
least understood.^^
How well has the European Commission understood the motives for collaboration? The 
annual Competition Reports monitored the pattern of collaborative agreements within 
the European Community, including those research agreements under the block 
Regulation 418/85 that gave exemption from Article 85(3) of the Treaty. Under this 
regulation, entered into force on 1 March 1985 for a period ending 31 December 1997, 
agreements between undertakings could include research and development of products
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and processes, and also joint exploitation of the results of that R&D without infringing 
Community rules on competition. The exemption also covered the exploitation of the 
results of prior agreements between the same organisations, and all exempted joint R&D 
activity had to be carried out in the framework of a defined programme.
Mindful of the central role the Community played in promoting competition, the block 
regulation was applicable only where all the parties had access to the results, and one 
party could, if it so wished, go on to exploit the results independently. The ambiguity 
referred to above was evident in the condition that joint exploitation was allowable 
'where the know-how resulting from the common R&D contributes substantially to 
technical or economic progress and constitutes a decisive element for the manufacturing 
of new or improved products.'^^
One of the problems with this condition was the difficulty of assessing at such an early 
stage the likely contribution of R&D results either at the level of the enterprises 
concerned, or more generally to technical and economic progress'. Economic and 
technical progress is a political goal which was not given any clear definition by the 
European Commission, creating by its failure to do so plenty of opportunity for 
ambiguity in the policy outcome. Furthermore, political goals may not bear a direct 
relation with the immediate objectives of firms. The risk therefore is that a policy linked 
to dual objectives serves none of the relevant interests, and ultimately faces the criticism 
of all interests.
An instance of the political nature of the block exemptions concerns the restriction to 
undertakings which together have a market share of less than 20%, thus facilitating the 
participation of SMEs. Earlier, reference was made to the MERIT study of international 
alliances which suggested that much of the alliance activity was carried out by large 
corporations. The Commission policy bias in favour of small and medium sized firms 
was clearly designed to broaden the alliance pattern within the European Community, 
and in doing so to widen the collaborative technology net.
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The Competition Reports offered an indication of the collaborative activities by 
European firms within the Community, and with organisations outside. Distinguishing 
between mergers (including takeovers and acquisitions of minority holdings) and joint 
ventures, the Commission noted in 1984 that firms motivated by research and 
development considerations opted for industrial joint ventures as the most preferred
form of collaboration 31
It also noted that in the high-technology industries there was a tendency to seek 
collaboration with firms outside the European Community when motivated by research 
and development considerations. However, it must be said that R&D was not the over­
riding concern in seeking collaboration of any type, and tended to be associated with 
other motives, principally with production and marketing motives. And, while the range 
of motives identified by the Commission increased over the period 1984 to 1993, 
research and development continued to hold a subsidiary position as far as 
organisational strategies were concerned, indicated by Table 2.8.
Table 2.8 (a) Main motives for industrial joint ventures 1985 
1992
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Production 8 12 15 19 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Prod/m kt 5 n/a 7 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a
R&D 10 10 7 n/a n/a n/a 7 4
R&D/prod 3 6 5 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
R&D/prod/mkt n/a n/a 18 27 12 18 n/a n/a
Rationalisation 14 10 11 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Specialisation 7 n/a 4 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Strengthen mkt position 7 3 3 22 38 33 24
Expansion 4 7 4 5 17 15 11 11
Diversification n/a n/a 1 2 4 3 1 1
Synergy n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 18 14
Complementary n/a 5 3 5 11 3 n/a n/a
Marketing n/a n/a 11 3 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Restructuring n/a n/a n/a 13 5 22 n/a n/a
Other 4 5 2 13 6 12 14 3
Not specified 12 19 9 17 42 27 36 31
Total
Source: CEO, Competition 
1992.
67 81 100 109 119 
Reports for the years 1985 to
138 120 88
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Table 2.8 (b) Main motives for mergers 1985-
m z
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Expansion 32 29 50 54 115 126 100 78
Diversification 9 20 13 23 26 14 10 5
Specialisation 12 3 3 5 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Strengthen mkt position 15 18 26 70 55 212 174 107
Synergy n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 48 14
Integration 2 n/a 3 6 n/a n/a n/a 7
Restructuring n/a n/a n/a 41 14 57 n/a n/a
Complementarity 19 23 28 54 39 26 n/a n/a
Rationalisation 61 56 67 n/a n/a n/a n/a 9
R&D 3 4 20 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a
R&D/prod/mkt n/a n/a 4 2 n/a 3 n/a n/a
Cooperation n/a n/a 3 n/a n/a 18 4 3
Other 4 7 21 19 18 12 29 3
Not specified 47 66 77 107 125 27 126 31
Total 204 226 315 383 392 495 491 257
Source: CEO, Competition Reports for the years 1985 to
1992.
The above table gives a sense of the motives and objectives that underpinned the 
different forms of collaborative activity undertaken by European organisations in the 
1980s, rather than offering a comprehensive and detailed numerical view of the volume 
of alliance arrangements. It is clear that the complexity of motives increased 
considerably, with additional motives being identified as the decade wore on. The rising 
number in the not specified' category for both mergers and industrial joint ventures 
bears out the difficulty of identifying clear objectives in the behaviour of firms. 
However, one of the more immediately obvious features of the table is the 
predominance of motives very directly related to market-based concerns.
Merger activity was important for expansionary strategies, as well as to strengthen 
market position and achieve complementarity in operations, particularly in the second 
half of the decade when firms were setting strategy in the light of the proposed single 
market. Diversification strategies accounted for some of the merger activity in the first 
half of the decade.
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Industrial joint ventures allow for cooperation in certain activities, while the partners 
retain their respective independent units and identities, as is the case with the forms of 
cooperation under the European Community Framework Programme. Yet here also, 
market-related strategies were predominant. Industrial joint ventures were undertaken to 
strengthen market position, or to expand, as well as more general cooperation activities. 
Research and development strategies were not prominent in either of the general 
categories considered, although there was a slight increase in the research strategies 
towards the end of the decade.
While this does not mean R&D was considered unimportant, it is certain that firms 
engaged in alliances for a variety of motives, combining research with production and 
marketing. The Framework Programme, and its constituent programmes provided the 
enabling environment to encourage cooperation for the purposes of R&D. 
Undoubtedly, there would have been less R&D cooperation without the support of the 
European programme and the European authorities were convinced that this form of 
market failure called for a policy to compensate.
In the 23rd Competition Report, issued in 1993, acknowledged this responsibility by 
saying 'policy needs to concentrate on horizontal measures and on areas where there is a 
failure of the market either to invest enough or to invest quickly enough (notably R&D, 
the environment, innovation and training)'.^^
2.5 Sectoral and geographic analysis
The preceding section suggested that firms were not naturally disposed to alliance 
activity for solely research and development motives. Here, some consideration is given 
to the question whether this claim can be made in respect of all industrial sectors 
generally, and whether differences in the geographic pattern has been established or is 
likely in the future.
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Evidence from a number of sources suggests certain differences in the sectoral pattern of 
alliances, but nevertheless a significant emphasis on market access/^ In the capital- 
intensive sectors, however, there is a greater tendency to engage in alliances with a 
technology motive, as is the case with sectors which exhibit rapid changes in 
technology. By the early 1990s, there was a stabilisation of alliance activity within 
Europe, and with the concentration of activities in some sectors firms faced the option of 
alliances to further globalisation aims. However, many of the industrial sectors in 
Europe retain lower levels of concentration than US industry, leaving plenty of scope for 
further alliance activity in the future.
At a sectoral level, future alliances in European sectors such as air transport, food and 
drink, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and vehicle assembly are considered either very 
likely or necessary. The belief that a competitiveness gap persists will support 
continued alliance activity, but the evidence so far is that such activities are much less 
focused on R&D than more downstream activities. This was the conclusion of the 1994 
Panorama of EU industry, in a review of alliance activity prepared for the European 
Commission by a group of external consultants.
Table 2.9 Future trends in alliances bv
sector
EU us Japan
Air transport 0 X X
Aerospace equipment X X
Computers X X
Food and drink 0 X X
Chemicals excl. pharma. 0 X X
Pharmaceuticals 0 X X
Biotechnology X X
Telecom equipment X X X
Semi-conductors X X X
Auto components X 0
Vehicle assembly 0 X
0= very likely/necessary 
X= likely
Source: CEO (1994) Panorama of EU industry,
p. 26.
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The Panorma of EU industry also considered that the level of alliance activity was most 
likely to continue in Europe, while those European firms looking to gain a foothold in 
the non-European markets such as the United States and Japan would experience 
difficulties, partly attributable to market restrictions in those countries, and partly due to 
their own competitive capability. The report accordingly predicts a continued need for 
alliances, and particularly for those which focus on technological outcomes. While it 
could of course be accused of making a case for an extended role for the European 
Commission in a technology policy which is sustained on the basis of R&D alliances, 
the evidence presented by the World Competitiveness Table, published jointly until this 
year by the IMD Business School in Lausanne and the World Economic Forum (see 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6) suggests that the competitive position of European industry leaves 
much room for improvement. The tables have been published annually for a number of 
years and are widely reported in the national press throughout the European Union, with 
the placings of the individual countries the subject of comment by a variety of interested 
parties, often disregarding the actual basis of the listings or the possible accuracy.
The sectors targeted by the BRITE-EURAM programme, essentially traditional 
manufacturing industry, have experienced a continuing decline in competitiveness 
against competitors in not only the United States and Japan, but increasingly from firms 
in the newly industrialising countries as well as Eastern Europe. "^^
2.6 Conclusion
2.6.1 Review and analysis
As this chapter has shown, many of the alliances have been sought for reasons other 
than research and technology acquisition. Alliances were multi-directional, both at the 
sectoral level and at the geographical level. The common link binding all of these 
alliances was the pursuit of competitiveness, and the fact that this pattern of 
international behaviour was developing against the background of policies for the 
promotion of competitiveness at the national and the European level.
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We are left with a situation in need of further analysis. Despite the higher spending on 
R&D by the European business sector throughout the decade, the higher volume of 
alliance activity which the European technology programmes fostered was not always 
directed solely at research and technology. It would seem that, in many respects, the 
European Commission was imposing a pattern of activity that would not have otherwise 
developed naturally. But it was able to do so for two reasons. Firstly, there was a 
developing pattern of alliances, a culture and environment which made its own 
particular approach seem both reasonable and acceptable. Various forms of 
collaboration were entering business culture and becoming a normal part of strategy.
Secondly, competitiveness became a political issue in the 1980s, at the national and 
supranational level. The Commission acted on the basis of this politicisation, and tied 
technology policy to the pursuit of competitiveness. Alliances would thus be fostered, 
at the European level, that would both increase technological capability and at the same 
time strengthen the competitive capability of European industry. It was fortunate that 
while the alliance pattern was emerging as a natural response to the general threat of 
increased international competition, governments of the member states were also 
seeking to combine support for competitiveness policies with a desire to shift the 
responsibility for research and technology to the private sector.
There has been some degree of success in this, and most of the member states of the 
European Community saw an increase in business spending on research and 
development, and also an increase in the number of researchers employed in business 
over the past decade. Yet, despite the increase in industrial spending on R&D, many 
European companies did not put as high a priority on research as American and 
Japanese firms. In 1990, for instance, European industry's share of total R&D spending 
was 65%, contrasted with 76% in Japan and 69% in the United States.^^
From the early 1990s, there was a degree of stabilisation and in some cases a decline, in 
business spending on research, and also in the level of collaborative activity. Much of 
the stabilisation seen in business spending in 1991 could be attributed to the 
reunification of Germany, and to the costs and uncertainties associated with the political
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change in the largest R&D spending member state. These areas of business activity are 
influenced by the general economic climate and the possibility of high return on 
investment. Market failure can mean a less than adequate level of business R&D, as the 
European Commission recognised, making a case for public policy of some kind.
Where, then, can the integrative pressures arise in the European technological 
community? There are a number of possibilities where public policy and business 
strategy could coincide, leaving the way open for further integration. We have seen in 
this chapter that the wide range of motives for alliances do not always extend to cover 
technological motives. A public policy which supports such motives has an obvious 
role to play. But there are other aspects to technological collaboration, which require 
public support or coordinated policy of some kind.
Research and development spending is just one activity in the link between R&D and 
the market. Innovation of new techniques, diffusion of knowledge and the results of 
research and development may be the subject of market failure just as much as the 
required quantity of research spending, and economic actors may be unable to follow-up 
the results of research activities because of such market failure. At the same time, the 
competitive pressures building up in the international economy demand that they should 
be able to use the results of research efforts, and that an economy must sustain 
competitiveness on the basis of innovation and diffusion. These issues represent, 
therefore, likely sources of further integrative pressures from the European technological 
community.
The predicted continued trend in international alliances needs to be considered in the 
context of the variety of motives behind such behaviour. Increasingly, such motives are 
likely to be market-related, either those of access or of protection. Economic actors are 
therefore likely to articulate their demands on the basis of not simply technology 
creation and exchange but also overcoming trade barriers, co-opting or blocking 
competition, and more generally risk reduction over a globalised market space, 
increasing the degree of instablility of the alliances.^^
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2.6.2 Technology collaboration and integration
On the other hand, technological change depends on the level of innovation and 
diffiision as much as the level of research and development spending. And the 
connection between R&D spending and innovation and diffusion is not so simple as is 
often assumed. Indeed, the capacity for innovation and diffusion is related to a broad set 
of circumstances and relations at the local level, quite distinct from the amount of 
collaborative research and development being done at the European or international 
level. Relations between industry and the scientific and technological community, 
communication networks, technology transfer mechanisms, and levels of educational 
attainment and skills development all contribute to an institutional structure that 
influences technological capability.
The institutional structure referred to above has a distinctly national, and local, 
character. Further integrative pressures are likely, therefore, to be balanced between a 
focus on the domestic institutional structure which has such an enormous influence on 
general technological capability, and a more European focus able to contend with the 
pressures and demands coming from the international and global economy.
The ability of the European Community to provide financial support for industrial R&D 
at a time when national governments were reducing such support, and to link such 
support to improving industrial competitiveness was essential to the initial integrative 
demands directed at the first phase of the European technology policy. But the 
implementation of policy has highlighted, too, the differences in national institutional 
structures, which affect the capability to innovate and diffuse new knowledge.
The essential point here is that any study of the integration process must consider not 
only the flow of demands and expectations to the central authority, but also a reverse 
flow of expectations and demands, directed to the domestic institutional structure within 
which economic actors operate. Even in an increasingly international and global 
climate, the established structure of social and political relations bears its mark on the
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actors within it. There is a collaborative network already in place, and a set of social 
relations that structures the interests and expectations of those in the network.
The creation of a collaborative technological network at the European level demands 
more than bringing together a group of economic actors to work on joint research and 
technological development projects. We have already seen that economic actors tend to, 
by themselves, pursue alliances for a whole range of commercial reasons, and in fact 
alliances of this nature can be extremely unstable. The network has to be built around 
institutional structures, linking a series of collaborative webs already in place within the 
national and regional system.
In conclusion, the literature on alliances does provide a concept that could also offer a 
more appropriate alternative to the notion of loyalty transfer in the process of 
integration. Trust between the participating interests is crucial to the success of 
collaboration, and it is established through a process of leaming.^^ The social basis of 
collaboration among economic actors, and the quality of the social relations, give rise to 
trust in a process of repeated interaction. The result of reiterated action produces 
learning among the actors, which forms the basis for trust, and the key to future 
collaboration.^*
Trust is described as an expectation, built up over time, that a collaborative partner will 
behave in a certain acceptable way. It has been described by two contributors to the 
literature on alliances as operating in the following way, interaction between firms 
develops over time. It takes time to leam about each others ways of doing and reviewing 
things and how to interpret each others acts. Relations are built gradually in a social 
exchange process through which the parties may come to trust each other.... Over time, 
as a consequence of interaction, bonds of various kinds are formed by the parties. There 
may be technical bonds which are related to the technologies employed by the firms, 
knowledge bonds related to the parties' knowledge about their business, social bonds 
related to the administrative routines and procedures of the firms, and legal bonds in the 
form of contracts between the firms'.
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Such are the necessary conditions to an integration process built upon the promotion of 
a European technological collaborative network. But they are not sufficient unless the 
process also takes account of the already existing set of relations inherent in institutional 
systems, where social and political relations have been created. The following chapter 
examines one such attempt by the European Commission to create an institutional 
system which would facilitate the social relations inherent in cross-border technological 
collaboration.
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CHAPTER 3
EUROPEAN POLICY - COLLABORATION UNDER BRITE-EURAM
3.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter examined the growth in intemational alliances during the 1980s. 
It concluded that a range of motives underpinned this development in intemational 
business, factors that were broadly commercial in orientation with technological motives 
being very much secondary. Yet, the European Commission was able to launch a series 
of programmes during the decade designed to increase the volume of technological 
alliances in Europe, and in so doing to create a European technological community. 
That it was successful at one level, in the number of collaborative links created, is 
evident, but the assertion that technological motives were secondary raises the question 
why so many organisations were prepared to participate in these programmes.
The question is addressed in this chapter specifically to one of the programmes, the 
BRITE-EURAM programme, which fosters cross-border collaborative research and 
development of a pre-competitive nature among industrial firms, research centres, and 
universities in the European Community. Introduced in 1985, and designed along 
similar lines to other collaborative research programmes in the European Framework 
Programme, it has now been in operation for ten years.
It is targeted at Europe's largely traditional manufacturing sector, which still accounts 
for a significant amount of employment throughout the region. BRITE-EURAM has 
developed, therefore as a multi-sectoral programme, and in this respect differed from the 
two other major programmes, ESPRIT and RACE, which were single-sector initiatives, 
in the information technology and telecommunications sectors.^
BRITE-EURAM was not as prestigious as the other two programmes, and did not 
receive the extent of financial support for industrial collaborative research allocated to
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ESPRIT and RACE under the Framework Programme, but neither did it attract the same 
degree of attention or opprobrium. Appendix 4, at the end of this thesis, shows a 
gradually increasing share of the Framework Programme budget over the decade going 
to industrial and material technologies, while the range of activities and objectives of the 
BRITE-EURAM programme has also been extended. Although the information and 
communication technologies continued to attract the largest share of the Fourth 
Framework Programme budget, its percentage had declined in favour of other areas such 
as industrial and materials technologies, environment, life sciences, socio-economic 
research and intemational cooperation.
Moreover, the BRITE-EURAM programme has succeeded in creating a large 
collaborative network, a web of alliances that span the member states of what has now 
become the European Union. By the end of 1994, there were 1577 projects overall 
running under the programme, compared to an overall total under the ESPRIT 
programme of 719. In that year alone, 706 new projects were agreed under the BRITE- 
EURAM programme, involving 1836 participants, while 178 projects with 983 
participants were launched under the ESPRIT programme.^
This chapter considers how the BRITE-EURAM has managed to build up this web of 
alliances through an examination of the programme's inception and development. It will 
consider how the programme was formulated, and the method of implementation, and 
will give particular attention to the process of interest group involvement at the different 
levels.
While the fortunes of the programme were determined at a general level by the 
Framework Programme negotiations, once the overall budget of the latter was 
concluded the European Commission had quite a degree of freedom to decide the 
programme direction, content, and participation rate. The explanation for this major 
role of the European Commission may be found in a memorandum from the 
Commission to the European Council in 1985, entitled Towards a Technological 
Community.^
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3.2 Roots of the Community process
In the memorandum to the European Council, issued in June 1985, the European 
Commission set out the basis for the creation of a technological community, the means 
by which the community could be established, and the political, institutional system 
charged with the management of the community process. By this time, some of the 
collaborative programmes had already moved beyond the embryonic stage to become 
fully operational, and provided the models for the proposals outlined in the Commission 
memorandum.
The basis for the proposed technological community was that common interests called 
for it. It was in the interests of the whole of the European Community to 'strengthen the 
technological bases of European industry and to develop its intemational 
competitiveness', and the challenge facing Europe was that of being able to counter-act 
the competitive and innovative threat from the rest of the world but particularly, the 
memorandum suggested, from Japan and the United States.
Europe's comparative technological position was key to the argument, and in the 
memorandum the European Commission used it as a bench mark against which to detail 
the various areas in which progress had to be made. The extent of the comparative gap 
between Europe and its two main competitors was identified right at the beginning of 
the memorandum, with the effect that the Commission had straight away identified a 
basis on which common action and political will could be united."  ^ The rivalry between 
intemational firms over technology flows, and between states over technology policy 
that was identified in chapter two provided therefore a very important source of 
consensus among the European member states for the proposal to create a technology 
community.
Like earlier attempts that were made in the 1960s to develop a European technology 
policy, the European authorities picked up on one of the issues that would be most likely 
to attract political support, especially from the member state governments.^ The
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memorandum addressed several additional issues that had proved the basis for 
disagreement in European technology policy two decades earlier.
The first issue concerned national technology policies, and where these fitted in with the 
European proposals to create a technology community. European programmes would 
supplement, not supplant, national efforts, and 'the European Technology Community 
would also be required to promote the coordination of national and Community policies, 
to propose the means of strengthening their complementary aspects.' The Commission 
memorandum provided the necessary reassurance to national governments that their 
efforts to deal with domestic circumstances would not be adversely affected by the 
proposals.
Here again, previous collaborative efforts cast a long shadow. Technological 
collaboration in the aircraft and aerospace sectors, and other sectors where collaborative 
technological projects had been attempted, had mixed results stemming partly fi'om 
continuing efforts of the national governments to pursue firmly national interests.^ Joint 
efforts ultimately failed through the unwillingness of national governments to make the 
large financial commitments, and the perception that joint collaboration represented a 
zero sum game as far as national interests were concerned.
The Commission memorandum promised to reconcile unity of vision and strategic 
coherence at Community level with the greatest possible flexibility in the management 
and financing of programmes and in the level of participation by Member States and 
their nationals.' Large and increasing financial demands to support an emerging 
technology policy were unlikely to meet with the support of European national 
governments in the early 1980s, or indeed any time afterwards. With this in mind, the 
memorandum placed emphasis on shared-cost initiatives, and on the variable geometry' 
nature of the proposed community. Not all of the financial burden would fall on 
member state governments, and the actual return to each member would be determined 
by the level of participation of national organisations.
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The memorandum also recognised the fact of intemational cooperation in science and 
technology, and proposed that the European technology community should continue this 
cooperation with intemational institutions and countries outside the European 
Community. Although not all technology efforts could, or indeed should be, conducted 
at the Community level, the Commission document focused on the synergetic effects of 
national, community and intemational efforts.
Having clarified national governments' concems regarding the financial requirements 
and the position of national technology policies, the Commission then identified the 
roles and responsibilities of the European institutional system in the formulation and 
implementation of a European technology policy. The division of responsibilities would 
effectively reflect what was already in place in the European Community. The 
Commission would 'fulfil its role as the driving force by issuing proposals on its own 
initiative for the adoption and review of the framework programme and following up its 
implementation.'^
The European Council would maintain its stewardship of Community developments, 
and consult the European Parliament before fixing the budget limits for technology 
programmes. Mindful of the European Council's ever cautious approach, the 
Commission was also anxious to establish its own position as the body which could give 
impetus to the creation of a technology community - the council decisions adopting the 
major specific programmes could conceivably be taken unanimously, but the ways and 
means of implementation should then be decided by a qualified majority and with 
considerable delegation of executive powers to the Commission.'^
Overall, the Commission memorandum described the context and purpose of the 
proposed policy, the broad industrial and technological objectives to be met, and the 
method of implementation. Its significance lay in the fact that it was the first 
comprehensive communication regarding a European technology policy for over two 
decades, and one which provided a coherent statement of how the overall policy might 
develop.
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But it was a communication where caution took precedence over any radical policy 
proposals. There was no challenge to national policies, and no intent to effect a 
structural technological change in European industry. Although a European dimension 
to technology policy could have provided the scope for a much more radical proposal, 
the Commission clearly decided to play safe, and to build a policy and a community on 
the existing conditions that prevailed in Europe. The conditions were in any event 
favourable - a growth in the volume of intemational alliances combined with a concern 
over the competitiveness of European industry that was shared by both national 
governments and the business community. Green Cowles (1995) showed that the large 
corporations were eager for some initiative, using the European Round Table as a very 
effective vehicle, and giving an overwhelming response to the European Community’s 
ESPRIT programme when it was first launched. Indeed, the success of this early 
ESPRIT initiative provided the basis for the introduction of the telecommunications 
programme (RACE) and other programmes, including BRITE-EURAM (Sharp and 
Shearman, 1987).
One of the over-riding concems of the memorandum was the creation of the community 
itself, one that had a broad base, rather than any particular conception as to the precise 
nature of the community. If anything, the nature of the proposed technological 
community was economic - it would be established on the basis of the need to avoid 
waste through the duplication of national research efforts, and of the need to maintain 
the competitiveness of European industry, and to protect market share. Beyond this, it 
was value-free.
The case which the Commission memorandum made for technological collaboration in 
manufacturing industry (and specifically for the BRITE-EURAM programme) is 
illustrative of this point - 'production technologies are passing through a transitional 
phase. Europe cannot let slip the opportunity it is being given of capitalizing on existing 
R&D investments. It must make the optimum use of the assets and resources that exist 
in the Community. The world market in industrial automation will probably be worth 
something between US$ 65 million and 75 million in 1989, whereas it represented only
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US$ 15 million in 1983. A great economic effort needs to be made to support such 
growth: the European CIM market should double over the next four years.'^
The following section traces the development of the BRITE-EURAM programme, and 
subsequent sections look at the political processes surrounding its development.
3.3 The BRITE-EURAM development
3.3.1 BRITEU985-19881
The BRITE-EURAM programme, under the responsibility of the Commission 
Directorate-General XII, is an amalgamation of two earlier programmes - the BRITE 
programme which covered the period 1985 to 1988,*  ^ and the EURAM programme 
from 1986 to 1989. The joint programme reflected a realisation on the part of the 
European authorities and industry of the importance of new materials and generic 
technologies in the modernisation and restructuring of industry.
BRITE-EURAM represented in large measure the acceptance by the European 
authorities of emerging ideas concerning the nature of technology as applied knowledge, 
with the blurring of the traditional science/technology divide (see section 2.2 in the 
previous chapter), and was directed therefore to the application of technologies so as to 
upgrade the processes and procedures of ordinary manufacturing operations. By 
contrast, the already-launched ESPRIT programme, in the information technology 
sector, and RACE, in communication technology, were more focused on the production 
of new technologies.
European manufacturing accounted for some 30% of Community GDP when the 
BRITE programme was first introduced, and a workforce of 41 million. BRITE and 
EURAM were both introduced to coincide with a renewed debate on the importance of 
manufacturing to economic welfare and employment. But while manufacturing 
mattered, it would be developed and supported through the market rather than through
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direct public intervention - in this case through collaborative research and development 
projects.
The overwhelming response to the first BRITE programme (1984-1987) showed that 
industry was interested in cooperative research. The Commission made two calls for 
proposals, in 1985 and in 1987. A total of 559 proposals were received in response to 
the first call for proposals, involving almost 2000 proposers mainly in groups of 3-4.
With a budget of only 125 million ECUs it was about five times oversubscribed and a 
further 60 million was made available 'with the second call for proposals in 1987. A 
total of 103 proposals with an average size of 1.6 million ECU were selected at the first 
call. They were evaluated by 63 independent experts fi'om industrial sectors and 
universities, who reported the majority of proposals of a high standard capable of 
making important contributions to the competitiveness of European industry. 
Following the second call for proposals, some 469 proposals were received, with a 
slightly higher participation by industry. With the extra money made available the 
Community eventually was able to support 112 projects under the second call, with an 
average size of project of 2 million ECU.
The programme identified nine priority themes within which collaborative proposals 
could be made. These were (1) reliability, wear and deterioration (2) laser technology 
(3) joining techniques (4) new testing methods (5) CAD/CAM, mathematical modelling 
(6) new materials (7) membranes (8) catalysis and particle technology (9) new 
production technologies suitable for products made from flexible materials. Themes 1, 
5, 6 and 9 attracted the largest share of the BRITE budget, each receiving 17% of the 
funds on average. The following section 3.4 will consider how the themes were 
selected. This first BRITE programme allocated some 67% of the budget to industry, 
22% to research centres and 11% to universities.*^ The distribution of the budget 
between the member states benefited the larger countries, with France and the UK 
receiving 22% each, Germany 20%, Italy 11%, Belgium and Holland each took 7%. 
Spain received 4% of the total BRITE budget, but in fact was only eligible to apply for 
funds under the second call following its accession in 1986.
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The overall objective of the BRITE programme was to increase the technological level 
of industry and through this to achieve an increase in its competitiveness. But the 
specific aims were to widen the collaborative net to include industrial organisations, 
academic institutions, and SMEs, while the European dimension centred on 
strengthening the European collaboration in technological R&D.
3.3.2 EURAM 1986-1989
EURAM was a much smaller programme, with a budget of 30 million ECU, introduced 
in 1986 to fimd collaborative research in new materials, including metals, ceramics and 
composite m a te r ia l s .A  total of 84 projects, with 302 participants, were funded under 
the programme, firom an original 300 proposals. The budget was allocated between the 
three groups - industry, universities and research centres - with industry receiving 44% 
of the total, universities 36%, a much higher percentage than the sector received under 
BRITE.”
The distribution of the budget between member states also differed to some extent, with 
France and the UK receiving 29% and 26% respectively. Much smaller shares of the 
programme budget went to the other member states, reflecting either strong national 
programmes in this area, for example in Germany, or lower levels of technological 
development in some of the smaller states. The German share of the budget was 17%, 
with 7% going to Italy and 5% to Spain.
EURAM differed from the other collaborative programmes in a number of respects, 
apart firom the obvious one of budget size. Although the areas and issues included were 
generally regarded as of significance for the competitiveness of European industry -the 
materials sector accounted for almost 10% of industrial activity, and formed the basis of 
developments in major industrial sectors such as automotive, aeronautics, building, 
electronics, nuclear - the evaluation committee noted the omissions in certain areas.
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There were overlaps in the areas supported with other programmes, such as BRITE and 
the ECSC programmes, and like the case of the BRITE programme many of the 
participants had already established European collaborative links. Nevertheless, the 
evaluation report found that the level of industrial applications was low and that much of 
the research work conducted under the programme was categorised as basic research, a 
fact which may be explained by the high involvement among the university sector.
The industrial response to the programme, although favourable, was somewhat mixed. 
In particular, many of the industrial participants found it difficult to accept the long-term 
nature of the research work balanced against short-term commercialisation needs. In 
this respect, the programme highlighted the different priorities and approaches of the 
two research communities, the industrial and the academic.
A more serious observation centred on the belief that the programme lacked strategic 
priorities, and that research themes were selected on a very arbitrary basis rather than 
being based on a techno-economic analysis which would enable priorities to be 
d e f in e d .T h e  evaluation committee reported 'there is a tendency for Europe to 
reproduce what it knows of American and Japanese research', and identified a lack of 
insight in the Community that extended from policy makers to industrialists. The lack 
of clarity and focus was not helped by the limited consultation with other areas of the 
Commission in the formulation of the programme.
EURAM, it would appear, was a rather hasty attempt by the Commission to counteract 
the competitive pressures which it saw facing the European materials sector, in a 
programme that lacked adequate consultation among those groups to which it was 
directed. It suggested as well a further attempt to construct the collaborative network, 
regardless of any consideration of the strategic direction that it should take.
The evaluation report on the BRITE programme had recommended that the two 
programmes be merged, a recommendation that was endorsed by the EURAM 
evaluation committee.
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3.3.3. BRITE-EURAM 1989-1992
The combined BRITE/EURAM had a budget of 500 million ECU from the Commission 
for the years 1989-1992. Under the first round of proposals in May 1989, 186 million 
ECU was made available to support 163 projects under BRITE/EURAM out of a total 
of 645 proposals covering a wide range of industrial technologies and advanced 
materials applications. A second call for proposals in the following year resulted in an 
eventual total of 368 projects, from 1304 proposals, receiving support under the 
programme - with 55% industrial participants (including 22% SMEs, 24% universities
and 21% research centres. 19
Table 3.1 BRITE-EURAM 1989-1992 Distribution of participants
Type of organisation Number of Number of
coordinators participant
groups
Large firms 165 670
SMEs 76 436
Research centres 60 355
Universities 67 473
Total 368 1934
Source: CEO (1993) Evaluation of BRITE-EURAM programme 1989- 
1992, EUR 15070.
The programme continued to be dominated by larger industrial firms, although the 
objectives included technology transfer between sectors with a high number of SMEs. 
The principal objective of the programme was to enhance the competitive position of 
European manufacturing industry, and additionally to foster trans-frontier collaboration 
in strategic industrial research, and to transfer technology across Community frontiers. 
Specifically, the programme was aimed at a small number of identified technical areas, 
with the budget allocations divided between the different areas (given here in brackets) - 
the development of advanced materials technologies (28%), design and quality 
assurance methods for products and processes (19%), applications of manufacturing
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technologies (19%), and technologies for manufacturing processes (20%). Of the 
remainder of the budget indicated in the Council Decision of 14 March 1989, 7% was 
allocated to aeronautics and the other 7% to management costs associated with the 
implementation of the programme (OJ L 98/18).
As the table below shows, there was a heavy representation among French, German and 
UK participant groups, with the smaller countries being less well represented.
Table 3.2 BRITE-EURAM National representation 
1989-1992
Member states B DK F D G IR I L NL P E UK
Coordinators 21 16 71 67 6 8 40 3 27 7 16 86
Participant 118 67 379 377 65 49 198 5 102 78 132 364
groups
Source: CEO (1993) Evaluation of BRITE-EURAM programme 1989- 
1992, EUR 15070
The merged BRITE-EURAM incorporated a number of amendments in its 
implementation.^® Projects were required to include two industrial participants so as to 
improve the industrial bias, although in fact most of the earlier projects which did 
receive aid under the first programme included two. Organisations, both industrial and 
academic, from the EFTA countries could participate in the programme, but they had to 
fund the general administrative costs of running BRITE as well as a general charge 
towards the basic administrative overheads of running the Commission generally. The 
question of EFTA participation had cropped up in the first programme, but then it was 
considered unacceptable to allow their participation when so many Community firms 
were rejected.
The BRITE-EURAM programme comprised a number of elements; industrial applied 
research, focused fundamental research, feasibility awards for SMEs, and coordinated
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activities. Under the industrial applied research, support was given to pre-competitive 
collaborative research on a shared-cost basis. Each participant was expected to make a 
significant contribution to the project, with the contracting parties bearing up to 50% of 
the costs and the remainder to be borne by the Community.
Research centres and universities were eligible for support for up to 100% of the 
additional costs of collaboration. Projects were required to include up to 10 man-years 
of activity, regarded as the realistic minimum for an effective collaborative project.
The focused fundamental research projects involved at least two partners established in 
different Member States. Where the partners were universities or research centres, the 
project was required to have at least two legally independent industrial enterprises. 
Here, the Commission was aiming to maintain the industrial bias of the BRITE- 
EURAM programme. Industrial participation was designed to ensure that the research 
matched industry needs, while also maintaining close cooperation between industry and 
the universities. The project costs in this focused research were expected to fall in the 
region of 0.4-1 million ECU under BRITE-EURAM I.
The feasibility awards were designed to assist SMEs that were interested in 
collaborative research, but were as yet uncertain of the degree of commitment which 
their resources allowed. Here the Commission supported up to 75% (maximum 25000 
ECU) of the cost of research lasting up to six months, in order to assist small and 
medium-sized firms to demonstrate their capability to undertake future collaborative 
research to potential partners. Research proposals had to conform to the technical areas 
already identified by the Commission in the BRITE-EURAM programme. Funds were 
provided to support R&D necessary to establish the feasibility of an innovative device, 
process or concept within the fields of industrial technologies and the development and 
application of advanced materials.
The intention was that the results of this research should then become the basis for the 
firm to participate in the BRITE-EURAM programme. Eligibility for a feasibility 
award was open to SMEs, defined as those firms employing less than 500 with
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capitalisation less than 75 million ECU and not more than one third owned by a parent 
company or any other organisation. The feasibility awards scheme was only open to 
businesses located within the Community, unlike the main BRITE programme which 
allowed participation to non-Community partners under certain conditions.
The final component of the programme involved the coordinated activities. In cases 
where work was already going on and funded by national authorities or privately, the 
Commission's role was confined to organising the coordination of the work, and 
Community funding covered the cost of the coordination activities. This component 
took the smallest share of the programme budget, some 10% while the largest share 
went to the first group of activities mentioned earlier, the industrial applied research.
By the time the Third Framework Programme (1990-1994) was introduced, BRITE- 
EURAM had become a well-established programme under its umbrella structure with a 
much larger share of the total budget (see Table 3.3). BRITE-EURAM II was approved 
in September 1991 by the Council of Ministers, with a budget of 848 million ECU. It 
also introduced the CRAFT initiative, specifically to assist SMEs to engage in 
cooperative research, directly responding to the criticism of the earlier programme 
regarding low representation of this group.
Table 3.3 Framework programmes - distribution of funds
% % %
1 II III
‘84-’87 ‘87-’91 ‘9Q-»94
Information/communications technologies 25 42 39
Industrial/materials technologies 11 16 16
Environment 7 6 9
Life sciences/technologies 5 9 13
Energy 50 23 14
Human capital and mobility 2 4 9
Total (million ECU) 3750 5396 5700
Source: European Report on Science and Technology Indicators, 1994 (CEC, Brussels).
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The expansion of the programme occurred through larger budgets, a greater number of 
projects being supported with larger numbers of participants. But, although more effort 
went into programme implementation with the intent of extending the collaborative net, 
it is hard to escape the conclusion that the overall Framework Programme budget 
distribution between the different areas still retained a clear objective of challenging 
Europe's main competitors, and principally Japan, in information technology.
So far, this chapter has concentrated upon setting out the development of the BRITE- 
EURAM programme chronologically, and providing a brief indication of the sectoral 
and national representation. But there is a broader concern here, which is to examine the 
extent of economic and political integration achieved through a programme that set out 
to build a network of collaborative technological alliances spanning European 
manufacturing industry.
At the beginning of this chapter, it was suggested that the number of alliances created 
under the BRITE-EURAM programme had increased significantly to a level that 
exceeded those created under the other initiatives of the Framework Programme. But 
the degree of economic integration cannot be assessed simply by the number of alliances 
created, and the volume of alliances created offers no guarantee of political integration. 
Undoubtedly, the existence of a network of collaborative technological alliances 
constitutes a technological community of some form.
The progress made in this area seems to suggest that the vision set out in the 1985 
Commission memorandum may be in the course of being realised. However, we have 
yet to ascertain the nature of the political community that was created in the process.
3.4 Political processes in BRITE-EURAM
Political integration in the technological area succeeded on the basis of several 
favourable conditions co-existing in Europe throughout the decade of the 1980s and into 
the 1990s. These conditions operated at the national level, through a general desire on
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the part of all the national governments to see an improvement in industrial 
competitiveness, secured through a macro-economic policy environment that focused on 
the market while retaining a facilitative role for government.
The member state governments were therefore in favour of a European technology 
policy that was represented with the stated objective of tackling European industrial 
competitiveness, but that did not demand large-scale financial resources. Attitudes 
towards European technology policy were essentially benign, if at times cautious. 
Caution was directed, however, less at the proposed programmes content and direction 
than at the overall Framework Programme budget.^ ^
At the international level, the growing trend in international alliances created a culture of 
cooperation among the business community. Although not in itself a new phenomenon, 
industrial alliances provided a general framework against which technology policy 
could be developed. In the context of European integration, these developments had 
potentially an important role to play, in sowing the seeds for greater economic 
integration. The European Single Market was the political goal of integrationists 
throughout this period, and any policy that fostered European economic cooperation 
could also be regarded as facilitating political cooperation.
The third condition referred to the European institutional structure, and particularly the 
part played by the European Commission within that structure. The leadership of the 
European Commission was a vital element in the development of policy, playing the 
role which it had identified for itself in the 1985 memorandum Towards a Technological 
Community. But the actions were more than those of co-ordination, it was also a 
strongly political role.^^
The notion of the European Commission as a political actor is widely accepted.^^ And it 
has long been represented as such in studies of technological policy development.^"^ The 
development of the Framework Programme throughout the 1980s under the Delors 
Commissions was essentially a continuation of earlier strategy begun by the Industry 
Commissioner, Etienne Davignon, at the turn of the decade when he brought the large
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European IT firms into the political jframe with the European Roundtable (Green 
Cowles, 1995).
The political process associated with technology policy has been broadened to include 
industrial interests through the Industrial Research and Development Advisory 
Committee (IRDAC), the European Parliament through the co-decision procedure 
introduced in the Single European Act of 1987, the member state governments still 
mainly through the European Council, and at the grass-roots level, the myriad of 
participants in the European technology programmes through the implementation 
procedures.
In essence, a multi-level political process has been developed around the technology 
programmes, and which was extended to the BRITE-EURAM programme. It becomes 
necessary to examine each level in the process, to identify what influence and input that 
particular level had on the development of the technological community. The political 
interests that were included had an obvious influence. But in fact if we also identify 
those that were excluded from having a more direct and more immediate input it may be 
possible to determine the ultimate limitations of the technological community.
This section, therefore, examines each of the levels in the political process that have 
been identifled above, beginning at the apex of the structure. Some of the aspects which 
will be looked at here relate to more general developments in the integration process, 
but which nevertheless had an impact on technology programmes overall as well as on 
the BRITE-EURAM programme. It is in this sense that the development of the 
programme has been subject to the fortunes of the broader integration process.
3.4.1 The Commission's role
As far as the broader integration process is concerned two developments had a particular 
impact - the Single European Act in 1987, and the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union which came into force on 1 November 1993. The latter brought all the diverse 
research activities of the Community together under the umbrella of the Fourth
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Framework programme, and with a much larger budget as a consequence (see Table 3.4 
at the end of this chapter). However, the Maastricht Treaty has further implications for 
European technology policy which will be considered in the concluding chapter.
Under the Single European Act (1987) a new Title VI to the Treaty of Rome covered 
research and development, giving legal status to a practice that had already been in place 
for some time. Article 13Of of the title set out the legal basis and intention of 
collaborative programmes such as the BRITE-EURAM programme. It is worthwhile to 
set out the detail of Art. 130f here:
1. The Community's aim shall be to strengthen the scientific and technological base of 
European industry and to encourage it to become more competitive at the 
international level.
2. In order to achieve this it shall encourage undertakings, including small and medim- 
sized undertakings, research centres and universities in their research and 
technological development activities; it shall support their efforts to co-operate with 
one another, aiming notably at enabling undertakings to exploit the Community's 
internal market potential to the full, in particular through the opening up of national 
public contracts, the definition of common standards and the removal of legal and 
fiscal barriers to that co-operation.
3. In the achievement of these aims, special account shall be taken of the connection 
between the common research and technological development effort, the 
establishment and the implementation of common policies, particularly as regards 
competition and trade.
There is a strong echo in these three points of the proposals made in the 1985 
memorandum. What is common to both is the emphasis on creating a community that 
encompasses the widest possible range of actors, together with a market bias that is 
linked to the objective of international competitiveness. To create this community, and
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to bring in as many participants to the Community technology programme, the 
European Commission undertook a major coordination role.
Coordination of the emerging web of technological alliances involved closer contact and 
growing involvement with participants and potential partners. It meant, too, finding 
ways of facilitating collaboration, of removing the obstacles to cross-border 
collaboration, and offering inducements to encourage higher levels of participation.
The extent of success in establishing a technological community would be gauged, in 
some respects at least, by the strength and size of the community. Conversely, success 
would also build the prestige and influence of the European Commission. Hence, it was 
logical that more economic actors had to be brought into the community. The process 
developed then through the direct interest representation of economic actors, and the 
European Commission responded through various means to facilitate their participation 
in the collaborative programmes.
Setting up and managing a collaborative venture throughout the lifetime of the 
agreement presents many problems for the firm. There is the problem of identifying the 
appropriate partner, or partners, establishing the financial contributions to be made by 
each one, the responsibilities and duties of each participant, and the protection of the 
intellectual property rights.
To the small and medium sized firm, such problems may present almost insurmountable 
difficulties to participating in a collaborative venture. Even large firms find it necessary 
to generate technology internally for this reason.^^ A firm will only enter an alliance if 
the benefits in doing so exceed the costs associated with setting up a venture between 
independent firms.
These problems were anticipated by the Commission and a system was developed to 
support participants and to encourage potential collaborators. The Commission set up a 
data base of potential participants by inviting firms, and research organisations to submit 
'expressions of interest' to Brussels. These expressions of interest offered details of
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research proposals under consideration but did not constitute, at the stage of making the 
expression, an actual proposal under BRITE-EURAM. The data base was classified by 
research tasks and types of action, and potential participants could access it through the 
Commission, or through national contact persons in each Member State.
In addition, the Commission organised public events in different Member States to 
promote participation in the programme, and to publicise a new programme, or a call for 
proposals, or to offer help on submitting proposals. Like any bureaucratic organisation, 
the Commission experienced administrative delays in its work and was conscious of 
criticism among the participants. The first BRITE programme which came into 
operation in 1985 was dogged to some extent by the complexity of the applications 
procedure, and the slowness of the decision-making by the Council on the eligibility of 
participants for Community support under the programme.^^
Following the BRITE evaluation report these issues were tackled in the Second 
Framework (1987-1991), which also had a greater level of funding and made annual 
calls for proposals rather than the intermittent calls that were a source of uncertainty in 
the first programme. It also included new standards and procedural rules, such as those 
relating to the environment and safety considerations. Application was made easier 
through a simplified information package. In addition there was to be close 
coordination of this programme with EUREKA projects, with ECSC research, the 
COMETT programme and the ESPRIT programme particularly in the areas of expert 
systems, situation monitoring systems and preventive maintenance and quality control.^^
Regular workshops were organised throughout the Community to provide support, or 
information to proposers, or to the individual coordinators who had to make regular 
progress reports to the Commission. Such events offered an opportunity for potential 
collaborative partners to meet, and helped to create an informal community with an 
increasingly European identity. Since the average length of collaborative project 
supported under BRITE-EURAM was 3-4 years, co-ordination was an important part of 
the management of collaboration.
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3.4.2 Industrial representation
The Commission was anxious, from the beginning, to promote the programme as 
market-led.^* It considered that the initiative should reflect the needs of industry, and 
that industry should be involved in the formulation of what the supranational authority 
termed a bottom-up' programme. Moving away from the previous experience of 
collaboration on centrally planned, large-scale projects during the 1960s and 1970s, the 
new policy sought to involve a much broader range of industrial and research actors on 
smaller projects with a distinct industrial bias.^^
The Industrial Research and Development Advisory Committee (IRDAC) was 
appointed by the Commission in 1984 to ensure that the industrial interests were 
represented in the formulation and implementation of technology programmes, to advise 
on industrial research policy, and to act as the general voice of industry.
It was composed initially of 12 members chosen for their 'substantial experience in 
research and development work in industrial undertakings, research institutes or other 
organisations involved in work related to industrial research and development who shall 
be appointed by the Commission in a personal capacity'.^^ Membership was increased 
to 14 in 1986,^* and currently stands at 24.
The term of membership is in principle limited to three years, except in the case of the 
members coming from European organisations: the Union of Industries of the European 
Community (UNICE), the European Centre for Public Enterprise (ECPE), the 
Federation of European Industrial Cooperative Research Organisations (FEICRO), the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), and the European Union of Crafts and 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (UAEPME). The individual members came from 
large corporations in the European Community - there were no individual 
representatives of small and medium sized firms.
IRDAC operated through plenary sessions, working parties and round tables, and 
established over the years a communication network throughout the Community made
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up of over 500 high level managers. These helped to form a pool of expertise to which 
the Commission turned for proposals regarding areas of research which BRITE- 
EURAM should target. Many of them were also invited to evaluate research proposals 
submitted under the programme, and to assist with mid-term reviews of the 
collaboration projects. The Commission also used experts not directly involved with 
IRDAC to assist in a similar way, from industrial organisations and universities 
throughout the Community.
Although IRDAC was set up to represent an independent voice of European industry, its 
work has tended to be organised by the Commission, and representatives of the 
Commission can take part in the meetings of the committee.^^ The areas of work have 
been extended beyond industrial research, to include environmental research, marine 
sciences, bio-technology, pre-normative research, and skills shortages throughout 
Europe. In effect, the agenda has widened to match the interests of the Commission, 
and to reflect the development of the Commission agenda on research and technology.^^
To a large extent, IRDAC has been co-opted by the Commission to identify the needs 
and interests of industry certainly, but also to build the political support for Community 
policy among industry representatives, and to widen the base of that support as much as 
possible.^"^
Despite its supposed independent status, IRDAC offered very cautious opinions on the 
Framework Programme. It has tended to offer little challenge to Commission proposals 
or the rationale for such proposals, and tended to respond more in a reactive mode to the 
proposals of the European Commission. The Opinion on the Framework Programme 
1987-1991 approved the purpose of the programme to stimulate cooperation at the 
European level both for the generation of new technology and for its implementation,^^ 
and in doing so re-echoed the stated aims of the Commission to create a European 
technological community.^^
IRDAC has consistently taken the side of the European Commission in seeking a higher 
budget for the Framework Programme, and for both the Second and Third Framework
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Programmes the committee found itself in opposition to the European Council, when the 
latter succeeded in forcing through lower budgets than those originally proposed by the 
Commission.
IRDAC aligned itself with the Commission in other areas besides the Framework 
budget. As the debate on what factors affected industrial competitiveness broadened, 
the contribution made by IRDAC to the debate was extended to a consideration of issues 
such as skills.^^ The committee supported the Community's Human Capital and 
Mobility programme, introduced under the Third Framework Programme to increase the 
mobility and training of researchers and the formation of research networks within the 
Community.^^ IRDAC's view, expressed in a report published in 1990, was that the 
output of education and training systems (including in particular Higher Education) in 
terms of both quantity and quality of skills at all levels is the prime determinant of a 
country's level of industrial productivity and hence competitiveness.'^^
The committee argued that investment in research and technology could not be 
increased without giving due regard to the level of qualified people. At the European 
level, the IRDAC recommended that all European R&D efforts should be accompanied 
by related training measures,"^® and concluded that education and training must be part of 
the European strategy for dealing with competitiveness. The universities and research 
centres, already part of the integration process through existing programmes, could be 
the vehicle through which such a plan might be implemented.
IRDAC's most consistent influence has been through its insistence that technology 
policy should start firom the needs of the market and the user. As a result, firom the 
Second Framework Programme onwards the BRITE-EURAM projects were encouraged 
to include a potential user of the research results in the collaborative project. This 
became central in the pronouncements of the Commission as the BRITE-EURAM 
programme developed.
More recently, as the committee extended its brief into the area of skills, training and 
education, it has moved to the view that the research supported under the European
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technology programmes should be confined to pre-competitive activities/^ It opposed 
the support for near-market activities. In an opinion on the EC White Paper, Growth. 
Competitiveness and Employment"^^ . delivered to the Commission in March 1994, the 
committee welcomed the special place that the White Paper gave to research and 
technological development. It agreed that research aimed at industry, including basic 
technological research, should be substantially increased, but it warned that while RTD 
was necessary it was not in itself sufficient for industrial competitiveness."^^ The 
committee did, however, recommend that traditional industrial sectors should be 
boosted through the application of new technologies.
3.4.3 The European Parliament's role
The European Parliament supported the Framework Programme from its earliest stages, 
and the parliamentary Committee on Energy, Research and Technology conducted 
rigorous debate on each successive Framework Programme and on the constituent 
programmes. The Committee was sometimes hampered in its examination of the latter 
by a scarcity of specialist technical advisors, but this problem was significantly reduced 
from the early 1990s. By contrast, the Committee has provided diligent comment on 
more general aspects of proposed policy issues, and particularly focused on strategic 
directions for the evolving European technology policy.
Parliament supported the European-wide initiatives on the basis of the need for a 
European-wide initiative to defend economic security. Its position was best summarised 
by the chairman of the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology in the 
European Parliament, Mr. Poniatowski, who concluded that Europe 'has neither the 
political and economic power for its strength is dispersed and divided by petty national 
frontiers, nor the aggressive scientific and marketing approach of the Japanese. Very 
few European firms have the international stature to act alone without political 
support...'"^ In this statement lay an endorsement of the sentiments expressed by the 
European Commission in its 1985 memorandum on the creation of a technological 
community.
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But Parliament found difficulty in making a real impact on the policy process. A report 
by the Energy, Research and Technology Committee, produced in 1985, put forward a 
set of criteria to be used in the selection of technologies. The criteria included broad 
socio-economic concerns that were rejected at the time by the European Commission on 
the basis that they had nothing to do with research, and would eclipse the scientific and 
technological quality requirements."^^
In a speech to the Parliament in 1987, the vice-President of the Commission, Karl-Heinz 
Naijes, emphasised the essential industrial nature of the BRITE-EURAM programme - 
'I t is essential for there to be inter-sectoral technological research in the European 
Community, with industry, technology and research centres and universities in the 
various Member States cooperating with one another. Even though this research takes 
place at a pre-competitive stage, it has a clear-cut industrial purpose. It lays the 
foundations for the development of new products and processes. In this way it 
strengthens our innovating potential, enabling us to participate in the race to 
manufacture the best products with the prospect of succeeding in the world's markets.'"*^
Until the Single European Act introduced the co-decision procedure, which gave the 
Parliament the formal right to consultation, this body had a limited role in the decision­
making on European technology policy. Up to that point. Parliament played an indirect 
role, acting as a buffer between the Commission and a European Council which tended 
to take a more cautious approach to research and technology proposals. It was not until 
1987 that the Chairman of the European Parliament's Energy, Research and Technology 
Committee was invited to address the Council of Research Ministers.
While Parliament supported the Framework Programme fi'om the beginning it found 
itself in conflict with the European Council over the level of funding for the programme. 
The ECU 5400 million eventually adopted in the Second Framework Programme had 
been stipulated by Parliament as a sine qua non of approval, without which the 
programme would not have been adopted.
115
When it came to the Third Framework Programme, the Energy, Research and 
Technology Committee of the European Parliament sought, unsuccessfully, to have the 
programme budget increased from the Commission's proposed ECU 7700 million to 
ECU 8230 million. It also called for more attention to be given to renewable energies, 
energy efficiency, the training of researchers, and the needs of SMEs."^ ^
However, it was also a platform for member state views on technology programmes. 
The more pronounced concern of the European Commission in recent years to conduct 
programme evaluations perhaps owes something to Parliamentary debates. Delegates 
from the United Kingdom stressed the need for programmes to be subject to strict 
evaluation, citing the national practice where strict appraisal of national programmes 
was a permanent feature of the system."^ *
Spanish delegates favoured a stronger focus on supporting small and medium-sized 
firms through the technology programmes. A Spanish MEP, Robles Piquer, suggested 
that the BRITE-EURAM programme had the potential to make a substantial 
contribution to modernisation of indus t ryMore  recently, in May 1994, the same view 
was expressed by J.D. Javier Solana, the then Spanish Minister of Education and 
Science, at a BRITE-EURAM workshop organised by the European Commission in 
Seville.
The European Parliamentary debates on technology policy often tended to reflect the 
national practice and approach, and reiterated the view that European technology 
programmes should not challenge national efforts.
The Single European Act not only established the legal basis to EC technology policy, it 
also changed the institutional decision-making structure, giving the Parliament the 
potential to have a greater say in such policy through a co-operation procedure giving it 
limited power of co-decision in certain areas and a formalised right to consultation.^^ 
Before this, the Commission drafted proposals for legislation and the Council made the 
final decisions on legislation. The European Parliament had no real say in the
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legislation process, although it could delay proposals. Now it had the opportunity to 
influence policy development.^^
In practice, it had more chance of doing so through individual programmes rather than 
the overall Framework Programme where financial considerations of the member states 
found expression in the deliberations of the European Council.^^
Parliament tabled several amendments to the BRITE programme (1985-1988), 
regarding the inclusion of an explicit reference to solidarity and cohesion in the 
Community, the requirement that the programme should increase jobs, and that more 
detailed terms governing the involvement of non-Community participants should be 
inserted.The European Parliament tabled some 53 amendments to the Commission's 
proposal for a new BRITE-EURAM II, and the Commission incorporated 34 of these 
into its amended proposal.^^ Increasingly, in the aftermath of the Single European Act 
the Parliament began to adopt views on the broader role of technology in serving the 
needs of society.^^ It considered that the Framework Programme did not have a well- 
defined strategy in this regard, although ESPRIT, RACE and BRITE-EURAM 
represented small steps in the strategic direction.
While the Second Framework Programme proclaimed that technology policy should be 
'placed at the service of social development through the pursuit of ad hoc aims (health, 
nuclear safety, working conditions, training, etc., and in more general terms, the 
environment),'^^ these remained general philosophies rather than being fundamental and 
specific to the implementation of the programmes. It was not until the debate of the 
Third Framework Programme (1990-94) that a more conscious attempt to relate the 
Commission policy to economic and social cohesion was made, and to consider the 
human and environmental impact of research proposals.^^
By the end of the 1980s, the European Parliament was trying to redefine the influential 
role which the Commission had created for itself through technology policy, while not 
launching an outright challenge to the Commission. Each still depended to a significant 
extent on the other, but the Parliament was, nevertheless, willing to flex its muscles by
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suggesting that the Commission propose the setting up of a European scientific high 
a u t h o r i t y T h e  proposed body, according to the Parliament, would involve all the 
institutions equally in evaluation.
3.5 Integration through the market
In point of fact, the Commission's position was unassailable. The BRITE-EURAM 
programme was presented by the Commission as being a 'bottom-up' programme, 
industry-driven and meeting the needs of the market. The involvement of IRDAC 
seemed to confirm this, and to affirm the legitimacy of the supranational authority's 
position.
Moreover, IRDAC combined with the Commission to establish a network of 
independent advisors and consultants among the industrial and scientific communities in 
Europe to advise on programme content. It was through this network that the BRITE- 
EURAM programme found its identity and structure. Although becoming ever larger 
and more dense by the beginning of the 1990s, the network operated at a disaggregated 
level as far as industrial interests were concerned, leaving a much more obvious 
leadership role for the European Commission. For a lot of the time, the Commission 
took it to extend the technological community.
Under BRITE-EURAM, the Commission made sure smaller enterprises were made 
aware of the opportunities available, and could receive assistance with finding partners 
in other countries as well as dealing with the administrative and bureaucratic 
processes.^^ This proved to be more difficult than anticipated, and the provision of 
institutional support alone could not guarantee either participation in collaborative 
programmes or that the objectives of SMEs were being met.^^
The findings of an independent evaluation of the first BRITE-EURAM programme were 
that smaller firms were under-represented.^^ And the Commission reiterated its 
intention to focus continued efforts on bringing in the SMEs.^ The Euro Information 
Centres, set up around the Community, were a direct result of the action programme.^^
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So too was the offer to SMEs to collaborate in related programmes such as SPRINT, for 
technology transfer, and COMETT for education and training. The majority of the 
participants in the BRITE-EURAM programme surveyed for this thesis take part in one 
or both of these initiatives.
It was envisaged that BRITE-EURAM projects would become self-supporting and that 
cooperation would become a natural and accepted procedure without support from the 
Community funds. But the programme would, in the Commission's view, be needed 
well into the 1990s.^  ^ It could also be said that the reassurance given by the 
Commission, that the programme would continue over the long term, acted as 
encouragement to economic actors in their search for collaborative partners.
So too did the provisions covering the new knowledge and patents directly obtained 
through Community research. The industrial property rights belonged to the firm or 
contractor carrying out the research. Preferential access to the information and patents 
directly obtained through the contracts with the Community, was granted in decreasing 
order of priority, to other contractors on the project, other participants in the BRITE- 
EURAM programme working in the same field, and other firms established in the 
Community. Exploitation of the results of research was facilitated by the Commission 
setting up the VALUE programme,^^ and the following chapter will show that many of 
the participants surveyed are also part of this network.
Although BRITE-EURAM was intended to support pre-competitive research, the notion 
of pre-competitive remained poorly defined, and open to liberal and individual 
interpretation among individuals within the Commission. European competition policy 
precluded collusive behaviour among industrial firms that could be considered to 
infringe market competition, so that some provision had to be made for cooperative 
practices emerging under the Framework Programme. The block exemptions under 
Regulation 418/85 covered joint activities conducted under the Framework Programme. 
In adition, the European Commission insisted that collaborative research activities 
should be confined to the pre-competitive stage. The greatest difficulty was in 
establishing a clear definition of the term ‘pre-competitive’.
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When pushed, as for example by participants at the Seville workshop organised by the 
Commission in May 1992, the supranational authority identified pre-competitive as 
being activities that were upstream and ‘away from the market’. The lack of a clear-cut 
definition, or a quantitative indicator, meant that a range of activities of varying 
proximity to the marketplace, were regarded as eligible by Commission officials. 
Sandholtz (1992) pointed out that the emphasis on pre-competitive research existed 
from the beginning of the ESPRIT programme, partly since the Treaty of Rome did not 
provide the European Commission with authority for industrial policy, and partly 
because the Commission itself argued for a concerted effort to be made in the area of 
long-term industrial research. He considered that the definition was ‘intentionally left 
vague’ (p. 167).
Deliberate or not, the vague definition given to the type of research activities that would 
be supported under the Framework Programme meant that the European Commission 
could launch the programme within the limits of the authority that actually existed at 
that point in time. In the first BRITE-EURAM, and successor programmes, the notion 
of pre-competitive research was again highlighted. But the political convenience 
attached to the use of this term managed to obscure for a while the essential 
contradiction behind it.
BRITE-EURAM is a good example of this contradiction. In this programme, the 
Commission sought to extend the amount of applied research in European 
manufacturing industry, including SMEs. It stressed the need for greater innovation, 
and from the Second Framework Programme stipulated that users should be involved in 
collaborative projects. For these objectives to be met there would have to be a move 
downstream in the activities undertaken. During the second Framework Programme, 
there was a downward shift in the research activities supported, to include activities 
closer to the market.^* Pre-competitive research was not so compatible with the 
simultaneous emphasis also being placed on innovation and application, particularly for 
small- and medium-sized firms that were actively encouraged by the Commission to 
take part in the programme. How could firms jointly cooperate on research activities
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away from the market, and at the same time co-operate to improve the level of applied 
research, which by implication takes them closer to the market?
The position taken by the supranational authority appeared more sympathetic with the 
needs of market agents, and so gave greater appeal to EC policies as relevant and 
appropriate to their commercial needs. The Commission maintained this position, 
seeing co-operation projects as a learning process for the participants, where the 
preconditions have to be built by a supranational institution.^^
An evaluation study of 207 finished projects, half of which involved SMEs, carried out 
in 1991 showed that a substantial impact on their innovation potential was expected as a 
result of participation in the programme.^^ BRITE-EURAM II, approved by the 
Council of Ministers on 9 September 1991 for the period 1990-1994, included a sub- 
programme which was specifically intended to assist co-operative research by SMEs - 
the CRAFT programme. By the end of 1991 the BRITE-EURAM had been responsible 
for setting up an industrial R&D network in Europe, involving 3000 organisations 
participating in 750 research projects among 17 countries. One out of four partners in 
the network was an SME, with 29% from industry, 27% from universities, and 17% 
comprising research centres.^^ As the opening paragraphs of this chapter suggested, the 
community of technological alliances has increased in size since then.
3.6 The integration pattern
The preceding remarks have a strong resonance in the context of any evaluation of the 
BRITE-EURAM programme. Although this specific programme has attracted an 
increasing share of the overall Framework Programme budget (see Appendix 4), and an 
increasing number of participants, the pattern of participation reflects the uneven 
technological capability that exists within and between the member states. At no point 
has either the programme, or more general policy pronouncements indicated either the 
desire or the intention to tackle such differences in technological capability.
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Under the Second Framework Programme, BRITE-EURAM supported 375 
collaborative projects in the shared-cost actions, with a total of 1871 participants and an 
average of five participants in each project. The successor programme supported 463 
projects with 1847 participants, and a smaller average of four participants to each 
project. The average number of member states had also fallen, fi’om 6.0 to 2.5, while 
the average European Commission funding per project also declined fi*om 1240 (000 
ECU) to 1091 (000 ECU)/^
These figures do not include the aeronautics section five of the BRITE-EURAM 
programme.^^ In this area, 28 projects with 295 participants were supported under the 
Second Framework Programme, with an average Commission funding of 1240 (000 
ECU). The average number of participants per project was 10.5, with some six member 
states to each project. By the Third Framework Programme, the number of projects 
supported had fallen to 22 but with more participants in each project. Both the average 
number of participants and the average number of member states had risen, respectively 
to 14.0 and 6.5, and a significant increase in the average Commission funding per 
project, to 2156 (000 ECU).^ "^
The evidence of the programme's popularity with European industry was shown by the 
overwhelming responses given to the Commission's calls for proposals, as each new 
programme was introduced. The early programmes had a particularly high proposal 
rejection rate, often because the funds had run out as much as because of the 
technological quality of the proposals.^^ However, the evidence presented above would 
suggest that the Commission was trying to involve as many participants as possible by 
spreading the net wide.
This type of approach carries with it certain risks which could have the effect of 
mitigating the positive results intended. For one thing, spreading the resources widely 
could mean such dispersion has little real impact which a more focused, strategic 
approach might achieve. If organisations are not certain of receiving the appropriate 
level of funding to do the requisite amount of research that is necessary, then they may 
be discouraged firom applying for support and hence fi*om doing the research. In any
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event, there is no guarantee that the most deserving will receive the support that is 
available. The most deserving, of course, will be determined by the political or 
economic criteria being used.
That observation regarding the most deserving recipients of support is a usefiil 
introduction to the next aspect of the participation pattern. BRITE-EURAM, intended 
to support multi-sectoral collaboration in manufacturing, was dominated under the 
Second Framework Programme by large enterprises. Following a concerted attempt by 
the European Commission to broaden the spread of membership, the number of small- 
and medium-sized enterprises involved in the programme increased during the Third 
Framework Programme. Nevertheless, the White Paper on industrial competitiveness, 
published by the European Commission in 1994, suggested that there is still a long way 
to go in incorporating the SMEs in industrial cooperation.
Of the total 1871 participants under the Second Framework Programme, some 522 were 
large organisations, with 493 SMEs, 402 research centres and 441 universities. The 
corresponding figures in the follow-up programme were 480 large organisations, 569 
SMEs, 373 research centres and 368, showing a more industrial bias. The dominance of 
the large organisations was also apparent with the other industrial research programmes, 
ESPRIT and RACE, although the former showed an increase under the Third 
Framework Programme in the number of SME participants.
Apart from their numerical strength within the programme, the large organisations also 
appropriated the largest share of the programme budget. Under the Second Framework 
programme, the large corporations received 30.6%, while SMEs received 25.1%, with 
public research centres and universities receiving 19.4% and 24.3% respectively. This 
did not change under the Third Framework Programme, and in fact the large 
corporations received an even larger slice, 32.8%, with 26% to SMEs and universities 
losing out to the public research centres, 19.6% to the latter's 20.9%.^^
A similar pattern was evident in the sectoral distribution of funds under the ESPRIT and 
RACE programmes, in both the Second and the Third Framework Programmes. RACE
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had a particularly strong bias in funding large organisations under the Second 
Framework Programme, although this was reduced slightly in the successor programme.
The third evaluation study of the BRITE-EURAM programme, based on interviews 
with the leaders of 84 projects completed in 1992, reported favourable results from the 
programme. Out of the total, some 71% of the participants believed they had fully met 
their objectives, while the majority considered the results of collaboration were either 
level with (28%), beyond (45%) or strongly beyond (18%), the current state of the art in 
the particular field of endeavour. The evaluation looked at the economic effects, 
measured either directly by sales or by cost reductions, and indirect effects as measured 
by technology transfers, improved networks, or improved organisational processes. The 
conclusion was that most projects show economic effects in the following five years, 
with the average for these 84 projects being 12 MECU per project. At a more general 
level, the conclusion based on this report and the BETA (CEC, 1993) report is that every 
ECU invested in these research programmes yields at least 7 ECU in potential economic 
impact within five years.
The evaluation also looked at the strength and cohesiveness of the partnership created, 
seeing this as a significant factor in the successful completion of the project. In the 
BRITE-EURAM evaluation, it was found that 90% of the partnerships continued after 
the project was completed, with high or very high efficiency of cooperation between 
partners in 67% of the cases. Chapter six of this study also finds a generally high level 
of satisfaction among the participants with their existing partners, with many expressing 
the intention to continue collaboration beyond the life of the project.
However, the bias towards large organisations mitigated the modernising impact of the 
programme, all the more so since much of the European manufacturing sector is 
characterised by small- and medium-sized firms. This is true of Spain, and to a 
significant extent in the United Kingdom also. Despite more recent efforts by the 
European Commission to include smaller enterprises within the widening collaborative 
net, and IRDAC's proposal to set up the CRAFT initiative specifically for SMEs, there
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is still a perception among this group that large obstacles hinder their participation in the 
programme. This was supported by the results of the survey, reported in chapter six.
Inevitably, this type of sectoral bias was reflected in the national participation pattern. It 
is difficult to obtain precise figures on the distribution of programme funds between the 
member states, particularly as the Commission does not tend to publicise this type of 
information which it regards as having potentially adverse political consequences if 
some member states see themselves as receiving less than their fair share. The UK's 
dispute over the agriculture budget had taught the European Commission a lesson in 
caution, and highlighted the political wisdom of avoiding the appearance of being too 
bountiful vdth some member states compared to others.^^
Nevertheless, the evidence pointed to the dominance of the larger member states within 
the programme. In this chapter, table 3.2 highlighted the leading positions of France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom in the BRITE-EURAM programme (under the 
Second Framework). The 1992 Annual Report of Government-Funded R&D, published 
by the Cabinet Office in the United Kingdom, ranked France, UK, and Germany (in that 
order) as the member states with the largest volume of participation in the overall 
Second Framework Programme. It also indicated a rising participation rate for each of 
these countries over the five years of the programme, from 1987 to 1991.^*
Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Belgium formed a second group, again in that particular 
order. The smaller member states showed significantly smaller participation rates, 
although these were rising over the period. Chapter five suggests that Spanish 
participation and the return from the BRITE-EURAM programme increased towards the 
end of the 1980s, but that the return was coming under increasing scrutiny from the 
Spanish authorities and also the technological community. The UK has been a net 
beneficiary under the BRITE-EURAM programme almost from the beginning, so has 
avoided this particular form of criticism. Additionally, the policy of cutting public 
support for research and development activities placed the European programmes in a 
position to act as replacement for national policy.
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One other related point concerning the national pattern of participation will be made 
here. It concerns the appearance of collaborative networks within the European 
Community, linking the different member states in relation to the volume of 
participation by each one. Among the countries with the largest participation rates, there 
has developed a very dense pattern of collaborative research and development links, 
with a much less dense pattern appearing for the smaller countries.
Under the Second Framework Programme, Spain had the highest number of 
collaborative links with France, United Kingdom, and Germany, a pattern that was 
repeated under the Third Framework Programme.^^ The survey results presented in 
chapter six of this thesis suggest a slightly different order in respect of the BRITE- 
EURAM programme, with Spanish organisations collaborating most frequently with 
partners in Holland, France and Germany. The United Kingdom created most 
collaborative links under the Second Framework Programme with France and Germany, 
with a less dense collaborative linkage with Italian and Dutch partners. The same 
pattern was repeated under the Third Framework Programme, although there was a 
slight shift away from France and Germany, in favour of Italy and Holland. There was 
also a slight fall in the number of collaborative links between the UK and Spain.
The United Kingdom had a higher rate of collaboration under the European programmes 
with domestic partners than was the case for Spain, which is also noted in chapter six. 
However, a comparison of the Second and Third Framework Programmes showed an 
increase in the volume of Spanish domestic collaboration, as well as a slight increase in 
the collaboration with smaller countries such as Ireland and Greece. These two 
countries were recipients under the Cohesion Funds announced at the Edinburgh summit 
in 1992, as was Portugal.
Spain’s collaborative links with Portugal, however, declined under the Third Framework 
Programme. Like Spain, Portuguese domestic collaboration also increased, as did its 
collaboration with another Cohesion partner, Ireland. The conclusion is that there 
appears to be an emerging pattern of alliances under a core-periphery scenario.
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reflecting in particular the technological capability of the member states and hence their 
dominance within the different programmes.
The conclusion is, therefore, disturbing for two reasons. Firstly, the appearance of a 
collaborative pattern that exhibits a core-periphery nature does not suggest a community 
that is fairly and evenly balanced. Such a community must inevitably be unstable, with 
low levels of trust and the expectation of continued divergence in the pattern of 
alliances, and in the consequent technological benefits to be derived from such alliances. 
If there is widespread support for the technological community, then pressures and 
demands for change are likely to arise.
Secondly, this emerging pattern of core-periphery technology alliances challenges the 
notion of economic and social cohesion, the objectives that were identified in the Single 
European Act and further endorsed under the Maastricht Treaty. European technology 
policy has certainly not addressed the issue of competitiveness, which was identified as 
one of the key objectives of the policy, and set out as such in the 1985 Commission 
memorandum. Towards a Technological Community. It is questionable, therefore, 
whether the policy can have any greater success in dealing with the issues of economic 
and social cohesion under the context and set of circumstances in which the policy is 
presently situated. Chapter eight will return to this question in assessing the possibility 
for the Framework Programme, and specifically the BRITE-EURAM programme, of 
being capable of meeting the goals of competitiveness and economic and social 
cohesion.
3.7 Conclusion
The emergence of European technology policy has brought with it a European 
technological community, one that is both hierarchical in structure and diverse in 
membership and commitment. With the adoption of the Fourth Framework Programme 
on 26 April 1994, and of the specific programmes later on that year, European 
technology policy has become a stable feature of the EU’s activities.
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From the first initiatives of the early 1980s through to the most recent Framework 
Programme, technology policy has attracted the interest and involvement of an 
increasing range of political actors - from the grassroots level of the participants to 
national governments, the European Council and the Parliament, and European-level 
organisations.
In addition to the actors referred to in the preceding paragraph, the programmes have 
also seen participants from EFTA countries, many of which are now members of the 
EU. Their involvement at the time reflected a degree of openness on the part of the 
European Commission as far as international technology flows were concerned, in 
recognition that 'a  technology community, open and uninhibited, cannot isolate itself 
within its geographical or institutional boundaries without the risk of suffocation or 
decline.^°
Returning to the specific case of the BRITE-EURAM programme, two general 
questions arise which this concluding section will address. The first question, identified 
at the beginning of this chapter, was why so many participated in the programme. And 
the second issue revolves around the consideration as to whether a political community 
has been created. Although in many respects the questions are inter-related, here they 
will be treated independently.
To answer the first question one can turn to a consideration of the individual motives for 
cross-border technological alliances, and to more general factors associated with the 
environment within which collaboration must occur. The next two chapters examine the 
national context within which actors must operate, and which shapes the approach to 
cross-border collaboration for all actors. In chapter six, the analysis takes a step fiirther 
by examining the individual motives, and the supporting empirical evidence.
As to the environment, the Commission effectively created a European-level 
institutional system which fostered cooperation and was directed towards reducing the 
risks and difficulties associated with cross-border technological alliances. As one of the 
primary political actors, the supranational authority responded to the demands and
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interests of those groups that it wanted to see in the collaborative net. It did so through 
the implementation of the programme, by providing support in finding partners, 
information about the programme, management of project collaboration, more near- 
market activities, and help with using the results of the collaboration.
In order that collaboration among industrial firms would not conflict with Community 
competition policy, a linchpin of the integration process, certain exemptions to Article 
85 of the treaty had been granted in March 1985. Regulation 418/85 allowed for 
collaborative agreements in pre-competitive R&D under the Framework 
Programme.Several years later, a system of regular programme evaluations was 
introduced, the results of which formed the basis for renewing the follow-up 
programme.*^
Evaluations were conducted by panels of independent experts from industry and the 
scientific community at the invitation of the Commission, and centred upon examination 
of the quality of the research results, programme management, and more generally the 
contribution of the programme to the social and economic development of the 
Community, as well as the benefits of implementing the programme at the Community 
level.
In practice, this system of evaluation was part of the broader approach which involved 
the European Commission coopting IRDAC into the political decision-making process. 
The chair of the first evaluation of BRITE was Yves Farge, vice-president of research 
and development with the French firm, Pechiney, who was also chairman of IRDAC for 
a number of years. Bringing in the industrial elites in this manner helped to secure 
greater legitimacy for the Commission strategy.
It worked well enough in that evaluation panels tended to report favourably, and their 
recommendations on programme management and implementation were acted upon by 
the Commission.*^ The evaluation of the BRITE-EURAM programme 1989-1992 noted 
the positive contribution to competitiveness and cohesion, and concluded that the 
programme had been a 'substantial success'. But it also raised concern over the shift to
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near-market research and the increasing level of proposals, which could bring the 
BRITE-EURAM programme more into competition with EUREKA, and warned 
'development along these lines without a substantial increase in fimds would result in a 
very high rejection rate - perhaps in excess of 95% - which could have undesirable 
consequences.
The problem, as the panel saw it, was that the Commission was engaged in a balancing 
act, trying to encourage pre-competitive research but facing political pressure to show 
immediate economic benefits. It was also trying to involve more SMEs, organisations 
primarily interested in the near-market activities. In addition, the programme sought to 
contribute to cohesion, while promoting projects of scientific and technical merit.
More broadly, the Commission was having to respond to pressure from some member 
states for juste retour, which could have an impact on project selection possibly at the 
expense of technical merit of the future projects. The balancing act was, however, an 
inevitable result of the political process instituted by the Commission with its over­
riding objective of creating the technological community.
Despite such difficulties, the political process gave singular prominence to the 
Commission as political actor. Industrial representation did not challenge this to any 
great extent in that IRDAC was created by Commission decree, with members 
appointed in their personal capacity while continuing to hold positions in the major 
corporations throughout Europe.*"  ^Certainly, it was not greatly representative of broader 
industrial interests, of SMEs, or of the scientific community at large. On the other hand, 
there was a benefit for the committee members in having the ear of the Commission, 
which could be potentially beneficial when it came to other areas of proposed 
Community policy.
The effect of the key position of the European Commission, combined with the 
industrial-bias and the increasingly near-market emphasis of the research was to leave 
the scientific community on the periphery in the political process. There was a degree 
of exclusion as far as the academic technological community was concerned, in that
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although the Commission consulted scientific experts, it did so on an ad hoc and 
decentralised basis. The result was an extremely disaggregated level of interest 
representation, making it difficult to reflect more organised scientific interests in the 
policy.
Some have identified a 'scientific deficit' similar to the democratic deficit. As one 
commentator has noted, 'the decision to tackle certain problems and the decisions 
subsequently taken basically reflect conflicts of interest - or lack of interest which 
produces a slide away from the scientific towards the economic. Procedures do not 
really allow organised, properly thought-out and transparent scientific confrontation .... 
there is insufficient connection between decision-making processes and European 
research programmes, and a closed character in the expert networks linked to the 
Commission'.^^
The European Parliament has displayed interest in European technology policy from the 
beginning, and an increasing desire to secure greater involvement in the formulation and 
implementation of programmes. It has emphasised the importance of technology policy 
in general adopting a more strategic focus, and indeed some of its recommendations are 
beginning to appear in the policy objectives, notably economic and social cohesion, 
employment, environmental, and health and safety concerns. The annual report by the 
Commission on research activities, the first of which was issued in 1995, is a direct 
result of pressure by the Parliament.*^
What part did the member states play in this political process? National governments 
were broadly in support of the programme and its objectives, particularly that of 
international competitiveness. The BRITE-EURAM programme did not conflict with 
national government policy. Instead, there was a degree of symmetry between the 
objectives of the EC technology policy - international competitiveness and the 
attainment of all the objectives laid down in the Single Act*  ^- and those of the national 
governments.
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The Commission did not claim to substitute for national policy, confining itself to 
suggesting its competence in allocating certain resources and in coordinating national 
activities, 'to introduce efficiency, transparency and compatibility with national 
polic ies ' .The idea of national economic security was thus assured, particularly since 
the promise made in the 1985 memorandum. Towards a Technological Community, to 
co-ordinate national policies showed no sign of being fulfilled.
In fact, it was not until July 1995 that the first debate on the coordination of member 
states' science and technology policies began - and even then it was conducted in an 
informal meeting of the Council of Research Ministers.
The BRITE-EURAM programme was launched amidst a general concern with the 
relative competitiveness of European industry. Both the political and economic case 
were obvious, while the Commission's presentation of the programme as market-led 
made it more acceptable to national governments, many of whom followed non­
interventionist policies at the time.*^ However, it was clear that approaching the mid- 
1990s competitiveness remains a major concern that is likely to give rise to additional 
pressures, expectations and demands and possibly require more forthright and as yet 
untried solutions.
The European Commission instituted a structure for the implementation of the BRITE- 
EURAM programme, which enabled it to go directly to firms, and to bypass national 
governments. While the latter have exerted their voices in European technology, 
through the Council, opposition has been voiced on the overall budget for Framework, 
rather than the specific strategy inherent in specific initiatives.
For many of the economic actors, the system of access and support provided by the 
Commission, and the growing ease of access, made the Commission appear as 
approachable as national governments. The Commission acted like the national 
government - it provided information, finance, support and management of research and 
technology within a supranational institutional structure. Chapter six will consider to
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what extent the participants did in fact regard the Community initiative as a substitute 
for national support.
But before this, the next chapter returns to the national level, to examine the nature of 
the UK technological system and the context in which UK actors operate.
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Table 3.4 Fourth framework Programme 1994-1998 - breakdown of finances (MECU)
ACTIVITY 1 - RTD and Demonstration Programmes 10696
Information/Communications technologies 3405
1. Telematics 843
2. Communications technologies 630
3. Information technologies 1932
Industrial technologies 1995
4. Industrial/materials technologies 1707
5. Standardization/measurement 288
Environment 1080
6. Environment/climate 852
7. Marine sciences/technologies 228
Life sciences/technologies 1572
8. Biotechnology 552
9. Biomedicine/health 336
10. Agriculture/agro-industry 684
Energy 2256
11. Non-nuclear energy 1002
12. Nuclear fission safety 414
13. Controlled nuclear fusion 840
Transport 240
14. Transport 240
Targeted socio-economic research 138
15. Targeted socio-economic research 138
ACTIVITY 2 - Cooperation with third countries and International Organisations 540
ACTIVITY 3 - Dissemination and exploitation of results 330
ACTIVITY 4 - Stimulation of the training and mobility of researchers 744
12300
(In April 1995 the European Commission proposed a 7% increase in the funds allocated above to 
cover the recent enlargement of the EU).
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CHAPTER 4
UNITED KINGDOM - SQUARING THE TECHNOLOGICAL CIRCLE
4.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter's analysis of the BRITE-EURAM programme suggested 
differences in the pattern of participation between the different member states, with the 
highest volume of participants among the larger countries. Many reasons can be put 
forward for this, but not the least is the capacity of firms, universities and research 
institutes to engage in cross-border technological collaboration. Another important 
factor is the support given to European technological collaboration by the national 
authorities. More broadly, the varied pattern of participation reflects differences in the 
national institutional systems which structures the relations of actors and determines 
how they see their role in relation to others in the process of technological development.
Institutional systems are not an immutable force. They change gradually in response to 
internal and external pressures - from economic, political, and financial pressures to 
those influences emanating from the international level. In the Spanish case (examined 
in more detail in the next chapter) the programme for the modernisation of industry 
(1983-84) called for changes in industrial organisation, in govemment-industry relations 
and in the focus of public policy - to a large degree such changes were prompted by the 
ultimate goal of European Community membership, and perceived as a necessary 
prerequisite to it.
The Conservative government in the UK, prompted partly by ideological conviction and 
the pursuit of a neo-liberal economic programme, sought to reverse the govemment- 
industry relations built up over the preceding decades. In matters of research and 
technology, this meant shifting the burden of financing to the private sector, and 
encouraging a more market-oriented approach to the research activities being conducted.
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However, the changes made in both countries suggest that even with the 'europeanising' 
of the system fundamental elements of the original structure remain. What both this 
chapter and the succeeding one will try to bring out is the essential stability of the 
domestic technological systems in both countries, which neither ideological shifts nor 
international influences could change.
This chapter examines the structure within which the UK participants of the European 
technology programmes operated, and considers the principal actors, the sources of the 
europeanising' influences, and recent policy changes. One consistent element of public 
policy throughout the 1980s and the 1990s has been the pursuit of competitiveness, and 
the government welcomed the European Framework Programme on that basis. The 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) view was that
European collaborative research can help both by 
encouraging industry to carry out more research leading 
to innovative products and by developing through 
standards more open markets which increase competition 
in Europe and hence industry's own competitiveness.^
Less consistent has been the view as to the government's role in maintaining 
competitiveness, the most appropriate policy and the necessary structure to sustain 
industrial research and technology - moving from the excessive managerialism of the 
1960s to the non-intervention of the 1980s, the government's approach seemed to 
present a picture of reaction to pressures rather than a co-ordinated plan offering a 
strategic approach to the problems of British industry. As one commentator observed 
In no other advanced country has the government department responsible for industrial 
policy so frequently changed its name, its internal organisation, or its Minister (six times 
in the 1980s alone, against twice in the Treasury). In no other country has it set itself 
such ambitious tasks in one decade (the Ministry of Technology under Wedgewood 
Benn in the late 1960s), or willed its own disbandment in another (DTI under Ridley in 
the 1980s)'.^
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The chapter thus begins by taking a look at the interventionist approach of the 1960s, 
and the policy and technology structure that resulted from it.
4.2 Historical roots of technology policy
The technological system that developed in the UK over the post-war period was 
characterised as mission-oriented, with an emphasis on the selection of large projects in 
areas such as civilian aircraft, electrical and mechanical engineering, shipbuilding.^ 
Policy centred upon limited, selective intervention in industries with high growth 
potential, where concentrated production in a few large firms with close ties to the 
Ministry of Defence would generate technological advance, and a 'trickle-down' to the 
smaller firms. At best, the belief of government was that as far as industrial prosperity 
was concerned bigger is better and that productivity is related to the percentage of 
wealth invested in research and development.'"^
Both before and after the Second World War, the Ministry of Defence had established a 
leading role in science and technology. In the decades after the war the bulk of 
government spending on science and technology in Britain continued to be devoted to 
defence.^ Ample resources and government support contributed to a long and successful 
record for the Defence Ministry in research and technology, with a spill-over into the 
private industrial sector for big industrial projects.
The mission-oriented system was in many ways dominated by the needs of defence and 
security, rather than broader societal concerns - and the particular sectors that grew out 
of it, computers, aerospace, nuclear power, reflected this. Big science' projects rather 
than technological innovation and broader industrial applications were the order of the 
day. In a study by Mowery and Rosenberg (1989), the authors concluded that very little 
Britih government-supported R&D was conducted within industrial firms, during the 
period 1900 up to 1950 (p. 102).
One effect of the mission-oriented system was to lock in policy makers to a mind set 
which regarded science and technology as properly the responsibility of the defence
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sector or the universities. Some concern with the direct technological needs of industry 
and the problem of linking basic research to applied research underpinned the activities 
o f the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), set up in 1916, which 
provided financial support for industrial research associations (RAs). The industrial 
research associations operated as cooperative organisations open to membership by 
firms within an industry. Although the RAs gained widespread membership, by the 
beginning of the 1940s the impact on industrial research was limited - fundamentally 
because the limited in-house capability of firms hindered them fi*om making the most 
effective use of the research results.
The idea broached by the UK scientist, J D Bernal, in the 1930s that science and 
technology could go beyond serving defence needs to meet broader social and economic 
goals met with little consideration until the 1960s.^ This meant that the UK 
technological system was essentially decentralised in the two decades after the Second 
World War, although taking into account the activities of the DSIR and the MoD. 
While the government was unwilling to set up a central mechanism to co-ordinate 
technological activities, it was also not eager to leave the responsibility for science and 
technology policy in the hands of the Royal Society or the two research councils - ARC 
and MRC.
Eventually, it was agreed that responsibility at ministerial level be split between a non- 
departmental coordinating minister and departmental ministers, vdth an Advisory 
Council on Scientific Policy to advise on civil matters and a Defence Research Policy 
Committee on defence matters. But science and technology did not have the degree of 
wide political concern which it has attracted in recent years, nor did it attract the interest 
and debate of academics.
A report published by the OECD in 1961, the so-called Piganiol report, renewed interest 
and debate on technology.^ The report coincided with inquiries into the relations 
between technology, national economic welfare and economic growth generally. It 
emphasised the importance for all OECD states to develop technology policies, and
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argued that government policies in practically every field could be assisted by the 
application of new knowledge discovered through scientific research.
The OECD report re-introduced the view put forward earlier in the 1930s by J D Bernal 
that science policy could help in the formulation of a wide range of government policies, 
and not simply defence. It also suggested the need for some coordinating mechanism 
for science policy, a suggestion that was to prompt many of the OECD member 
governments to appoint ministers with responsibility for science.*
Further reinforcement of the need for science and technology policy, if any was needed, 
came with the publication of a book by the French writer, Jean-Jacques Servan 
Schreiber, warning that Europe was losing out in competitive and welfare terms to the 
technological capacity of America.^ It was an argument that was used with equal 
conviction at the beginning of the 1980s to secure support for a European technology 
policy. In the 1960s, a concern with the gradual slow-down of the post-war growth 
experience made governments take a closer look at science and technology as a means 
to reverse the process. But the most appropriate technological structure or the role of 
government within this structure was not at all clear, and countries adopted varying 
models.
The Harold Wilson government, in an apparently more interventionist frame of mind, 
set up the Ministry of Technology in 1964, undeterred by brief term of the former 
Ministry of Science set up under Hailsham in the 1962-4 period. From its inception, the 
new Ministry of Technology had a wide ranging brief, covering industrial support, 
technological change, co-existing with the Department of Economic Affairs for the first 
couple of years with the latter taking responsibility for planning. The Ministry of 
Technology had responsibility for the government’s activities in DSIR, and from 1967 it 
also took responsibility for aviation research. In addition, a number of academic 
establishments were set up, which focused attention on the study of science and 
technology policy. These included the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), set up in 
1966 by Asa Briggs, at the University of Sussex, the Department of Liberal Studies in
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Science (later Department of Science and Technology Policy) at the University of 
Manchester.
Despite these developments, there was no agreement on the role of government in 
science and technology. Opinion extended between giving responsibility for science to 
the research councils and the Royal Society, to favouring a stronger role for government 
in the formulation of policy, with a Minister to oversee the planning of public and 
privately funded research in the civil, military and industrial areas. Partly as a result of 
the lack of agreement, partly because of the entrenched position of the Ministry of 
Defence, the newly created Ministry of Technology took some time to find a role for 
itself and was forced to steer a course between defence and other ministries dealing with 
aspects of industrial affairs.
Inter-ministerial rivalry was somewhat inevitable, also, given the wide-ranging brief of 
the new department, which saw overlap with activities of other departments besides 
Defence, such as Education, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The inclusion 
of aviation research in 1967 to the Ministry of Technology's list of activities, an area 
long held to be the responsibility of the aviation ministry, added to this rivalry.
The Ministry of Technology grew in size through merger with other departments and an 
extension of its responsibilities, including the control of the Industrial Reorganisation 
Corporation, to attain a staffing level of 40000 by 1969, compared with 6000 in 1964. 
But uncertainty was also created through several departmental re-organisations, in 1968 
and in 1970. On the latter occasion, following the general election win by the 
Conservatives under Ted Heath, a superministry was created to form what is now the 
Ministry for Trade and Industry - with a preference for a less interventionist style of 
management. The UK's Ministry of Technology lasted just six years.
The creation of the Ministry of Technology presented an opportunity to develop the 
institutional structure so as to direct the technological needs of industry and of society, 
but it was an opportunity that was not seized. Its failure is difficult to explain.
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particularly in the context of years of post-war policy making and a demand 
management structured on the basis of consensus.
The appointment of Frank Cousins, a senior trade union official, to be the first 
Technology minister in 1964 represented this consensus-building in practice. But it 
did not work out as planned and he was replaced by Tony Benn in 1966. Already, the 
cracks in the consensus were beginning to show up. Several reasons may be put 
forward to explain this, although none provides an adequate reason for the inability of 
the government to develop the institutional structure.
One commentator has suggested that the post war consensus was breaking down by the 
early 1960s, even though government continued to act on the basis that strong consensus 
still prevailed. The gap between the perceptions and aspirations of decision makers, 
and the practice of politics prevented a coherent, strategic technology policy from being 
introduced. More directly, the nature of 'mission-oriented' technology policy did not 
lend itself to sustained consensus, even within the system of interest representation that 
the government had fostered in order to achieve that consensus.
The ' mission-oriented' approach was characterised by selectivity, focusing upon a 
narrow range of industrial sectors containing a few large corporations. The possibility 
for trickle-down' upon which the policy was based would become increasingly unlikely 
with structural change and greater international competition. Government policy hinged 
upon the belief that large corporations were more efficient and technologically dynamic, 
a premise that drove the activities of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation which 
was created amidst this short wave of public institutional innovation to rationalise the 
industrial structure. The outcome of its activities - examples such as ICL, Leyland and 
GEC - proved the falsity of the assumptions behind the organisation.
This was the context in which Tony Benn made a speech to the Cabinet on 22 October 
1964, calling for a technologically united Europe.'*^
But Benn's vision, and that of the rest of Europe did not translate immediately into a 
broad-based industrial technology policy. Instead, the mission-oriented approach
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brought forth projects such as Concorde, polaris, and nuclear research .In  the absence 
of a more strategic attempt to harness the combined efforts of industrial firms, research 
centres and universities, these projects probably did more to exacerbate the rivalry 
among government departments than to engender a spirit of co-operation among the 
main actors in the technological system.
In 1970 the new government, under Edward Heath, reorganised the Ministry of 
Technology into the enlarged Department of Trade and Industry, under the direction of 
John Davies, a former Director General of the CBI. It set out a programme of support 
for industry - business incentives, lower taxes, cuts in public spending, and at the same 
time tried to encourage greater competition. However, it was unable to maintain the 
programme in its entirety, as the decline in manufacturing and discontent of the trade 
unions forced the government to continue with subsidies to private industry. The 1972 
Industry Act was a tum-around from the non-interventionist style that the government 
had preferred in 1970, giving significant powers of intervention to the DTI that were 
later to be used by the Labour government throughout its term of office in implementing 
the industrial policy of the period 1974-79.
One of its earliest efforts centred upon a report on the nature of government support for 
research and development, the so-called Rothschild report. This signified a shift in 
thinking on mission-oriented research, and was in fact the beginning of a more 
widespread re-appraisal of the role of government in economic management that was to 
spread throughout Europe as the decade wore on.*  ^ The Rothschild report was based 
upon the view that science policy should be aimed at more specific objectives than 
simply the general idea of promoting economic growth.
It was commissioned by the Heath government, which was already convinced that large 
science projects were a drain on public funds and better ways were needed to allocate 
scarce resources. The conclusions and recommendations, made over two decades ago, 
find an echo in more recent directions of government policy. Rothschild made a 
distinction between basic and applied research, with the recommendation that applied
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research should only be carried out at the instigation of government ministers, on a 
'customer-contractor' basis.
The report marked a move away from the science-driven attitude of public policy 
makers to technology-pull, with social responsiveness as being secondary to industrial 
innovation. By the end of the 1970s, the term 'science policy' was replaced by science 
and technology policy', with a greater emphasis on the technological dimension. 
Technical change, it was believed, came about through the direct efforts of firms, as well 
as being the result of scientific findings. New technologies did not come about, as 
originally supposed, solely from scientific effort and the radical new technologies 
ensuing, but also through the internal processes of firms which generated incremental 
technological change as these firms responded to the market pressures. The rapid 
encroachment of a neo-liberal economic agenda, in the UK and elsewhere, allowed for 
the ready acceptance of this new approach to technology policy.
The preference for less government intervention, which was the basis of neo-liberalism, 
extended to technology management. Unlike Spain with its National Technology Plan, 
the UK did not have a formal technology policy throughout the 1970s or 1980s. There 
was no individual government department or Minister with responsibility for research 
and technology.
By the 1980s, the national technological system had all the appearance of a loosely 
organised system, with a fair degree of independence allowed to the different parts. But 
in shifting the responsibility for research away from the public purse so as to 
decentralise the system even further, the effect was to strengthen the control of 
government over the public areas of research and technological activities that remained. 
This became apparent with the changes that took place after 1993, and which will be 
considered later in this chapter.
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4.3 UK technological system - actors and resources
The neo-liberalist doctrine permeating economic policy throughout the 1980s also 
affected technological policy, essentially through a concerted shift of spending, and to a 
lesser extent a change in the priorities of R&D coupled with a gradual change in the 
institutional structure.
It began with an attempt at coordinating the range of technological activities conducted 
throughout the public sector by the Cabinet Office Scientific Officer, a post linked to the 
Prime Minister's office. From 1983 the Cabinet Office Chief Science Advisor produced 
an annual review of government-funded R&D, which gave a comprehensive 
examination to previous years activities, the sources and providers of funds, and the 
technological areas attracting funds. Increasingly the review began to pay more 
attention to international programmes, including European programmes, and aimed to 
establish some coordination with regard to international programmes. In 1986 the 
Cabinet Office set up a Science and Technology Assessment Office to assist in the 
evaluation of R&D programmes.
The Advisory Board for Research Councils (ABRC) advised the Secretary for 
Education and Science, while the Advisory Council on Applied Research and 
Development (ACARD), set up in 1978 by Jim Callaghan to advise on new 
technologies and to identify emerging areas of commercial importance. ACARD was 
replaced by ACOST in 1987, a year which marked a change in Conservative policy 
when it dropped any remaining vestiges of the Labour government’s system from the 
1970s. However, each government department continued to have responsibility for its 
technological activities, and set its own research budget. Science activities in higher 
education and the Research Councils continued to be the responsibility of the 
Department of Education and Science (DES) until 1992 when the Office of Science and 
Technology was set up, when the latter took over responsibilities for the Research 
Councils and government research strategy. The Higher Education Funding Council 
eventually came under the responsibility of the new Department for Education and 
Employment (DfEE) in 1995.
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The Advisory Committee on Science and Technology (ACOST) was set up in 1987 to 
advise the government on the nature and extent of the UK participation in international 
collaboration in science and technology, and issues in science and technology generally. 
The Chairman and members of the committee were appointed by the Prime Minister, 
who initiated some of the work, with the remainder undertaken by ACOST itself. It 
occupied a somewhat unusual position in that, although closely connected to the 
government through the Prime Minister's office, the government did not always heed its 
recommendations.
ACOST proved, however, to be more in tune with developments in technology policy at 
the international level than the government was prepared to consider in practice. It 
criticised government departments and research councils, arguing that ‘greater European 
collaboration could increase cost effectiveness. UK government needs to be more 
proactive in developing cost effective R&D programmes on a European basis.’
It also criticised the policy of attribution (where funds received from Brussels were 
attributed to a particular department and in effect substituted for central government 
funds), suggesting that such a policy acted as a disincentive to more active participation. 
ACOST's acknowledgement that issues of pollution control, harmonisation of standards, 
competition policy and industrial competitiveness would increasingly need to be tackled 
at a European level,^^ did not meet with the full acceptance of the government.
The system differed in several respects from the French one, where a more dirigiste 
approach underpirmed a system containing many structural elements dating back to the 
1950s. In France five year R&D plans were issued by the government, and co­
ordination took place through the Ministry for Research and Technology.
In addition, the French government provided a higher proportion of funds to R&D than 
any other member state (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3), whilst the National Centre for 
Scientific Research (CNRS), under the Ministry for Research and Technology, provided 
one-third of this. Much of the French science research is carried out through
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government- funded research institutes, grouped under the CNRS, rather than university 
departments. Whilst efforts have been made in France to develop close links between 
the research centres and industry, the Mitterrand government also encouraged greater 
decentralisation of research activities to local authorities and regional organisations.^^
The UK's other main European competitor, Germany, had developed a technological 
system which reflected the federal system of government. The Ministry for Research 
and Technology (BMFT) works with the authorities at federal and Lander level to 
develop technological activities. BMFT provides most of the funds, with additional 
sources coming from the ministries of defence, economics, and education.
In addition, several independent organisations, jointly funded by Federal and Lander 
governments, allocate funds for research -the German Research Society (DFG) to 
academia, the Max Planck and Fraunhofer societies run research institutes that are 
funded partly by industry. The major national laboratories are largely funded by federal 
funds, while the regional applied research institutes receive funds from the Lander. The 
Ministry for Research and Technology has the primary responsibility for planning 
technology over six-year periods, and other ministries assist in the review of national 
plans.
Support for research in the UK, particularly industrial research, was identified on the 
basis of the general thinking of the time. Macro-economic policy centred upon a fairly 
strict counter-inflationary strategy, allied to supply side initiatives to improve 
competitiveness. The latter tended towards the pursuit of enabling policies that did not 
impinge on the general intent to reduce public spending.
Shifting the financing of research activities in general to the private sector was part of 
this enabling strategy, with government's role being largely one of facilitating and 
coordinating whatever activities were designated by the actors, without actually setting 
priorities for these actors. The overall result was to give primary position to the 
Treasury, making all the other government departments subject to its direction. This 
strategy was carried out fairly consistently throughout the 1980s and into the 1990 until.
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with the advent of Michael Heseltine to the DTI, there was a renewed emphasis on 
competitiveness, with pressure on firms to increase their R&D efforts, increase the level 
of training, and promote greater organisational efficiency.
The Department of Trade and Industry followed the enabling role which government 
had set for itself in its dealings with industry, pursuing a series of 'soft policies' to 
encourage the development of the enterprise culture. In a White Paper published in 
1988, the Enterprise Initiative set out the department's vision for industrial and sectoral 
growth based on the entrepreneurial efforts of individuals and small firms.^^
The White Paper signalled a renewed interest in supporting small firms, and individuals 
who wanted to set up their own businesses. The DTI set about advertising the Initiative, 
and launched consultancy schemes to help small enterprises, seeking financial support 
for them through the encouragement of the venture capital sector. However, the White 
Paper was criticised for idolising the market and enterprise ‘but the entrepreneur was not 
necessarily, or even primarily, a creative force generating or exploiting new scientific 
and technical knowledge - the essential qualification was that the entrepreneur should 
operate a new or expandiing business, whether it be a sweatshop, a software house, or a 
property com pany.Instead , it lauded the benefits of the free market, setting out the 
' value-fbr-money' approach that was to determine the future decisions on government 
spending.
Collaborative R&D was supported by the DTI through the LINK programme, 
EUREKA, the Advanced Technology Programme, and Club R&D. The LINK 
programme encouraged collaboration with universities on pre-competitive research 
relevant to industrial needs. Although in fact a govemment-wide programme, the DTI 
has played a major part, contributing £106 million of the total allocation of £194 
million.
Many of the areas involved under LINK overlap with those supported under the 
European BRITE-EURAM programme - advanced materials and chemicals, advanced 
manufacturing and engineering, electronics and communications, and measurement and
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sensing. At the end of 1992 there were 350 collaborative projects in progress or 
completed, and a further 110 approved.^"* By contrast, UK companies were participating 
in one quarter of the 600 projects approved under EUREKA, and the DTI had 
committed £85 million to 106 EUREKA projects.^^
Under the Advanced Technology Programme the DTI had allocated, by 1993, £185 
million to 22 programmes to assist pre-competitive research in advanced information 
technology, manufacturing technology, advanced robotics, and superconductivity. The 
Club R&D operated on a slightly different basis, although still with the aim of 
encouraging industrial collaborative research, with the work being carried out by a host 
organisation on behalf of a group of companies.
Based on a principle which was adopted for firms interested in collaborating under the 
European programmes, but without sufficient internal facilities, the DTI had approved 
£3 million for 13 projects under the Club R&D programme.^^ By the time of publication 
of the 1993 Annual Review of Government-Funded R&D, UK firms were very actively 
involved in the European collaborative programmes participating, according to the 
review, in almost 80 percent of the Framework II projects in some areas and receiving 
18-20 per cent of the funding'.^^
In terms of the specific programmes, the ESPRIT, RACE and BRITE-EURAM attracted 
the major interest of UK participants. Under ESPRIT II, UK firms were involved in 291 
of the 420 projects. The BRITE-EURAM II programme was second in terms of the 
number of UK participants attracted, with involvement in 157 of the initial 271 projects 
approved. A later evaluation study conducted by the European Commission indicated 
that a total of 368 projects were approved, and the UK profile was 364 participants from 
a total of 1934. The largest number of coordinators of the projects approved were of 
UK origin.^* RACE 11 (1990-1994) attracted UK organisations to 75 of the 95 projects 
initially approved.^^
This 'européanisation' of UK industrial collaborative research was not created by the 
direct intervention and support of the government. The national authorities did not play
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the same role as their counterparts in Spain to push for domestic engagement in 
European technology programmes. While the drive for industrial modernisation was 
linked to European integration of Spanish industry, in the UK economic liberalism was 
a primary force in keeping government, and the Department of Trade and Industry, from 
taking a more prominent position. As the next section will argue, the europeanising 
influences came from other areas of the changing technological system that had 
emerged.
Throughout most of the 1980s and the early 1990s the central government avoided 
direct consideration of a national technology policy. Technological priorities were 
absent from government pronouncements, and no real attempt was made to coordinate 
the various institutions, both private and public, engaged in technological activities. As 
far as the European Framework Programme was concerned, the UK government brought 
its most vociferous opposition to the overall budget.
The lengthy debate on the budget for the Second Framework Programme (1987-1991) 
exemplified its stance. The original budget proposal made by the Commission set a 
figure of 7.7 billion ECU, which the UK government regarded as being too high. While 
holding the Community presidency in 1986, when the budget negotiations were under 
way, the government proposed 3.1 billion ECU with the suggestion that it was adequate 
for any country's aspirations and accused the Commission of not being willing to 
compromise.^^ The eventual settlement was 5.3 billion ECU.^^
4.4 Europeanisation'- the public level
The liberal inclination characteristic of the 1980s policy towards industry created a 
vacuum, and UK manufacturing looked to European initiatives for financial support. In 
the context of a loosely structured technological system with a high degree of 
permeability it was a simple matter for economic actors to bypass the national 
government, and articulate their interests directly at the European level.
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But at the domestic level there were a number of voices and influences that were taking 
a strongly European orientation from the early 1980s. One that proved particularly 
influential was the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology which 
issued a number of reports on research and technology during the 1980s, with the 
intention of promoting strategic thinking on science and technology
Apart from its impact on the technology strategy, the House of Lords Select Committee 
also offered a platform for a whole range of interested parties to voice their concerns, or 
set out ideas for the improvement of the technological system.^^ It drew attention, 
through its various enquiries and reports, to aspects of socio-economic activity that were 
largely neglected by the government, and many of the reports' conclusions have 
subsequently been incorporated into policy.^ "^
The Select Committee's perspective was a broad one, covering matters relating to the 
domestic technological system and also aspects of international technology 
programmes. The Annual Review of Government-Funded R&D, first published in 
1983, was the government's response to the Select Committee's report on Science and 
Government.
The 1986 report of the Select Committee, Civil Research and Development, made a 
number of recommendations regarding industrial R&D.^^ These included greater 
financial support from the DTI for industrial research, which it had called for three years 
before,^^ and also the improvement of information about public and private R&D. It 
also recommended that the government should do more to help the small firms with 
regard to their research needs, and that more effort should go into increasing the 
knowledge of R&D results from overseas. There was also a recommendation that a 
process for funding strategic research to support the economic future be introduced.
Following the recommendations of the Select Committee's 1986 Report on Civil 
Research and Development, the government set up ACOST, with a brief to prepare a 
strategic review of public and private S&T every three years for submission to the Prime 
Minister's office. Apart from setting up ACOST, the government's response to the 1986
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House of Lords report was mixed, and conformed entirely to the prevailing spirit of 
laissez-faire being pursued so vigorously.
In a subsequent government White Paper published in 1987, Civil Research and 
Development, certain aspects of agreement with the Lords Committee were clear/^ 
Support for small firms was one area of common ground, and the government was to set 
out a clearer position on such support in the Enterprise Initiative White Paper of 1988. 
However, the nature of support was different, with the government being unwilling to 
commit further spending on applied research. In particular, public support for 
programmes such as the Alvey programme of the early 1980s, which supported 
industrial/academic resarch in IT, were ruled out.
Instead, government held firm to the view that finance should come from the private 
sector, on the basis that research and technology is market-driven. The government 
would confine itself to granting financial support to basic research, and expressed very 
general encouragement for greater collaboration and technology transfer.
In the absence of a concerted attempt by the government to further European 
technological collaboration, the House of Lords Select Committee turned its attention to 
an examination of international scientific programmes, and the UK's position as 
participant and beneficiary. The resultant report. International Scientific Programmes, 
published in 1991, urged a higher level of participation in international collaboration.^^
Since only 5% of the world's research is carried out in the UK, and earlier reports had 
indicated a lag in UK research efforts which had not been filled, the Committee urged 
the necessity to participate in international research programmes. The Lords Select 
Committee made a further recommendation that the Annual Review of Government 
Funded R&D should identify the amounts contributed by research councils and 
government to international scientific programmes, and to include a separate section 
drawing together UK participation in these programmes.
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However, the fact that the UK was a net beneficiary to many of the European 
technology programmes, including the BRITE-EURAM programme, meant that there 
was little need for concern over juste retour/^ It is fair to say that much of the
subsequent co-ordination of technological activities by the government, evident after the 
1993 White Paper on Science and Technologyow es a lot to the efforts of the Lords 
Committee to highlight deficiencies in the system.
The unhesitating support of the House of Lords Committee for a greater international 
dimension to UK technological activity was not mirrored to the same degree by that of 
the House of Commons Education, Science and Art Committee. In a report entitled 
Science Policy and the European Dimension, published at the end of 1990, the 
Commons Committee expressed reservations concerning the European dimension, 
particularly if it reduced the autonomy of the national scientific effort. Indeed, the 
stance taken by the Commons Committee was closely aligned with the general 
ambivalence to issues of European integration which the UK government expressed 
throughout much of the 1980s.'^ ^
While it did not oppose the European dimension, the Committee preferred to take a 
broad view of Europe, beyond the area of the European Community to include wider 
international ties. It commented that 'while it is and will continue to be appropriate for 
the greater part of the United Kingdom's scientific research to be organised and funded 
at national level, the evidence we received recognised the increasingly international 
character of scientific endeavour and strongly supported the United Kingdom's 
continuing to develop and strengthen her international links in order to retain her place 
in world science.'"^^
The Commons Committee strongly endorsed the principle of subsidiarity, rejecting the 
idea that the European Commission should play a predominant role in determining the 
priorities for, and funding of scientific research in Europe, declaring that it would be 
inappropriate for the Community to seek to extend its competence in science and 
technology beyond its present objectives.'^^
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Instead, the Commons Committee view was that the Commission should be one of 
many players. It accepted the Community support in such areas as information 
technology, but also that other forms of research organisation should continue, for 
example, specialised collaborative laboratories, informal networks of research teams, 
decentralised coordination of national research activities.
Essentially two distinct views were represented by these committees, one of which 
found favour with the scientific community and the research councils, and to some 
degree the industrial community, the other representing the underlying philosophy of the 
government. It is difficult to identify a convergence of views such as occurred in Spain, 
and which formed the basis of that country's consensus on European integration. One 
position was represented by the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology where the view was that 'the government has .... a general responsibility to 
support science and technology because this is fundamental to the social and economic 
well-being of the country'
On the other hand, the government's position stemmed fi-om its view of the purpose of 
technology, and was firmly set in the prevailing philosophy which regarded the market 
as the most efficient allocator of resources. In the words of the DTI, 'Firms themselves 
are best able to assess their own markets and to balance the commercial risks and 
rewards of financing R&D and innovation. The Government should not take on 
responsibilities which are principally those of industry'
Technological development and innovation was accepted as a means to improved 
competitive capability, but relative costs particularly associated with the labour market 
and the general price level also determined the country's position in the international 
competitiveness table. The objective of the European technology policy to improve 
competitiveness of industry made it generally acceptable to the government, even when 
the government's preferred domestic technology policy was strictly non-interventionist.
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4.5 'Europeanisation - the private level
UK industrial and academic support for European technology programmes grew steadily 
through the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, despite the absence of an 
organised and coherent campaign directed at the technology programmes. The major 
representative groups, although building up a lobbying presence at the European level, 
tended to confine themselves to regulatory matters and more directly competition- 
related issues. In the period under study here two features stand out in stark relief -the 
general shift of financing research and development to the private sector, and the greater 
proportion of that financing coming from abroad.
The foreign sources of R&D financing included European Community resources as well 
as the financial resources provided by the multinationals resident in the United 
Kingdom. This section does not argue that the European sources were predominant and 
a primary factor in the 'européanisation' of the domestic R&D effort, but undoubtedly 
both sources indicated a greater internationalisation of the technological activities 
conducted in the country.
Table 4.1 shows a notable increase in the share of research funds coming from overseas, 
over the period 1983-1993, rising from 7% in 1983 to 15% in 1993, a clear outcome of 
the government’s very active encouragement of foreign direct investment during this 
period. By the end of the 1980s the government's policy of shifting the burden of 
research funding to the private sector appeared to be showing some signs of success, but 
it was clear that a significant proportion of the burden was being carried by the foreign 
firms in the United Kingdom.
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Table 4.1 Sources of funds for industrially performed R&D cash terms)
1983-1993
1983 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Govt. 30 23 20 17 17 17 15 14 12
Overseas 7 12 12 12 13 15 16 15 15
Own 63 64 68 71 69 68 69 71 72
resources 
Total (£m) 4163 59951 6335 6922 7650 8318 8135 8489 9069
Source: Forward Look of Government-funded Science, Engineering and 
Technology, 1995, vol. 3 (London, HMSO)
Large firms, employing more than 1000 employees, spent nearly 70% of the total, with 
firms employing 1000-4999 accounting for 30% of industrial R&D expenditure.'^^ 
Companies employing under 200 workers spent 15%, confirming a long-held view that 
local firms were slow to assume the burden of research funding alone.'*  ^Findings from 
the research carried out by Patel and Pavitt showed that UK managers were less willing 
than their international competitors to commit their own funds to technology creation, 
general economic conditions not withstanding. With the general shift of financing away 
from government to the private sector, shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, some small and 
medium-sized UK enterprises inevitably turned to the European Community as a source 
of support.
Table 4.2 Gross expenditure on R&D by performing sector 1986- 
1993. £m cash terms
Performed by: 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Govt. 1212 1264 1360 1534 1566 1757 1846 1893
Higher ed. 1288 1460 1575 1689 1837 2020 2129 2266
Business 5951 6335 6922 7650 8318 8135 8489 9069
Private non-profit 317 324 370 415 480 494 516 524
Source: Forward Look, 1995, vol. 3, ch.4.
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Table 4.3 Gross expenditure on R&D by source of funds 1986- 
1993. £m. cash terms 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Sector providing funds:
Govt. 3541 3640 3665 4031 4262 4248 4355 4446
Higher ed. 54 65 77 81 84 90 98 104
Business 4199 4643 5331 5788 6156 6248 6666 7161
Private nonprofit 174 195 217 253 309 362 404 430
Abroad 640 840 937 1134 1428 1457 1458 1611
Source: Forward Look, 1995, vol. 3, ch. 4.
An examination of manufacturing industry's expenditure on R&D shows some variation 
on a sectoral basis, with the pharmaceuticals sector maintaining the largest share of 
research spending over the period since 1986. Other sectors that accounted for research 
spending included motor vehicles and electrical machinery, although the aerospace 
industry has continued to maintain second place in the spending stakes behind the 
pharmaceuticals industry, as Table 4.4 shows.
Table 4.4 R&D intensity in UK manufactured products, selected years. %
Chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals 
Mechanical engineering 
Electronics 
Other elect, engineering
Source: Forward Look, 1995, 
vol 3, ch.4.
1986 1989 1991 1993
2.3 2.7 2.9 2.7
11.8 14.7 15.8 21.0
0.8 0.8 0.9 1.4
7.2 5.4 4.5 7.0
4.5 3.2 3.9 5.9
Foreign firms have shown a significant presence in those sectors with the highest 
intensity of research, suggesting there was already a European bias in the general 
activities of the manufacturing sector, and no doubt supported the integration of national 
research activity into the European programmes. The prevalence of foreign firms was 
noted, but not necessarily condemned.
The government was initially permissive and then actively encouraging to foreign 
investment, and a spin-off in terms of research activity was thus welcomed. The general
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attitude was expressed cogently by John Banham, once director-general of the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), that 'technology can be purchased or copied, as 
can productive capacity.'"^*
Foreign investment was regarded by some, including the academic community, as 
necessary to fill a vacuum left by either indigenous firms or government. However, the 
evidence fi*om Table 4.4 and elsewhere does not suggest a pervasive spread of the 
results of such research activity throughout the broad sweep of UK manufacturing 
industry.
The import penetration in UK high technology sectors had risen more rapidly than other 
OECD equivalent sectors. But it seemed to be the case that import penetration was 
largely confined to high technology sectors, rather than the medium and low technology 
sectors to which the majority of the UK manufacturing firms belonged."^  ^ Overall, 
manufacturing's share of GDP had been falling, from 27% in 1979 to 22% in 1989 and 
around 20% in 1993, but it accounted for some 23% of the total employment.
Manufacturing has continued to have economic significance,but it required the ability 
to compete on technology in order to be able to take advantage of opportunities in the 
wider European market.^^ European technology programmes served two objectives, 
therefore - access to technological resources, and access to the single market. The UK 
participants were very strongly influenced by market-oriented commercial motives, 
rather than more directly specific research and technology related concerns, although the 
two sets of motives are inter-related. But there is no overwhelming evidence that the 
UK participation was swept along by organised interests and elite groups in the way that 
the Spanish participants were.
The CBI had opened its Brussels office in 1971, two years before UK accession to the 
European Community, and was a long-standing supporter of European integration. 
During the 1980s its relations with the government were not particularly close, and the 
smaller but more influential. Institute of Directors, was favoured. A remark by Lord 
Young, the Secretary of State at the DTI, best illustrated the situation - 'we have rejected
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the TUC; we have rejected the CBI. We do not see them coming back again. We have 
rejected the corporate state.' The lack of confidence was mutual, particularly given 
the government's failure to 'define a worthwhile role for the Department of Trade and 
Industry.'^^ With the lack of activity on the part of government, the CBI did involve 
itself in research and technology issues to some degree.
One of its mechanisms was the Technology and Innovation Committee of the CBI 
which meets quarterly, and has among its responsibilities the preparation of submissions 
for the European Framework Programme. Given the broad spread of membership of the 
CBI, however, it has proved difficult to reach consensus to make specific proposals on 
individual programme content. The confederation preferred to avoid giving any support 
to sectoral interests, although it clearly favoured the full implementation of the 
European single market programme.'^"  ^ Although it has made submissions on the 
Framework Programme, the CBI did not feel it had a great deal of influence on 
technology policy at the European level, and was consequently happy to channel its 
concerns through UNICE.'^^
The inadequacy of the UK government position, in the CBI view, centred upon its 
unwillingness to more actively influence the nature and direction of European 
technology development programmes. It was not a case of doing enough to promote 
participation in the European programmes, but not doing enough to influence the 
direction of programmes, and instead concentrating on the budget.' The British peak 
organisation, like many of the sectoral interest groups, did not issue policy documents 
specifically concerned with research and technology, instead concentrating upon more 
general policy issues. One of its principal concerns regarding the Fourth framework 
Programme was its omission of the future needs of the market'.
A similar lack of concern over direct technological issues was apparent among other 
groups. One of the interest groups with the strongest European-level links, the 
Engineering Employers Federation, published its view of industrial strategy in 
November 1992. Referring to science and technology, the report commented that 
invention and initial research is only the first stage of a long process which must
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include technology demonstration; product, manufacturing process and market 
development; and commercial production and marketing.'^^ The Institute of Directors 
(lOD) held similar views. In its manifesto for Europe, published in 1994, the lOD 
concentrated upon urging a faster pace upon the liberalisation programme, with a reform 
of the European institutions so as to reduce the power of the Commission.^^
A tacit consensus seems to have developed among UK collective interests that the 
European technology programmes, even if not immediately and obviously beneficial to 
national interests, were certainly not harmful. This is borne out by the high level of UK 
participation in the programmes, 'having secured more research contracts under the 
Third Framework Programme than any other member state.'^^ However, the 
européanisation' of the actors took place through direct participation in the already- 
formulated programmes, rather than through any substantive input into the policy 
formulation process.^^
Chapter three of this thesis examined the formulation and management of the BRITE- 
EURAM programme, and suggested that it was essentially a top-down programme, 
notwithstanding the claims of the European Commission otherwise. A significant role 
was played by the European-level elite group, IRDAC, and by a very large, but de­
centralised group of experts engaged by the Commission to judge project proposals. 
Thus was the programme formulated and managed, although the Commission did take 
account of the opinions presented.
Within the UK, interests were not organised in such a way as to take full advantage of 
this system. The de-centralised technological system, combined with the non­
interventionist style of government, precluded a more proactive input by UK interests 
into the European policy-making process.
The evidence given to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities, in its inquiry A Community Framework for R&D. seems to bear this 
out.^  ^ A range of government, industrial, and academic interests presented their views 
to the Committee. Many of the individual researchers and the research councils were
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dissatisfied with the possibilities of presenting their interests before the European 
Framework authorities. Feeling excluded, they considered that the programmes were 
decided at a political level, in the Research Council of Ministers where political 
considerations play a major role. The research councils felt they had little or no 
influence, and were not asked for their opinion.^^
It was difficult for things to be otherwise, under the UK system, since the Advisory 
Board for the Research Councils (ABRC) lacked formal and acknowledged 
consultations with the Cabinet Office Science and Technology Secretariat. The Cabinet 
Office did not always appear as a first point of contact for the many business and 
academic organisations seeking to extend their international collaborative activity. The 
Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology inquiry on international scientific 
programmes, conducted during the 1990-1991 session, heard that the Secretariat's 
published guide. Guidelines for Future International Collaboration, was not sufficiently 
used or indeed widely known.^^
The 'européanisation' of UK micro-level actors in the particular area examined was the 
result of both domestic political and institutional factors. For the business community, 
already undergoing an internationalisation of activities, participation in European 
technology programmes was a logical part of the process.
European technology programmes were presented by the European Commission to the 
business community in terms of the positive contribution that they could make to 
competitiveness, and as a complement to the essentially neo-liberal single market 
programme. The latter programme was one of the areas of European policy 
development that attracted the broadest support from otherwise cautious UK politicians, 
a positive attitude that spilled over to the European technology programmes.
A neo-liberal economic policy conducted by the national government had repercussions 
on technological activities in general, and directed the attention of the research and 
technology community to what the European Commission had to offer. In particular, 
the perception of a shift in public financial support for research and technology
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prompted many organisations, including universities, to seek financial support 
elsewhere. Government departments did not actively promote the participation by these 
organisations to the same extent as their counterparts in other member states for a 
number of reasons.
One reason was the policy of attribution of the Treasury, in which it attributed sums 
received from Brussels to individual departments and then adjusted the following year's 
budget allocation to that department by a similar amount. The Treasury policy affected 
the government department most closely associated with the Framework Programme, 
the DTI, inevitably forcing it to balance encouragement of business participation in the 
European collaborative programmes with a desire to maintain its own level of resources.
The Department for Education and Science (DES) which was responsible for the science 
community faced a similar dilemma. The policy of attribution, heavily criticised by the 
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities in its inquiry on the 
European Community R&D programme, forced businesses and universities to find their 
own way to européanisation.^^
Government departments retained individual responsibility for research and technology, 
precluding any organised effort at the national level to unite the interests of business and 
the academic community or to identify and channel national priorities into the European 
policy process. The result was growing support on a very de-centralised basis for the 
EC programme, but also a growing feeling among many of the UK interest groups of 
having little input into the integration process.
At the same time, UK industry and the universities were taking an increasing part in the 
European technology programmes, evident both in the number of collaborative projects 
undertaken by UK organisations, and in the share of the Framework Programme budget 
going to the UK. To a large extent, these organisations were swept along by the tide of 
internationalisation of technology, and by the need to secure an elusive technological, 
and ultimately, commercial advantage. But the more mundane financial considerations 
also played a part - the European Community was a source of funds for both industry
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and the universities at a time when the central government sought to impose more 
stringent conditions on public funding of research and technological activities.
On the domestic level, meanwhile, the issues raised by the House of Lords Committee 
on Science and Technology over the course of a decade - the need for strategic direction, 
the incorporation of science into politics, industry's need for innovation, and a stronger 
political commitment to European technological collaboration - had still to be addressed 
by the early 1990s.
4.6 A new beginning?
When the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities reported on 
the Third Framework Programme (1990-1994) it had concluded that 'there was general 
agreement that the six lines of research identified by the Commission were broadly 
r i g h t ' B u t  the absence of strong opposition to programme content did not indicate a 
stated preference for European technology policy over national technology policy by the 
groups giving evidence to the committee. Instead, European policy filled a vacuum and 
met certain needs.
A report by the House of Commons Education, Science and Art Committee on the 
European dimension to UK science supported the United Kingdom's continuing to 
develop and strengthen her international links in order to retain her place in world 
science.'^^ But the Commons Committee also rejected the idea that the European 
Commission should play a predominant role in determining the priorities for, and 
funding of, scientific research in Europe, declaring that it would be inappropriate for 
the Community to seek to extend its competence in science and technology beyond its 
present objectives.'
In 1991, John Major replaced Margaret Thatcher as prime minister and the government 
shifted its stance on science and technology from that which had prevailed during much 
of the Thatcher era. Although the emphasis on the market as the allocator of resources 
remained, several initiatives appeared under the new administration. The DTI became
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more active in its support for British industry, under the management of Michael 
Heseltine, through the encouragement of competitiveness, and marked its concern by 
publishing two White Papers on competitiveness. In 1992, the DTI set up the Industrial 
Competitiveness Division to ensure that all government departments and policies would 
take account of the need to promote industrial competitiveness. Heseltine’s public 
speeches and the flurry of activity within the department generated a high level of 
optimism and expectations that the DTI would at last become the vocal and substantive 
supporter of industry.
The government department sought to improve the innovation of industry through a 
variety of means, by encouraging firms to invest more on research and development, 
publishing an annual R&D scorecard, publicising innovative companies, and more 
generally encouraging firms to undertake higher levels of training. Although this 
renewed initiative by the DTI did not extend to further financial support, Heseltine’s 
emphasis on innovation was broadly conceived, and extended to areas that might more 
properly be considered as within the remit of the Minister for Technology, William 
Waldegrave. In the event, the Office of Technology, which during the 1980s had been 
located in the Cabinet Office, was moved to the DTI in 1995, further strengthening the 
profile of the industry department in the area of technology and applied research.
The DTI and the Minister with responsibility for technology operated on parallel tracks 
as the decade moved on, with the DTI taking a larger slice of the action and leaving less 
opportunities for Waldegrave to introduce technology initiatives in basic or applied 
research. It looked as if the vacuum might be filled at the national level, with the 
publication in May 1993 of the government's White Paper on science and technology. 
Realising Our Potential. I n  the first government review of technology policy since the 
1971 Rothschild report, the White Paper emphasised the important contribution that 
technology could make to wealth creation. The stated intention was to 'harness the 
intellectual resources of the science and engineering base to improve economic 
performance and the quality of life. It intends, in future, that decisions on priorities for 
support should be much more clearly related to meeting the country's needs and 
enhancing the wealth-creating capacity of the country.'^^
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specifically, the document identified the market-pull context of science and technology, 
and innovation as the central element by which S&T activities are to be judged. Like its 
predecessor three decades earlier, the White Paper espoused the contractor-customer 
principle, where government departments purchase scientific advise, applied research, or 
commission basic research under competitive market terms according to their individual 
needs. What was in fact proposed in the White Paper was an organisation, and in some 
cases a re-organisation, of the institutional relations, to focus activities and priorities on 
meeting an economic challenge - that of industrial competitiveness.^^
While government departments retained independence in their respective research and 
development policies, the re-orientation of the research councils and the application of 
market principles to public research and technological activities, including privatisation 
and the strategic allocation of government funds, clarified the direction and priorities 
that future activities should take.
In terms of the particular proposals made in the White Paper, what resulted was a 
continuation of the broad strands of a philosophy which had been in place since the 
beginning of the 1980s - which put primary emphasis on the market, on non­
intervention, and on the economic use of public resources.
Closer and more substantive links between the business and scientific communities were 
envisioned, partly by a reorganisation of the Research Councils, increasing the number 
from five to six, with five of them oriented to applied research rather than basic 
research.^^ The DTI would, it was further proposed, become more proactive in the 
promotion of innovation by firms, and the department would endeavour to encourage 
greater awareness of innovation - by firms and by the public.
Although the arrangements set out in the White Paper preserved the de-centralised 
system, and in some ways extended it, the government would exert a strong 
coordinating role over the nature and general direction of the activities under way or 
proposed. It could do this in several ways. One was by moving the responsibilities of
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the Advisory Board for the Research Councils to the Office of Science and Technology, 
then situated in the Cabinet Office, and by the creation of the post of Director-General 
of Research Councils, also to be located in the Cabinet Office.
The Director-General assumed responsibility for coordinating the work of the research 
councils in the context of the priorities set out in the Forward Look (the annual review 
assessing fiiture scientific and technological needs), and of advising ministers of 
resources needed by the councils, as well as the distribution of hinds between them. 
The research councils would recruit more senior staff from industry, and agree targets 
with the Director-General towards a higher level of interaction between the councils, 
industry and government.
The post of Director-General thus had great political significance, and the administrative 
arrangements created to strengthen industrial links could be supplemented, if necessary, 
by the ultimate sanction of financial rectitude for those councils not measuring up to 
their mission statements. According to the White Paper, the government 'will, of 
course, monitor the extent to which the Research Councils are successful in delivering 
this and indeed all aspects of their missions and consider their organisation and level of 
funding accordingly.'^®
The existing LINK programme, aimed at furthering industry-academic collaboration, 
was strengthened, and lead responsibility for the programme taken by the Office of 
Science and Technology. As indicated earlier, government departments would retain 
the freedom to determine their own research needs, but would not be guaranteed an 
unlimited budget to meet them. The Office of Science and Technology would co­
ordinate the activities of the different departments, encouraging collaboration between 
them and discouraging duplication of research activities. Further privatisation of 
government research establishments was under consideration, with the recommendation 
of the White Paper that 'more could be done to extend and accelerate the operation of 
market forces in relation to the science and technology which Government departments 
commission in support of their policy, statutory, regulatory and procurement
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responsibilities.'^^ Similar expectations and restrictions were accorded to the research 
activities of the universities.
The radical element in the White Paper centred on the proposal for a Technology 
Foresight Programme. Here, the government would identify future technological needs 
and priorities, and ensure co-ordination of activities across the board along the lines 
aheady indicated above. It would do so by bringing together firms, scientists and 
government researchers to identify 'emerging technological trends and market 
opportunities.' Under the formal structure of the Technology Foresight Steering Group, 
chaired by the government's Chief Scientific Adviser but with mostly non-govemmental 
members, a list of technology sectors would be drawn up for examination and 
assessment of future scientific and market potential.
It was intended to channel the results of the Technology Foresight Programme into the 
activities of the research councils, and other public and private research and technology 
groups. Essentially, the Technology Foresight Programme represented the government's 
attempt to encourage market-based technological priorities. These priorities would set 
the future direction of the government's own science and technology programmes, and 
also become the basis of the UK's negotiating position at the European Framework 
Programme discussions.
In conjunction with the Technology Foresight Programme, the government announced 
that the Annual Review of Government Funded R&D would be replaced by an annual 
Forward Look, giving a longer term assessment of technological needs, and 
incorporating the results of the technology foresight programme. The Forward Look, 
prepared by the Office of Science and Technology, thus extended the annual review 
beyond the examination of past and present activities and current expenditure plans to 
consider how government plans are being aligned with the longer term science and 
technological needs of the economy. What was proposed was the setting of strategic 
objectives with a five to ten year perspective. A proposal was made to replace ACOST 
with a Council for Science and Technology (COST) to advise ministers on the balance
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and direction of government funded research, taking into account the findings of the 
Technology Assessment Programme.
Slightly less radical, but nonetheless important in view of earlier ambivalence, was the 
White Paper's commitment to an unambiguous support of European technology 
collaboration, stating 'an important benefit of Community membership is the access 
which it provides to European-wide research collaborations.'
The promise to use technology foresight and the Forward Look for Government-funded 
science and technology to draw industry and the science and engineering base more 
effectively into its policy-thinking on the purpose, size, direction, shape and content of 
future programmes'^^ may be regarded as a first step in an attempt to address the 
inadequacies of the relations between the central government and the technological 
community. The political process surrounding European integration had underlined the 
need to address institutional aspects of the technological system, as the previous section 
indicated.
When the White Paper was finally released in 1993 it received a mixed response from 
the UK technological community, with industry in particular encouraged by the higher 
profile given to science and technology, and the encouragement of applied research.^^
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4.7 Conclusion
In many respects the 1993 White Paper on science and technology gives a focus and 
coherence to the activities of the UK technological system, which was not apparent 
during the 1970s and 1980s. With the demise of the mission-oriented technological 
system, the UK technological base lost a central plank which had given strong support 
over a period, and which helped to put in place a technological infrastructure decades 
before the Spanish government undertook the same task in the 1980s. By this latter 
date, the UK system was also showing signs of weakness, with reports of a national 
technology gap, lack of innovation, and inadequate levels of investment in basic and 
applied research.
What are the central features of the technological system in place in the mid-1990s? 
With the recent changes that followed on from the White Paper, the reform of science 
funding and administration of activities now reflect the controlling hand of the Treasury. 
The research councils and the universities must account for their activities, and the 
relevance of such activities to priorities set by the government, in contrast to the 
previous system of receiving block grants and then deciding their own priorities. The 
Higher Education Funding Council now reports to the DfEE, while the research councils 
report to the OST; universities report to both the HEFC and the research councils on 
research activities. The government ministries retain individual responsibility for 
technological initiatives, but financial rectitude is the guiding principle and relevance to 
the needs of the market the yardstick by which proposed research activities are judged, 
while many of the laboratories have been privatised. The Office of Science and 
Technology, located in the Department of Trade and Industry, epitomises this enabling 
role in coordinating the national and international science and technology activities of 
government departments, industry, and universities (see Figure 4.1 below).
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Figure 4.1 UK System of Science & Technology
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As the UK lacks a formal regional authority structure, there is no regional system of 
science and technology along the lines of the German Lander or the Spanish 
Autonomous Communities. Instead, régionalisation of technological resources depends 
on the location decisions of industries, and the links established by universities with 
local industry. Universities still receive most of their funding from the government, but 
have faced increasing pressure to increase links with industry, both as a way of 
fiirtheiing industrial innovation and as an additional source of funds for their research 
activities.
Perhaps the best summary of the UK technological system as it exists at the present time 
can be made on the basis of the answers to three questions - what are the sources of 
funds? who carries out the work? and, where are the priorities decided? The gross 
expenditure on R&D (GERD) for 1993 represented 2.19% of gross domestic product, 
with government (GOVERD - government research institutes and the research councils) 
accounting for 0.3%, higher education (HERD) 0.36%, business expenditure (BERD)
I.44%, and the remainder from charities 0.08%, measured by performing sector. "^^  In 
terms of financing, the major source of funds is the private industrial sector, contributing 
52.1% of the funds for GERD for 1993, while government contributed 32.3%, and
II.7% came from overseas businesses investing in their UK branches R&D activities. 
Charities have increased in importance both as providers of funds, and as performers of 
R&D. During the period 1985 to 1993, the performance of R&D by the charities, 
measured in cash terms, increased from £344m to £524m, while the source of funds 
from charities over the same period, again in cash terms, increased from £170m to 
£43Om (Table 5.2 and 5.3, Forward Look).
To a large extent, the UK technological priorities are decided by the market as the 
primary provider of resources. The White Paper published in 1993 and the Technology 
Foresight Programme endorsed this, with the system controlled for financial reasons but 
now continuing very much to reflect the neo-liberal inclination of the UK government. 
Technology foresight was particularly important in giving direction to the various 
national technological activities planned by industry and by the public research and 
technology institutions. The approach and organisation of the foresight programme
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builds on the activities and programmes adopted by the Japanese government and other 
European member states such as Germany and Holland, and in the United States, to 
identify key technologies for the future and direct resources towards the development of 
such technologies.
On the other hand, the government's commitment to shifting the financial burden of 
research and technology to the private sector remained in place. So too did the policy of 
attribution, criticised by the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities, on the basis that 'the system of attributing the cost of Community 
expenditure to Departments (on the basis of lead policy responsibility for the content of 
specific programmes) has given Departments a clear incentive to seek value for money 
from Community programmes.'^^
Government policy had, throughout the 1980s, exhibited a broad consistency in some 
areas, principally in counter-inflationary strategy, in the commitment to reduce public 
expenditure, and non-intervention in the day-to day economy. The new developments 
in technology policy were broadly in line with this thinking. Competitiveness was a key 
goal to which all of these policy strands were directed.
In the 1980s it seemed that attaining lower inflation, and economic de-regulation would 
be sufficient to maintain the competitiveness of UK industry. But successive indicators 
suggested otherwise, while at the same time the government was coming under 
increasing criticism because of the lack of a technology policy.^^ The criticisms of 
under-funding of UK research and development made by the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology, and widely supported, led to a conclusion that 
the country could not keep up with its competitors.
The 1993 table on world competitiveness in science and technology, prepared by IMD 
business school in Lausanne and the World Economic Forum, showed the UK in twelfth 
place, but it was the listing of general competitiveness, which placed the UK in sixteenth 
position that caused greatest concern (both listings are shown at the end of this chapter, 
in Tables 4.5 and 4.6). Some commentators described Britain as a follower rather than a
177
leader in innovation - 'the reality is that Britain is now locked into technological 
collaboration, and that, for British high technology firms, Europe provides the only 
means of achieving the requisite scale of innovative activity....Integration could well 
mean increasing dependence upon these more dynamic European partners.'^^
Comparisons with other countries suggested a gap between domestic R&D efforts and 
major competitors, a scenario damaging to the national pride if perceived as hindering 
the country's competitive capability. The minister at the DTI, Michael Heseltine, had 
signalled a more pro-active policy for the department in the aftermath of the 1992 
general election, creating an industrial competitiveness division and announcing the 
intention to create closer partnership with industry.^^ In general, the response which the 
government made to the country's perceived technology gap was a market-based one 
rather than a clear cut alternative strategy of investment in improving mfrastructure for 
science and basic research.
Two White Papers on competitiveness have been published since then, in May 1994, 
and in May 1995.^  ^Fifteen Foresight Sector Panel reports were published in May 1995, 
together with the report of the Technology Foresight Steering Group.^^ In mid-1995 the 
government announced the transfer of the Office of Science and Technology fi*om the 
Cabinet Office to the Department of Trade and Industry, to the consternation of the 
science community.
The Cabinet Office press release explained that moving the Office of Science and 
Technology to the DTI would allow the government's policy on science, engineering 
and technology to be developed alongside its policies on industry, and with due regard 
to the contribution of science, engineering and technology to long-term wealth 
creation.'*^ In fact the move was consistent with the philosophy of the 1993 White 
Paper and, more generally, consistent with the neo-liberal deregulatory approach of the 
government. In practice, it represented a more stringent organisation of science and 
technological activities and priorities within the public sector, with the latter constrained 
by financial considerations in its fi*eedom to decide what S&T activities to foster.
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All of the developments identified above have been aimed at improving the 
competitiveness of industry, and stem from a view of competitiveness - that somehow, 
technology is the key -which has underpinned the development of European technology 
policy from the early 1980s. Then, and perhaps even now, the relationship between 
competitiveness and technology has not been clarified. It would be ironic if the UK 
continued to find itself as a follower in the technology stakes because of this 
misunderstanding.
Table 4.5 World competitiveness in science and technology (OECD) 1993
1 Japan
2 Germany
3 USA
4 Switzerland
5 Sweden
6 Netherlands
7 Finland
8 Denmark
9 France
10 Austria
11 Belgium/Lux
12 UK
13 Ireland
14 Norway
15 Australia
16 Italy
17 Canada
18 New Zealand
19 Spain
20 Greece
21 Portugal
22 Turkey
Source; IMD Business School, Lausanne, and World Economic Forum. Ratings based on R&D 
spending, patents, no. of scientists in industry, and technology investment.
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Table 4.6 World competitiveness table (OECD) 1993
1 Japan
2 US
3 Denmark
4 Switzerland
5 Germany
6 Netherlands
7 Austria
8 New Zealand
9 Sweden
10 Belgium/Lux
11 Canada
12 France
13 Ireland
14 Australia
15 Nonway
16 UK
17 Finland
18 Portugal
19 Spain
20 Italy
21 Turkey
22 Greece
Source IMD/World Economic Forum, 1993.
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CHAPTERS
SPAIN - THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEM
Pero, al mismo tiempo, si no asumimos la revolucion tecnologica, nuestra vitalidad 
social y  nuestra calidad de vida se deterioraran rapidamente, frustrando una nueva 
oportunidad historica para armonizar espanolidady modernidad, identidad cultural y
desarrollo tecnoeconomicoJ
In Spain technological change was regarded by many in government, industry, and the 
academic community as key to industrial renewal, and more broadly as affirming the 
cultural identity and modernity of the country. However, in post-war Spain 
technological development occurred slowly. After 1959, much of the technology was 
imported, as the Franco government pursued a modernisation policy on the strength of 
foreign investment.^ By the beginning of the 1980s, when the Socialist government of 
Felipe Gonzalez launched a new phase of modernisation, the technological deficiencies 
of Spanish industry were clearly apparent.
Accession to the EC in 1986 was the culmination of an association with the Community 
that began when the government first initiated talks in 1962. Following on fi-om the 
Preferential Agreement in 1970 which removed duties on exports and imports between 
Spain and the EC, formal negotiations on membership began in the late 1970s. Full 
membership had important economic and political implications, although the economic 
aspects were generally emphasised.^ Both public and private sectors gave unwavering 
support, even when rational argument indicated the benefits were more likely in the 
medium-term than in the immediate future.^ In the short term, adjustment costs could 
hit some sectors extremely hard.
One year after joining the European Community the Ministry for Industry and Energy^ 
intimated the immediate effects of EC integration on Spanish industry would be in terms
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of an increase in commercial trade and a greater level of internationalisation, both of 
which would result from the process of modernisation and the competitive pressures that 
the open market would bring.^
The effects of membership were expected to be seen in the modernisation of industry, 
but also of Spanish society including broad areas of government policy. This chapter 
begins by identifying the technology gap that existed in Spain, a deficiency which can 
be attributed to the nature of the industrial system combined with the institutional 
structure which had evolved in the post-war period.^ The chapter goes on to identify the 
support for EC technology policy among government and business, and examines the 
impact of EC developments on national policy and the technological system as a result 
of participation in the EC technology programmes.
A key question which underlies the examination is the extent to which the institutional 
structure of the country determined the nature of the support for European technology 
programmes, and the pattern of policy development in Spain.
5.1 The Spanish technology gap
Twentieth-century Spain inherited poor levels of technological development, a fact that 
was recognised even earlier than the period with which this thesis is concerned. In the 
early 1900s the Spanish Nobel prize winner for medicine, Santiago Ramon y Cajal, 
stated 'Spain is an intellectually backward, not a decadent, country, where scientific 
development has never been advanced,'* iterating a view that was to be repeated by 
academics, business people and government in the succeeding decades. During the 
Franco era the almost total reliance on foreign technology suggested that all of these 
groups were content to follow the maxim of Miguel de Unamuno, let others invent.'^
The European Community incorporated a number of political institutions within which 
Spain could take part in the European political process, while at the same time 
modernise its own industrial and political structures. In the area of technology, an
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opportunity was offered to close the gap which existed between Spain and some of its 
partners.
Membership of the Community was seen as inevitable since Spain would in any case be 
affected by decisions taken in the Community, and it was better to be inside in order to 
have the best chance of influencing those decisions. Otherwise, the peripheral position 
of the country within the European space could mean even greater marginalisation of 
business and society generally. Spanish entry to the Community coincided with the 
announcement of the Single Market programme, and the development of a European 
Technological Community. The national strategic programme was thus well timed.
At the same time an obvious question was whether Spanish industry was capable of 
taking full advantage of the potential opportunities. One aspect of membership that 
became evident early on was the increase in the openness of the Spanish economy, and 
particularly in the level of inter-industry trade. But, whether domestic firms could 
sustain a position in the new open trading system depended on technological capability, 
and the ability to gain economies of scale. Vifials (1990) suggested that much of 
Spanish industry not only could not sustain this technological capability, but also many 
firms were of sub-optimal size.*® Research by the European Community found that 
Spanish firms were aware of this, conscious of the need to improve competitiveness and 
to engage in co-operation agreements with partners in other countries.**
While the Single Market meant greater market access, participation in European 
Community programmes offered additional support to a national technological 
capability that was below the EC average. In 1986, the year Spain joined the 
Community, Spanish R&D expenditure was 0.6% of GDP, while the EC percentage was 
above 2% on average (see Table 5.1). While the percentage of Spanish GDP devoted to 
research and development increased throughout the 1980s, the figure still lagged behind 
other European member states.
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Table 5.1 R&D as per cent of GDP
Country: 1983 1985 1987 1990 1992
Spain 0.45 0.53 0.61 0.82 0.87
UK 2.25 2.38 2.26 2.21 2.12
Germany 2.51 2.71 2.85 2.84 2.65
Italy 0.95 1.12 1.19 1.29 1.38
France 2.11 2.25 2.28 2.38 2.36
US 2.71 2.92 2.90 2.78 2.68
Source: Comision Interministerial de Ciencia t Tecnologia,
Resumen de la Memoria de Desarrollo del Plan Nacional de 
l+D en el periodo 1988-1990 y revision para 1992-1995:
Ministerio de Industrie y Energie, Informe Anual sobre la 
Industrie Espanola 1993.
A report by the OECD, published in 1987, suggested that much needed to be done in 
terms of improving the technical innovationstructure.’^  It was critical of the low level of 
research spending by the universities, and of the inadequate number of researchers and 
technical staff, recommending that the level of university funding should be increased 
by a factor of 15. But the report also stressed the need for industry to bear more 
responsibility for innovation, and to develop the internal capability to judge the best 
areas of research.
The division of research expenditure between the public and private sector in 1983, at 
the time the White Paper on modernisation was introduced, is shown in Table 5.2 
below. The share of the business sector was below the EC average. A high proportion 
of Spanish firms operated under foreign licence, or as subsidiaries of multinationals. 
Some 55% of the capital goods produced in Spain were manufactured under licence, 
while 85% of Spanish patents were taken out by foreigners, as against an EC average of 
45%.
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Table 5.2 Spain- research expenditure bv sector. 1983
Sector: MPTA % of total % of GDP
Public administration 68814 61.5 0.300
Public enterprises 21429 19.2 0.094
Private enterprise 21571 19.3 0.095
Total 111813 100 0.489
Source: OECD (1987).
Cooperation between industry and the university sector had tended to be poor, a fact 
acknowledged by the OECD, and this needed to be reversed in order to establish an 
effective system of innovation. In the view of the OECD, technical innovation called 
for social innovation and a new way of managing the interactions of researchers, 
industrialists, engineers, and customers. For Spain, a crucial problem centred upon the 
nurturing of a new set of relations among the actors in a technological system that was 
still at the embryonic stage.
In regard to cooperation, the OECD suggested that the responsibility for arranging, 
devising and managing research programmes lay with the professional bodies. There 
were benefits to be gained nationally from the involvement and commitment of all 
levels of society in the development of research and technology. 'Public opinion should 
be persuaded by all possible means of the need for a commitment alike to basic and to 
applied research in the interests of Spain's friture economic competitiveness'.^^
The Spanish government developed the national technology plans of the 1980s 
alongside the modernisation programme of industry, the latter set out in the 1983 White 
Paper (see following sections). A report by the government, Espana en Europa. 
produced in 1987 suggested some agreement with the OECD innovation study. It 
proposed a division of responsibilities for government and the business sector. 
Government would tackle the public sector, including the restructuring of industry.
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while Spanish industry should aim towards establishing an international presence, 
improve the quality and design of output, and pursue technological innovation.
The report, Espana en Europa affirmed the role of government in industrial 
development, and thus represented a continuation of the modernisation programme 
begun by the Socialists in 1982-83. However, the expectations placed on the business 
sector to foster technological development, design and quality improvement, as well as 
greater market share, extended the modernisation approach in a more European way.
But two features of the system remained amidst the changes of the 1980s. Firstly, the 
chief financial responsibility for research and development continued to lie with the 
public sector. The government failed to shift the responsibility for research funding to 
the private sector to the same degree as other partner states, and according to the 
evidence published by he government and presented below in Table 5.3 the industrial 
sector continued to lag behind other countries in terms of both providing research 
funding and carrying out research activities. The public sector proved to be one of the 
most important forces in the technological system, both as a provider of funds and in 
terms of carrying out technological activities.
Table 5.3 R&D. sector of oerformance/ source of funds (%) 1988-90
Germany UK France Spain
Sector of performance:
Business 73 67 60 58
Higher ed. 14 15 15 16
Public sector 12 14 25 25
Other 1 4 1 1
Source of funds:
Business 65 51 43 40
Public sector 32 37 49 40
Other 1 3 1 1
Abroad 2 9 7 4
Note; The figures for Germany and Spain refer to 1990, while those for 
UK and France apply to 1988.
Source: Comision Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnologia, op. cit., p.7.
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Secondly, the traditionally poor level of domestic cooperation between industry and the 
academic sector continued, as much of industry looked towards European partners to 
support their collaborative activities. The government's efforts, together with those of 
the European authorities, proved singularly successful in encouraging greater 
participation in European technology programmes, as Table 5.4 below shows. While 
both the academic and business sectors became involved in European programmes, the 
level of business involvement was particularly high.
Some 43% of business researchers were involved in European programmes, compared 
to 28% in the national technology programmes. The situation is almost the reverse in 
the context of university researchers, although public research centres have increasingly 
taken up much of the European collaborative work. Despite the government rhetoric on 
greater industrial responsibility for research, it was in practice ready to direct the 
allocation of research resources, and to provide public funds. The following section 
provides an examination of manufacturing industiy which explains why this trend 
continued.
Table 5.4 Distribution of Spanish researchers between national and 
Community programmes. 1990 %
Researchers: EC programmes National programmes
University 29 50
Public research 28 22
centres
Business 43 28
Total 100 100
Source; Comision Interministerial, op. cit., p. 82.
5.2 Profile of Spanish manufacturing
Three different groups comprise the industrial sector in Spain -a large number of small 
and medium-sized enterprises, a very small number of large public enterprises that have 
largely withstood the privatisation efforts of the government, and multinational 
enterprises which significantly increased their investment in Spain following the 
country's membership of the European Community. Despite the resources of the latter.
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the political power of the public enterprises, and the govemmenfs push of SMEs 
towards the European Community technology programmes, none of the groups has been 
able to make a significant contribution to the technological intensity of industry.
The absolute size of the Spanish manufacturing sector is small by comparison with 
Germany, France, and the UK, although its relative size (as a proportion of the 
economically active population and GDP) is in line with other European countries. In 
1990 the number of people working in industry (excluding construction, but including 
energy, water and mining) was 2.98 million, 24% of the total occupied population, and 
contributing about 29% of the GDP, compared to the UK's 20%.
Manufacturing industry is characterised by small scale firms, and it is often difficult for 
these firms to carry out R&D. Some 90% of industrial companies have fewer than 100 
employees, accounting for 50% of industrial employment.*^ Only one Spanish 
company, the State holding company INI, was among the one hundred largest industrial 
companies in the world in 1988 (by value of sales), in 61st position. In 1988, INI and 
Repsol were the only two Spanish companies in the top 100 European Community 
companies (measured by turnover).*^
Inevitably, such small sized firms have difficulties in technology creation - fi-om a lack 
of research and technical staff, to inadequate laboratory facilities, or a lack of financial 
resources, or an insufficient knowledge of what technological resources are needed to 
meet the needs of the organisation or the industry.
The predominance of small-scale industry is one problem, sectoral and geographic 
concentration another. When Spain became a member of the EC much of the industrial 
structure was dominated by the traditional sectors. In 1986 one third of all employment 
and one quarter of value-added in manufacturing industry arose fi-om the three sectors 
food, drink and tobacco; textiles and clothing; wood, cork and furniture. There was, 
also, an element of concentration on a geographical basis. The province of Barcelona 
accounted for 25% of manufacturing employment, while Barcelona with Madrid, the
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Basque country, Valencia, and Alicante accounted for 60% of industrial employment. 
The location of foreign direct investment also follows this geographic concentration.
During the period 1985-1989 the volume of investment in manufacturing in Spain rose 
by a much greater level than in the EC as a whole. During 1986-1988 the average 
annual rate of investment in manufacturing in the EC was 5.7% compared to a rate in 
Spain of 26.8% in the same period. Since 35% of manufacturing investment was 
accounted for by foreign-owned firms, there was a significant inflow of capital to the 
more dynamic sectors. Foreign direct investment tended to be centred on computers, 
electronics, pharmaceuticals, and these sectors have contributed to the high technology 
content of small areas of Spanish industry, as well as in car production, food, paper, 
chemicals.
Table 5.5 Private foreign investment in Spain 1983-1990 (MPTA)
1983 19841985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Direct 140 177 194 321 444 691 806 1257
Real estate 117 127 163 195 227 275 311 245
Portfolio 16.8 55.5 120 501 1483 1211 1774 1636
Other 41.8 39.7 52.8 111 69.6 71.4 102 161
Total 316 412 530 1129 2224 2249 2994 3313
Source: Alberto Redo (1992), p. 3.
The growth of foreign direct investment in Spain during the 1980s (see Table 5.5) 
created a pool of general support for European integration, but it was not the decisive 
force pushing the government in the direction of the European technology programmes. 
While Spain was successful in attracting some of the largest multinationals, encouraged 
by the low costs of labour and the support of the government, these organisations did 
not contribute greatly to the technological basis of Spanish industry. Their failure to do 
so rested with the particular organisation of activities on a multinational basis, including 
the location of research.
Multinationals produced for the export market*^ The concentration on commercial 
activities meant less resources were devoted to research and technological development.
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Research has indicated that up to the middle of the 1980s the multinationals located in 
Spain had obtained technology through contracts, rather than patents. In-house 
development of technology seemed less preferable than commercial acquisition.^® Often, 
these technology contracts covered the use of imported equipment, rather than the 
transfer of knowledge. In the four years following accession to the EC much of the 
foreign direct investment originated in other member states, as Table 5.6 shows, 
suggesting a relocation of investment to take account of the Single Market.
Table 5.6 Foreign direct investment. % of total by country
of origin
1984-85 1986-89
EC: 38.4 52.0
Hoiland 7.3 16.5
UK 7.5 10.1
France 8.2 9.4
Germany 10.5 8.7
US 18.4 4.9
Foreign companies in Spain 12.9 25.3
Other countries 30.3 17.8
Source: OECD Economic Survey: Spain 1990, p.64.
Technology transfer was thus restricted, and diffusion was largely excluded from what 
was essentially a series of commercial activities between the multinational plant and the 
parent organisation.^^ There was no particular need for these organisations to make a 
strong bid for European Community programmes, even when the parent company had 
established close links with the Brussels machinery.^^ Castells concluded that the 
location of multinationals was not enough to guarantee technology transfer to the local 
community. Although the evidence fi*om other countries such as the UK, Taiwan and 
Singapore indicates certain beneficial effects for the host region, particularly in terms of 
new machinery, methods of work organisation, and management styles, other 
technological benefits may depend upon the degree of expertise already available in the 
region to enable it to avail of opportunities presented by MNC investment.^^ Despite
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the high level of investment made by such firms, the figure was substantially below the 
Spanish govemmenfs spending on public programmes to stimulate the economy. 
Spain's technological gap with the rest of Europe made it clear that some kind of 
government action was necessary to assist the technological development of indigenous 
industry.
While the Spanish economy experienced significant growth in the period of the 1980s, 
accompanied by an increased internationalisation of business through foreign direct 
investment, domestic industry did not display the same drive to establish distribution 
and other commercial links abroad.
Table 5.7 Direct investment (*000 PTA)
Fdi in Spain Spanish fdi abroad 
1991 462,289 18,433,048
1990 1,080,242 45,481,577
1989 672,167 28,038,366
1988 514,244 2,297,079
1987 321,500 100,597,453
1986 248,200 668,578
Source: El Pais panorama semanal (1991) 'En 
manos ajenos', p.24, 19 August.
Over the past three decades the volume of exports as a percentage of GDP has increased 
from 9.8% in 1960 to 20.6% in 1984, while the volume of imports showed a similar 
trend, moving up from 13.9% to 21.3% over the same period. "^  ^ Although still below the 
EC average, this represented the average for the OECD as a whole. During this period 
there was a gradual opening up of the previously protected domestic market, largely in 
recognition of the need to import technology in order to build up the indigenous 
industrial base.
The dependence on foreign technology was evident throughout the 1980s, and in this 
respect there are parallels with the United Kingdom. However, Spain was starting from
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a smaller base and was still relatively far behind the UK in terms of technological 
development by the beginning of the 1980s.
By the 1980s the dependence on foreign technology continued through the foreign direct 
investments of multinationals. At this time, the government actively pursued a policy 
that could almost be described as 'Spain For Sale'. Technology was needed to develop 
the industrial base, but the expansion of this base fuelled the demand for even more 
advanced technology. Despite the significant levels of investment, Spanish industry was 
seen to have lower levels of technical efficiency by comparison with industry in 
Western Europe.^^ Many studies have noted the dependence of Spanish industry on 
foreign t echnologyand tended to take a generally pessimistic view of the possibility 
of changing this situation. A large number of Spanish firms produce goods with foreign 
patents, or under licences. Such patents frequently stipulated domestic production only, 
reinforcing the strong orientation towards the domestic economy which was a result of 
protection and the absence of international competition.
The situation may be appreciated more clearly by looking at the country's technological 
balance of payments, defined as the money paid or received for the use of patents, 
licences, trademarks, designs, inventions and know-how. In 1981 there was a deficit of 
35684 million pesetas, rising rapidly to 63277 million pesetas the following year and by 
1988 to 140243, a 50% increase on the previous year (see Table 5.8). The majority of 
the technological deficit was due to other EC member states, principally France, 
Germany and the UK, with Holland and the United States also contributing to the 
technological flow. One obvious conclusion from this is that Spanish industry placed an 
increasing reliance on technology developed elsewhere, rather than through in-house 
research efforts.
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Table 5.8 Technological balance of payment deficit
MPTA
1981 35,684
1982 63,277
1983 69,647
1984 63,962
1985 78,600
1986 81,500
1987 93,000
1988 140,243
1989 157,200
1990 181,500
1991 171,400
Source: El Pais (1989) 'El deficit tecnologico se dispara durante el 
primer ano del Plan Nacional, 27 Jan.; MINER (1991) Informe sobre 
Industrie Espanola.
Four years after accession the European Commission also expressed concern over the 
situation of Spanish industry and its ability to remain competitive in the single European 
market.^^ The Commission view was conflicting and somewhat mixed.^* It regarded the 
foreign investment as speculative and detrimental to overall long-term production 
growth, but then went on to suggest that the presence of multinationals in Spain could 
compensate for the as yet badly prepared domestic industry.
The sectors with the best future were ceramics, shoes, toys, sports goods, wine, food, 
shipbuilding and cars, many of the areas targeted by the European Community BRITE- 
EURAM programme. In the high technology sectors such as aeronautics, information 
technology, telecommunications, Spanish enterprises were identified as having poor 
competitive capability in the face of international competition. Overall, the report 
concluded the general problem for Spanish industry was the poor technological 
capability.
Building the technological capability of industry became a part of the modernisation 
process begun by the Socialist government following its election in 1982. It was clear 
that the domestic industry was ill-prepared to compete at the international arena, but 
there was also a lack of confidence in the ability of industry to raise its capability 
without the continued assistance of imported t echno logyThe  national technology
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plan, introduced by the Spanish government in 1988, was essentially a continuation of 
the modernisation approach adopted earlier in the decade. Before examining these 
changes to the technological system the following section takes a brief look at the early 
modernisation strategies implemented by the Socialist government.
5.3 Modernisation - from intervention to liberalism
Industrial policy in the period 1977-1982 centred on supporting industrial firms, even 
those that were inefficient. The two energy crises of the decade had left their mark on 
the Spanish economy, exposing weaknesses in what were considered sectors of national 
comparative advantage. The unwillingness to restructure when the other advanced 
countries were doing so stemmed from the strong influence which industrial groups had 
with the government. Government was willing to provide subsidies to support these 
industrial sectors, and to channel resources into sectors in order to save jobs, thus hiding 
the need to reorganise in order to improve productivity. In effect, the policy was a 
continuation of the policies that were pursued in the 1960s.
The Socialist government under the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez set out plans, in a 
White Paper published in 1983, for the restructuring and modernisation of industry, 
including many of the large public organisations which had sheltered for so long behind 
government subsidy. The Ministry for Industry had the responsibility for identifying a 
sector in need of restructuring. It could activate the process itself, or act on the basis of 
representations from trade union or employer organisations. Once the sector was 
identified, restructuring proceeded on the basis of a course of action agreed between the 
three partners.
This approach was criticised by some as resulting in a less than optimum allocation of 
resources.^^ But it had the advantage of continuing with the consensual approach which 
had developed in the post-Franco period and was useful to elicit support from industry 
for the government programme. Modernisation was seen as a necessary prerequisite to 
European integration.
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The 1983 White Paper which set out the strategy to improve competitiveness by a two­
pronged attack, on productivity and the promotion of investment and technological 
innovation in those activities with good future potential, showed how the indicative 
planning approach was beginning to adopt more market features. Industrial restructuring 
required the introduction of measures to adapt industry to the changing environment.
The modernisation plan was intended to cover a large number of sectors including 
integrated iron and steel, special steels, carbon steels, shipbuilding, textiles, footwear, 
motor vehicle parts, electronic components, kitchen appliances, semi-manufactured 
products of copper and its alloys. It focused on cost cutting, reinvestment and mergers, 
and building up new markets. Tax incentives were given to firms that merged. Other 
measures used covered modernisation and rationalisation, financial restructuring 
(writing off debts, rescheduling debt, new lines of credit, public underwriting of loans), 
tax rebates, extension of the payment period for tax and social security debt.
The government anticipated the adverse effects which might be felt by labour, with an 
envisaged reduction of 80,000 to 90,000 jobs. It tried to soften the blow through early 
retirement and redundancy packages, and through the provision of free retraining and 
subsidies to employers to encourage them to employ people. Such labour market 
policies proved of limited success, and Spain continued to have one of the highest rates 
of unemployment in the Community throughout the decade of the 1980s. Between the 
period 1975-1985 one million jobs were lost, while the years after EC membership 
witnessed unemployment rates of 18%, despite the creation of new jobs through 
multinational investment.
All of these measures involved substantial public expenditure. In the period 1984-1986 
some Pta 1000 bn. (about £5 bn.) was expended on the reconversion plan. Investment in 
modernisation and rationalisation of installations between 1981-1989 totalled Pta 650 
bn., out of which some Pta 50 bn. was allocated for design and research.^'
Modernisation was additionally to be effected through the continued encouragement of 
foreign investment, the privatisation of much of the public sector enterprises, and a
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concentration of production in areas where it was difficult for small firms to gain 
e n t r y F o r e i g n  direct investment was expected to promote the modernisation and 
internationalisation of the Spanish economy, and at the same time exert greater 
competitive pressures on domestic industry. Frequently, these competitive pressures 
were expressed by domestic firms preferring to create alliances with foreign firms rather 
than other domestic firms, and a climate of rivalry dominated relations among industrial 
firms. In the context of what the government was trying to do, namely to improve 
competitiveness and prepare for international competition, this was not necessarily a bad 
thing. However, in the context of interest group representation it represented a 
difficulty. At the national level, it was difficult to organise business interests and to 
establish common positions on areas of concern.
Judging the success of the modernisation programme is not easy, regardless of the set of 
criteria used. Structural change was affecting all of the European states to a greater or 
lesser degree, with different effects and very varied capabilities towards adjustment. 
But it cannot be said that the modernisation programme instituted a structure for 
technical innovation in Spain. The observations of the OECD study published in 1987 
suggested that there was still much room for improvement of the technological system 
(section 5.1).
Before 1986, two government departments shared the responsibility for the management 
and co-ordination of research and technology -the Ministry of Education and Science 
had responsibility for science, and the Ministry of Industry and Energy for technological 
innovation. However, like the practice in the UK, most of the government ministries 
carried out R&D activities with little central co-ordination. The existence of inter- 
ministerial rivalry within the Spanish administration meant that the restructuring plan 
lost some of its sharper edges, as particular departments sought to satisfy long- 
entrenched interests, and political goals were sometimes more to the fbrefi-ont.^^
At a general level the Socialist government was caught between the traditional ideals 
and the desire to safeguard the interests of workers on the one hand, and the urgent 
objectives of modernisation of the industrial base in preparation for EC entry on the
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other. In one sense, perhaps, it tried to follow conflicting policies. But the government 
was anxious to pursue agreement on the modernisation plan, and to protect jobs as far as 
possible, and this approach had the effect of slowing down the restructuring of industry. 
In the UK, by contrast, the government had already broken down the industrial relations 
structures, and the liberalisation process of the labour market had gone much fiirther.
Membership of the European Community brought a shift to a more open liberal 
economy, and also a gradual move in the direction of a more liberal economic 
management. But the policy shift should not be over-stated. By the end of the decade, 
the government still maintained a strong position in many areas of decision-making and 
wealth creation - despite privatisation programmes on the one hand, and the creation of 
the regional autonomous communities, on the other. Policy could be described as 
liberalisation combined with selective public sector intervention, compared with the 
earlier era of widespread intervention across the board. The earlier reference (see Tables
5.2 and 5.3) to the continued public financing of research and development, contrary to 
trends elsewhere in Europe, was just one instance of the central role of government.
The Spanish government was constrained by the requirements of Community legislation 
after 1986, but it continued to pursue an active industrial policy through the latter years 
of the decade. However, there was a shift away fi’om supporting traditional industries, 
towards producing an economic environment conducive to the emergence of new 
industry. This meant policies aimed at greater flexibility of the labour force, new 
technologies, helping SMEs and promoting industrial exports.
Up to the mid-1980s, very little public funds had been directed at stimulating R&D in 
Spain, but there was an acceptance of the need to bring the base up to a comparable 
level with the other Member States. The next section examines the institutional and 
policy developments that occurred following accession to the European Community.
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5.4 Planning the institutions
The Bill on Science and Technology, passed in April 1986, was described by the 
OECD as the most important step taken by Spain towards setting up a policy of 
innovation, provided the basis for a technology policy.^ "* It contained institutional 
arrangements for the co-ordination of functions (see Figure 6.1 at the end of the 
chapter), and provided for a national technology plan - but what developed from it was 
a structure and policy framework modelled very closely on European Community 
developments.
The Interministerial Commission on Science and Technology (CICYT) was the 
principal instrument of coordination of scientific, technological and innovation issues 
with an Advisory Council for Science and Technology which operated alongside it. In 
addition, the Centre for Industrial Technological Development (CDTI) was given a 
greatly extended role within the Ministry of Industry. Originally set up in 1977 as a 
result of a credit of US $18m. from the World Bank for five years, CDTI became the 
focal point for much of the government's efforts to promote co-operation at the national, 
and the international level, facilitating participation in international cooperative 
ventures, and acting as a marriage broker for the various individuals interested in 
technological cooperative activity. It was both the national contact for the 
BRITE/EURAM and other EC programmes, and the manager of the government's 
national technological policy.
As manager of the public technology policy, it carries out three broad tasks: financing 
research and development projects by industry, representing Spanish interests in 
international programmes, and general promotional activities to encourage greater 
technology transfer and diffusion. The OECD regarded CDTI as an essential instrument 
for the technological development of Spain, and recommended that it should be 
provided with a regularly growing budget.
It was, in actual fact, the kind of elite group typified in the neo-functionalist theory, and 
a principal vehicle for pushing forward the integration process through technology
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policy. CDTI was very strongly supportive of the European technology programmes. It 
was staffed by intellectual elites, from the young generation of post-Franco Spanish 
bureaucrats and professionals that embraced modernity and progress. Modernity was 
represented in European integration, and the possession of an international outlook.
In addition to the aforementioned three bodies, the Bill also provided for the 
establishment of a General Council for Science and Technology, intended to co-ordinate 
the national and regional policies. Many of the regional autonomous communities have 
developed, or are in the process of developing a technology plan for the region. The 
scope of the regional technology plan varies from region to region, depending on the 
capability of the regional authorities, and the degree of autonomy each has negotiated 
with the national authorities. Policy is, thus, the responsibility of the Interministerial 
Commission, while the General Secretariat for the National Plan has responsibility at the 
operational level.
The Bill on Science and Technology also provided for a National Plan (drawn up for 
four years, with annual revision), to bring the country's research potential up to the level 
of the EC partners within 5-10 years at most. The Plan set out a target for R&D 
expenditure above 1% of GDP, with an increasing proportion to be met by industry. In 
this emphasis on industrial financing, the government was aligning itself with the 
OECD and the European Commission.
But the practice was somewhat different in the Spanish case. The country was starting 
from a low technological base, and the degree of technological co-operation between 
different groups was weak. It was perhaps inevitable that government retained a 
directive role in the development of the technological system, even when the technology 
Bill provided for the industrial interest representation at the various levels of 
government responsible for decisions on technology policy.^^
The National Plan (1988-1991) coordinated research activity in a series of programmes 
which identified technological priorities within a broad societal framework. It was 
intended to increase technical activity of industry, and also the public research
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institutions as well to support the research of the Autonomous Communities. It planned 
to increase the number of researchers in Spain from 20,000 to 30,000 by 1991, and the 
proportion of GDP going to research from 0.7% to 1.2%. Largely funded by the 
government, the objectives of the first Plan (1988-1991) focused on a range of what are 
essentially very general socio-economic goals of broad application:
• progress of knowledge and advance in technological innovation and development;
• conservation, enrichment and optimum exploitation of natural resources;
• economic growth, job promotion and improvement in working conditions;
• development and strengthening of the competitive capacity of industry, commerce, 
agriculture and fishing;
• development of public services, especially those related to housing, communications 
and transport;
• promotion of health, social welfare and the quality of life;
• strengthening of national defence;
• defence and conservation of the national artistic and historical heritage;
• promotion of artistic creativity and the progress and dissemination of culture in all 
its forms;
• improvement of the quality of education;
• adaptation of Spanish society to the changes brought about by scientific 
development and new technologies.^^
Funding of 235.400 million pesetas (174 million ECU) was allocated for 1988, and 
increased to 348.000 million pesetas (257 million ECU) for the following year. In terms 
of development and organisation, the National Plan bore distinct resemblance to the 
policy-making style at the European level. Priorities were set by the Interministerial 
Commission, following a process of consultation with over 400 experts from the 
scientific community, private sector experts, and government departments. Containing a 
total of 23 constituent programmes, the structure mirrored the European programme.
But the national plan was in practice too broadly designed to address the specific 
problems of a technological system: the gap in industry-academic relations, inadequate
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technology transfer mechanisms, and the historical role of the state in technological 
development. Moreover, it catered for precompetitive research, much of which was 
conducted under the aegis of the Ministry of Education and Science.
The national plan proved to be highly ambitious in its objectives, particularly given the 
fact that the country was still not well equipped with an institutional base to co-ordinate 
all the necessary activities. The plan represented a form of leadership from the top, and 
incorporated the ambitions and objectives of those involved in the formulation. It was 
less associated with the needs of the grassroots of Spanish industry, particularly the 
small- and medium-sized firms that made up the majority of the manufacturing base, 
low spenders on research and technology generally, yet in need of the means to 
modernise their activities.
Nonetheless, the plan set a strategic direction for technological development which 
would bring Spanish industry into line with other European partners, and at the same 
time continue to strengthen the indigenous resource base.^  ^ The Ministry for Industry 
was anxious, like the DTI in the UK, to promote greater collaboration by firms and 
research centres in the European Community programmes, even though the motives 
differed substantially.
While the UK government regarded the EC fimds in support of business collaborative 
research as a substitute for national government financial support, the Spanish 
authorities regarded participation as a way of acquiring technology, and upgrading 
standards, and believed that co-operation could increase the European presence and 
identity of Spanish firms.
The implementation of the national plan for technological development showed up a 
number of problems which needed to be addressed - technical skills shortages,^* the 
inadequate industry-university cooperation with low levels of applied research,^^ and 
poor technological diffusion.
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5.5 Bridging the industry-academic divide
Encouraging the business sector to conduct more research, and to finance greater levels 
of research activity was one of the tasks for the Spanish government. But, equally 
important and difficult was that of bringing industry and universities together to conduct 
collaborative activity directed at the technological needs of industry. Universities were 
more inclined to pursue basic research, and consequently industry was discouraged from 
financing the research activities which they perceived as being irrelevant to their needs.
It was not only a question of developing a system of providing and diffusing 
information, and publicity, but also of encouraging businesses and universities to change 
their attitudes and practices. This required the creation of mechanisms to bring the 
business and academic communities together, and to develop strategies to enable non­
university laboratories to act as intermediaries.
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Table 5.9 Industrially-financed HERD. % of total, selected countries
UK 3.90
Germany 5.30
France 1.90
Spain 1.60
Italy 1.54
Ireland 7.20
Source: CEC (1991) HEl/Research centre/ Industry links in Europe, 
Innovation/SPRINT report.
A report by the European Commission on research centre-industry links, published in 
1991, suggested that something needed to be done to improve relations between the 
two."^  ^ Many in the private sector believed that relations between business and the 
academic community were completely inadequate, and 'existed in a climate of mutual 
m istru st'U n iv ersities  had, for several decades, been increasing their international 
cooperative links, not just through CERN, the European Space Agency, and other 
European-level initiatives, but to a great extent with American institutions. Often this 
had resulted in a brain drain, and the belief among scientists that little opportunities 
existed for scientists in Spain, and little fireedom from the bureaucratic approach of the 
government."*  ^ The Spanish scientific links with America had attracted criticism that it 
was neglecting its European counterparts."*^
A system of industrial liaison offices (ILO's) set up to foster greater industry-academic 
cooperation in Spain, and provided for in the 1986 Technology Bill, exhibited many of 
the weaknesses associated with distant business-academic ties. A European 
Commission report found that they were academically oriented, often with little formal 
training in innovation or technology management, and concluded that they seem unsure 
of or even disinterested with the needs of industry'."*  ^ The problem of poor 
communication with industry was compounded by a serious lack of adequate 
information among much of the industrial sector regarding European R&D, technology
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and industrial activities, making intervention by the government seem a reasonable 
institutional development.
The communication gap operated in both directions, with much of the business sector 
having little knowledge of the research programmes conducted by research centres or 
the European Community. As the EC report acknowledged 'Spanish businessmen are 
generally ill-informed of this type of activities and programmes, and know very little 
about how to gain access to them'."^  ^ In this regard, Spanish businesses were less well 
prepared to approach the European Commission directly regarding participation in the 
EC programmes than UK businesses.
This point need to be qualified, however. It was the small and medium-sized firms, 
increasingly targeted by the European Commission, that were particularly ill-informed 
about the European programmes, and most in need of upgrading their technological 
capability. Small firms took part in the research projects of the National Plan, on an 
individual and collaborative basis, but participated most fi*equently in the applied 
research area, where there was less need for sophisticated R&D facilities. Large firms, 
especially those multinationals with operations in Spain, were already associated vrith 
the European technology network either through the Spanish operations or those 
elsewhere.
One horizontal measure in place since 1989 was a network of technology transfer 
organisations, the OTRI (Oficinas de Transferencias de Resultados de Investigacion), 
vrith branches in the universities throughout the country. The OTRI built up extensive 
databases on technological developments, including European programmes, and on 
financing and potential partners. Close liaison with the central authorities was the 
hallmark of these units scattered around the country. The OTRI network was modelled 
on the data bases established by the European Commission to provide support to 
applicants under the European technology programmes, and similar to the European 
Documentation Centres located in certain universities in the United Kingdom.
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As a result of the direct invitation of the Spanish government, IRDAC addressed a 
gathering of the Spanish business community in 1993 to encourage greater participation 
in European programmes, especially the BRITE-EURAM programme/^ Given the 
small-scale and limited resource base of industry, the Spanish government took a more 
active and direct role in co-ordinating the participation of both the business and the 
academic community in the EC Framework Programme than did the government of the 
United Kingdom.
The mixed results of mechanisms such as the ILO's and the OTRI network, amidst the 
initiatives of the national plan, suggested industrial technological development and 
innovation was taking place slowly. To push forward technological innovation, the 
authorities adopted a plan for the introduction and use of industrial technology. Plan de 
Actuacion Tecnologico (PATI) 1991-1993, which was in effect a programme of 
horizontal measures and sectoral initiatives designed to run alongside the broad-based 
programmes of the National Plan, dealing specifically with industrial technology and 
applied research. Three priority areas were identified: information and production 
technologies; natural resources, agriculture and food technologies; quality of life. In the 
area of information and production technologies certain categories of research were 
identified:
• new materials
• information and communication technologies
• microelectronics
• space
• training of researchers.
The PATI was intended to improve the technology infrastructure so as to bring the 
technological capability of Spanish industry up to the level of other advanced countries, 
through support for individual and collaborative research and technological activities."^  ^
An equally important objective was to guarantee the continuance of existing initiatives 
within the framework of the conditions of the European Single Market. In effect, the 
government wanted to continue national efforts of support for technological
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development, but mindful of the European Community's policy on state aid to industry. 
The intention was that such public support at the domestic level could act as a 
springboard for taking these activities to the European level."^ ^
By 1991 the percentage of GDP devoted to research had increased to 0.81%, but still 
below the projected figure of the National Plan. A second National Plan, covering the 
period 1992-1995, regrouped the original set of programmes, and attempted to address 
the problems which had been identified in the first programme.
However, even without the establishment of this system for transferring technology, the 
size of the government sector by itself could almost certainly guarantee some degree of 
technology transfer. In Spain, the public sector is substantially larger than in the United 
Kingdom, and represents a major element of the total demand for new technology. But 
a key part of the plan to set up a technology transfer network was the need to increase 
the demand for new technology generally among indigenous industry. Diffusion of 
technology was the best way to ensure the increase in total productive capability 
throughout the economy, and not just those isolated sectors dominated by 
multinationals. Otherwise, the efforts to increase technological development merely 
offered a subsidy to the foreign investors."^^
Paradoxically, while membership of the European Community brought with it increased 
competition for Spanish industry it exposed the technological inadequacy, forcing the 
government to take an even more active role in ensuring that industry could meet the 
challenge. Surviving the single market required more intervention in Spanish industry 
and the technological structure rather than less, as the European Commission in general 
favoured. But at the same time, there was no sense among the Spanish authorities or 
technology community that European technology policy was in conflict with national 
policy. In fact, national policy continued to evolve along a European design, even 
during the recessionary years 1991-1993 when general support for integration declined.
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5.6 Evaluating integration
The Spanish authorities continued to promote participation in the European programmes 
as the recession took hold in Spain. It was clear that the Spanish business community 
had some way to go towards matching the level of participation by other member states 
in European technology programmes.^® In spite of the goals set out in the National Plan, 
and specifically in PATI, to increase the technological capability of Spanish business 
and shift the financing of R&D to the private sector, the state still retained much of the 
initiative in this area. It was acknowledged by the director general of CDTI, Antonio de 
Carvajal, that the plan had been ambitious, and that there was still improvements to be 
made in regard to innovation.^ ^
One of the objectives of the CDTI, and a statutory duty, was to secure for Spain a 
technological return commensurate with the country's economic contribution to the EC. 
This objective was pursued much more forcefully in the period 1991-1994, as Spain 
questioned its contribution to organisations such as CERN, ESA, Airbus, and 
EUREKA.^
By 1990, the ESPRIT programme had attracted a substantial number of Spanish 
participants, although this numerical strength was not matched by an equivalent share of 
the total funds. Ortega pointed out that Spain had received 5.04 % of the total funds 
while the European average was 7%.^  ^ This suggests that the influence of 
multinationals persisted in the identity of those firms participating in the EC 
programmes,^"* while national firms still lacked the confidence to make a large scale 
assault on European collaborative programmes.
The BRITE-EURAM programme, which particularly suited Spanish industry through its 
targeting of SMEs, attracted less firms overall than the ESPRIT programme up to 1991, 
although Spain received more in terms of funds under BRITE-EURAM. The apparent 
contradictory experience of the two programmes can be explained by the nature of the 
collaborative participation of the Spanish firms.
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Participants often had a limited responsibility in the collaborative project, and the 
financial receipts reflected this. In other words, greater numbers participating in a 
programme did not always mean a greater contribution of the programme budget going 
to Spain, if the nature of the role played by Spanish participants was small in 
comparison to other national partners. Apart hrom the financial implications, a limited 
participation in European programmes meant reduced access to the technological 
developments of the projects.^^ Public sector organisations participated in the European 
programmes to a greater extent than did the private sector business firms.
Table 5.10 Spanish participation in EC R&D 1989
% total budget projects approved projects with
(1) (2) Spanish par 
(3)
BRITE-EURAM 6.20 170 46
BRITE: Aeronautics 3.70 29 8
ESPRIT 5.10 158 73
RACE 4.40 88 38
ECLAIR 8.50 25 9
SPRINT 10.20 121
Source; MINER (1989) Informe sobre la Industria 
Espanola, p.254. 
(1) gives % of total current programme budget going to Spain, (2) total projects 
approved at that time, (3) number of projects with Spanish participation.
By 1991, the principal programmes under the EC Framework programme of concern to 
CDTI covered the areas of industrial and information technology, agri-industrial 
research, telematics, pharmaceuticals/medicine. Spain received 5.3% of the total EC 
research budget, while the programme which stood out as giving the highest percentage 
share of an EC programme budget was the ECLAIR programme (European 
Collaborative Linkage of Agriculture and Industry through Research). The table below 
shows the position.
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Table 5.11 EC R&D - Spanish share of EC 
programme budgets %. 1991 
ECLAIR 9.00
BRITE-EURAM 8.10
ESPRIT 6.20
BRIDGE 3.80
RACE 0.20
Source: Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y 
Turismo (1991) Informe sobre la Industria 
Espanola, p.319.
By 1992, when Spain attained full membership of the EC, one thousand groups within 
Spain had submitted research projects under the European programmes, principally 
those included in Table 5.10 above, with over half of them being approved for support. 
CDTI expected 13538 million pesetas in 1992 from the BRITE-EURAM programme. 
By contrast, 326 projects were supported in that year under the national programme 
covering technological development, and technological innovation, with CDTI itself 
providing 18200 million pesetas.
EC programmes offered access to new technology, and the opportunity to develop a 
'culture of co-operation' in industry-academic relations. Eventually, the sum of all the 
participative efforts would, it was hoped, have the effect of upgrading the level of the 
technology base. The BRITE-EURAM programme was seen as an EC initiative which 
complemented the Spanish government's modernisation plan'.^^ In addition, the 
programme offered opportunities to a substantial section of Spanish industry to acquire 
new technology, and at the same time to plug into the European network.^^ The survey 
results presented in chapter six of this thesis suggest this is what they wanted from the 
programme. But it also provided Spanish researchers with the chance to supplement 
research efforts already under way. In the area of new materials, for instance, there were 
numerous research projects being carried out by the universities, with the support of 
government funds.^^
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5.7 Conclusion
European technology policy exerted its influence on the Spanish policy, in a way that 
reflected the particular nature of the domestic institutional system. The driving force for 
change of the existing system was undoubtedly the governing elites, although they were 
strongly supported by the business and academic communities. Developments were set 
within the twin-pillar support of modernisation and European integration.
A tradition of high state involvement in society generally proved difficult to displace, 
however. This meant prominent support and intervention by the government in the 
technological system - an increasingly European-oriented elite appeared, one which was 
not always so well attuned to the particular needs of industry or to the deficiencies of the 
institutional system of technology transfer and diffusion. The statutory provisions 
regarding CDTI's development thus created some concern that technological projects of 
interest or relevance to industry could be neglected. However, the Ministry for Industry 
and Energy made strong efforts in the second half of the 1980s to bridge this divide, and 
attempted to direct industrial policy to the needs of industry.
European Community technology programmes represented both a challenge and an 
opportunity to industry as well as the national authorities. For industry, it was the 
opportunity to build industry-academic relations in order to improve the technological 
capability of industry, to ‘européanisé’ the technological activities underway or planned, 
to upgrade technical processes of Spanish industry, and finally to extend commercial 
links throughout the European market. For government, it was the opportunity to 
construct a technological system that would underpin it. And for Spanish academic 
researchers, the European programmes represented an opportunity to construct links 
with researchers and technologists in other member states.
Having undertaken the task of constructing a technological system, the government was 
then put under pressure from the early 1990s to justify Spain's involvement in the 
European programmes at a time of declining economic activity within the country. 
Industry and the academic sectors, as well as other areas of Spanish society came to
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question the extent of Spain’s share in the European technology programmes. The 
picture in 1993 (illustrated in Table 5.12) showed that the highest share came from 
participation in the European programme promoting agro-industrial research 
cooperation (AIR) and the BRITE-EURAM programme.
216
Table 5.12 Third Framework Programme 1993. Spanish share % 
EC budget Spanish share %
MPTA
Programme:
Telematics 5895 405 6.9
RACE 12300 501 4.1
ESPRIT 66825 4715 7.0
BRITE-EURAM 48780 3705 7.6
BRIDGE 1695 119 7.0
ECLAIR 24405 2640 10.8
Environment 17355 990 5.7
Total 177255 13075 7.4
Source: MINER, Informe 1993, p. 431 (1993 exchange rate: 
1ECU=150 PTA)
Moving from a rather autocratic style of government to one based on consensus was a 
challenge - the national technology plan was a response to that challenge. It was 
modelled on the European Framework Programme, with wide-ranging consultation. 
But, like its Brussels counterpart, it was in reality a top-down programme rather than 
one based on substantive representation of sectoral interests.
The large number of small and medium-sized firms with low technological capability, 
combined with weak organisation of business interests and the poor history of industry- 
academic co-operation opened the way for the Spanish authorities to adopt the European 
model, yet not in fact adapting it sufficiently to the national circumstances.^^ At the 
same time, technological dependence on the one hand, and the demands of international 
competition based on technological capability emphasised the political significance of 
European and national technology programmes, making them complementary.^^ The 
need to improve competitive ability in the international economy encouraged higher 
levels of intervention.^^ It proved to be the public sector elites, more than economic 
interests, that exerted the integrative pressures within Spain.
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The integrative pressures were harnessed by the central government with the support of 
areas of the public sector such as the research centres and the universities. Spanish 
business had long supported the idea of integration, but the overall sector was not 
organised as an effective pressure group. Among the large industrial groups there was 
often rivalry, and co-ordination of activities was not fi-equent. The small and medium­
sized firms did not have the resources, or the capability to approach the Commission 
directly, as many of the UK firms were prepared to do. Weaknesses in the organisation 
of business interests, and the dominance of international companies in Spanish industry 
left the way open for the government to take more of a leadership role, so that 
throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s the government was a primary actor in the 
drive towards technological development.^^
The lack of technological capability relative to European competitors was a factor in 
bringing the different groups together - industrial organisations, research centres and 
government. Participation in the European Community Framework Programme offered 
benefits to the individual participants, while, at the same time, could help to offset some 
of the problems in the Spanish technological system.
Many of the business firms had little experience of international technical cooperation 
and welcomed the coordinating role which the authorities were prepared to undertake. 
Unlike the United Kingdom firms which often approached Brussels directly, or followed 
up earlier collaboration efforts, the Spanish firms were happy to allow the CDTI to deal 
with Brussels, to find partners, and to attend the information workshops organised by 
the national authorities. There was substantially greater interaction between the Spanish 
authorities and the Brussels bureaucrats at the implementation stage than was the case 
for the United Kingdom.
The more extensive direct involvement of the Spanish authorities with Brussels meant 
that the learning effect associated with the integration process, discussed in chapter one, 
operated through the government elites. By contrast, in the case of the United Kingdom 
it operated directly through the participants in the collaborative programmes. The 
Spanish authorities were in a position to manage the process to some extent, to direct the
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entry points of new technology, and to set up mechanisms for assimilation and transfer 
of new technology. At the same time, CDTI and other organisations set up by the 
government were eager to study and adopt the Brussels model of technology 
management, without concern for sovereignty loss.^
Interest of the Spanish authorities in the EC technology programmes was in large part 
driven by the commitment of the government, led by Felipe Gonzalez, to the pursuit of 
an international dimension in domestic policy. As one writer expressed it - 'The only 
way for Spain to become an internationally respected and politically and economically 
powerful nation, it is argued, is to think and act internationally'.^^ Both the government 
of Sefior Gonzalez, and the bureaucrats within the national ministry and the science and 
technology institutions, contributed to the creation of the political spill-over.
The experience of deep recession during 1992-1993 did not reduce the government's 
support for integration, although it did result in a more critical position by the 
government. At the Edinburgh summit in December 1992, the prime minister, Felipe 
Gonzalez exerted his influence and determination to secure greater financial benefit 
from the country’s membership of the EC by securing the agreement of the European 
Community for the Cohesion Fund to support environmental and transport projects in 
Spain, as well as Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, in return for support of the Maastricht 
T re a ty .S in c e  then, the government has set macroeconomic policy so as to meet the 
convergence criteria, while microeconomic policy was directed at improving the 
competitiveness of the Spanish economy.^^
With greater competition for foreign direct investment among the member states of the 
European Union, policy inevitably turned to ways of maintaining Spain's competitive 
edge. Given the shift to a more neo-liberal approach, this has meant a greater emphasis 
on cost reduction and structural reform of the labour market, rather than on 
technological innovation activities. Although the level of foreign investment in the 
country began to rise again in 1994 (with 62.5% of the total originating from the EU, 
principally Holland, Germany and France) favouring particularly the manufacturing 
sector, much of it was targeted at existing Spanish enterprises rather than new fixed
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capital formation.^* This suggests that the technological capability of Spanish industry 
remained to be addressed at both the macro and the micro level.
The Cohesion Fund was in many respects a compensation for the hardship that the 
Spanish economy would have to endure in order to meet the Maastricht convergence 
criteria for eligibility to the next stage of monetary union. By 1995, the public sector 
deficit was 5.8% of GDP (the requirement was 3%), with inflation at 3.4% but showing 
an upward tendency. The tight monetary policy imposed by the government had a 
knock-on effect on business investment and R&D in the early 1990s, which showed 
little sign of abating. The expected growth for 1996 was 2.3%, revised fi*om 3.4%, 
while unemployment in 1995 was 22.&%, more than twice the EU average. Private 
consumption, which had been one of the contributing factors to the growth of the second 
half of the 1980s, was expected to increase by 2% in 1996, at the same rate as the 
previous year.
The examination of the national institutional systems presented in this chapter, and in 
the preceding one, opens up the context for the actions and motivations for technological 
collaboration by individual actors. But it gives no clear picture of the micro level, where 
the decisions to collaborate or not are made, nor does it elaborate on the changing 
expectations and attitudes of these actors. For this, we have to go directly to the micro 
level so as to identify what, if any, changes in attitudes and expectations are evident 
from their experience in the European programme. The next chapter presents the 
evidence fi*om a survey of the Spanish and UK participants, conducted in two stages 
over a three-year period between 1992 and 1995. It is to this empirical evidence that we 
now turn.
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Figure 5.1 Spanish technological system
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CHAPTER 6
COLLABORATION AND COMMUNITY BUILDING - THE EVIDENCE
One of the central tenets of the neo-flmctionalist theory was that economic forces should 
respond to an initial integrative step by exerting pressure for further integration, as the 
perception of successful integration causes a spill-over into other decision-making 
mechanisms to satisfy other demands in an interdependent economy. Chapter three of 
this thesis examined one instance of an initial integrative task, a programme to integrate 
European manufacturing through collaborative research. The question now is to 
consider whether subsequent demands will be made by these actors on the supranational 
authority. How would these economic actors respond to integration? What force 
operates on these economic actors, prompting calls for integration, and resulting in a 
transfer of loyalty to a supranational institution?^
Neo-functionalist writers disagreed over the priority given to the actions and 
expectations of individual economic actors at a more disaggregated level.^ Yet it was 
clear that the programme for establishing a single market in Europe offered substantial 
benefits to the business community, and was consequently supported individually and 
collectively by business leaders. The integrative pressures which appeared before and 
after the Single European Act have prompted a closer look at the nature of these 
pressures.^
As this thesis will show, with the development of the BRITE-EURAM programme 
business pressure and demands on the Commission were intensified more often through 
the leadership and actions of the Commission itself - by developing a programme that 
was accessible to participants, and harnessing it to a broad institutional structure of a 
supranational nature. Business leaders played a more direct role at an early stage in the 
formulation of the Single Market programme through their private consultations with 
both national and Commission officials."  ^ In the case of European technology policy, 
however, the nature of the business-govemment relationships in the different national
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economies of the Community have also played a part in the political process. This 
chapter presents the results of the survey of the UK and Spanish participants in the 
BRITE-EURAM programme. The analysis considers the pressures and motives of the 
actors, and the extent to which the experience of participation leads to a change of 
attitudes, expectations or loyalties towards the central authority. The objective is to 
consider the evidence, quantitative or qualitative, to suggest that a community has been, 
or is in the process of being created.
6.1 Survey Methodology
This section provides details of the research design and methodology, and the results of 
the survey will be presented in the following sections. The results are based on 
information provided by responses to written questionnaires issued to participants in 
both Spain and the United Kingdom. (The questionnaires are included in Appendix 5 at 
the end of the thesis).
Survey samples consisted of a roughly representative cross-section of the participants - 
business firms fi*om across the industrial sectors targeted by the programme, 
universities, and research centres. The survey included SMEs as well as the larger 
firms. A total of 214 questionnaires were issued to the project leaders and 
representatives of participating firms and research centres, 104 in the UK and 110 in 
Spain. This total of 214 represented around 40% of the 530 projects running under the 
BRITE-EURAM programme in September 1992, when the first survey was made.
A follow-up survey was carried out in September 1995, with a total of 200 
questionnaires issued, 100 in the UK and 100 in Spain. The slightly smaller number of 
questionnaires issued the second time around was a result of updated information 
regarding the status of the original list.^ The overall response rate to the first survey was 
61%, with a total of 68 usable replies fi*om the UK, and 63 fi-om Spain, while the second 
survey had a lower response rate at 47%, with 53 responses from the UK and 40 fi*om 
Spain.
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No previous survey of the BRITE-EURAM had attempted such a detailed analysis of 
national participation, and at the same time the survey benefited from the maturity of 
many respondents' collaborative experience. One of the intentions of this survey was to 
identify some generalisations regarding the experience of collaboration under the 
BRITE-EURAM programme, and to establish any differences in the experience at a 
national level, or sectoral level.
The BRITE-EURAM Programme Current Projects 1990-1991 (revised 1992 edition) 
provided the information on the UK participants, while a list of the Spanish 
organisations participating in the programme was provided by the Comision 
Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnologfa (CICYT) in the Spanish Ministry of Industry 
and Energy (MINER). The reason for the different sources lay in Spain's then relatively 
recent membership of the European Community. As Spain only joined the European 
Community in 1986, Spanish organisations were slow to provide leadership for many of 
the collaborative projects.
The Synopsis of Current Projects (referred to above) lists each project, giving details of 
the project leader and merely listing the national origins, but not the identity, of the other 
partners. The Spanish government, unlike the UK government, maintained an 
information base on the national participants in this and other EC programmes under the 
Framework Programmes, and has tended to be very closely involved in the 
implementation and evaluation of national participation in the European programmes.^
The questionnaire for the first survey was pilot tested at a workshop organised by the 
Commission for BRITE-EURAM participants, held in Seville in May 1992. A member 
of the Spanish authority, CICYT, also advised on the form of the questionnaire.^
6.2 Purpose of the survey
The first survey sought to obtain a profile of the participants under the programme, to 
establish the sectoral and structural origins and nationality of the partners, the reasons 
for engaging in collaborative research under the auspices of the programme, and the
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perceived difficulties and benefits of European research collaboration. In particular, it 
was intended to show the response of the partners to collaborative transnational 
research, and to ascertain whether this might result in future changes in behaviour 
towards support of the Commission in developing technology policy.
In order to show the extent to which a change in attitudes, expectations and loyalties 
occurred on the part of the participants a number of questions fi*om the first survey were 
repeated in the follow-up survey. Both questionnaires are included in Appendix 5. In 
particular, respondents were again asked about the problems of collaboration, the 
benefits which they perceived, and how they considered the Commission could provide 
more assistance.
In addition, respondents were again asked to indicate whether they would continue 
collaboration with their current partners to commercialise the research results, whether 
they considered that taking part in the BRITE-EURAM programme improved the 
organisation's cooperative capability, and whether they would participate in future 
BRITE-EURAM projects. The success of a collaborative venture may be measured by 
the degree to which the objectives set out at the beginning of the project are met, and to 
the extent that all of the partners are satisfied that this is the case.
This survey considers whether the participants expressed a change of preference, as a 
result of the collaborative experience, likely to lead to a consideration of further 
collaboration with the same or alternative partners and without the direct assistance of 
the Commission. Where such evidence of further independent collaboration by the 
participants exists, it supports the development of economic integration. But more is 
needed to test the predictions of neo-fimctionalism. For this, there should be evidence 
of 'loyalty transfer' by participants, who now direct their R&D proposals to the 
Commission, and are ready to suggest or accept initiatives in technology policy beyond 
what has been presented to them thus far.
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63  SURVEY RESULTS
6.3.1 - the participants
This section concentrates primarily on the results of the first survey carried out in 1992 
to provide a profile of the participants and of the general nature of the collaboration, but 
there is occasional reference to the findings firom the second survey conducted in 
September 1995 where it is considered that the follow-up results provide additional 
clarification. A more detailed presentation of the findings fi*om the second survey, and a 
comparison with the earlier picture is given later in the chapter.
The BRITE-EURAM programme sought to increase the representation of SMEs to a 
greater extent than some of the other Framework Programmes, and the profile of the 
participants which was established through the first survey suggested some success in 
this. However, the success was mixed, as the Spanish profile showed, and as the 
comments of respondents indicated. Out of the total of 131 respondents, 28% 
comprised industrial firms of more than 500 employees, with 18% in industrial firms of 
250-499 employees and a total of 42 industrial respondents (32%) employing less than 
250 people. There were 16 research centres and 13 universities (see Table 6.1), making 
a total of 29 public organisations in the survey.* The profile of the participants suggests 
a particular national bias in the size of the organisations involved. Spanish participation 
tended to comprise firms of less than 500 employees. From the total of 37 respondent 
organisations employing more than 500 people, 22 were of UK origin and only 15 of 
Spanish origin.
232
Table 6.1 size (no. of 
employees) and type of 
participants
Total UK Spain
131 68 63
Industrial firm, 
500+
37 22 15
250-499 24 5 19
150-249 14 5 9
50-149 17 3 14
less than 50 11 6 5
Research centre 15 15 n/a
University 13 10 3
n/a: not 
applicable
Note: Firm size is identified by number of employees.
Table 6.2 gives details of the sectoral origin of the industrial participants under the 
BRITE-EURAM programme for the total of the UK and Spanish respondents. The 
principal industrial sectors represented in the survey were aeronautics, construction, 
ceramics/glass, electronics, engineering, with a smaller representation from 
pharmaceuticals, robotics, textiles, and enterprises involved in the area of advanced 
materials.
Table 6.2 industrial sector bv respondent
Total UK Spain
Aeronautics 13 10 3
Construction 10 6 4
Ceramics/glass 6 4 2
Electronics 10 7 3
Engineering 35 25 10
Robotics 8 4 4
Pharmaceuticals 5 3 2
Textiles 6 3 3
Footwear/clothing 6 3 3
Food/drink 4 3 1
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Although BRITE-EURAM was presented by the Commission as a multi-sectoral 
initiative, there was little evidence of cross-sectoral collaboration. Many of the 
industrial sectors collaborated with partners from within their own sectoral grouping, 
although this was not the case uniformly.
Table 6.3 cross-sectoral 
collaboration
Respondents Total Sector
Aero. Constr. Ceramics Electr. Engin. Others
Aeronautics 13 8 1 2 1 6 5
Construction 10 1 7 n/a n/a 4 1
Ceramics/glass 6 2 n/a 4 2 3 3
Electronics 10 2 1 1 5 5 5
Engineering 35 5 3 1 1 25 12
Respondents in the aeronautics industry collaborated with partners from engineering and 
advanced materials, as well as with public research centres. Ceramics/glass industrial 
participants included electronics, engineering and textiles enterprises in the venture. 
Both electronics and engineering collaborated with partners in the aeronautics, 
construction, ceramics, but again these industrial sectors displayed a bias towards their 
own industrial sectors in the choice of collaborative partners.
The survey results suggested a distinct national bias in terms of the introduction to and
involvement in the programme by participants. It showed that there were differences in
the way national participants became involved in the BRITE-EURAM programme,
which stemmed from the nature of the support and encouragement given by the national
authorities, or the degree to which participants were already involved in technology
collaboration networks.
Table 6.4 how organisations became 
involved
Total UK Spain
131 68 63
Response to the Commission 16 13 3
Response to national govt. 15 2 13
Approach by interested party 49 8 41
Own proposal 54 42 12
Other 11 9 2
234
The UK respondents were already well established in the ways of collaborating, with 42 
out of the total of 68 replies initiating their own proposal directly as opposed to 12 from 
Spain. For many of the Spanish participants, the learning effect occurred slowly, and 
there was a strong dependence on the national government to provide the initial 
guidance around the Brussels maze.^ Respondents in the UK did not receive a 
comparable level of support from the national authority in setting up the collaborative 
project. Table 6.5 shows that in general there was a strong perception of national 
support by the Spanish participants.
Table 6.5 level of national support for 
project
Total UK Spain
Substantial 24 1 23
Moderate 17 2 15
Limited 30 14 16
None 60 48 12
A high proportion of the UK participants indicated no support from the national 
authorities in setting up their collaborative project under the BRITE-EURAM 
programme, while there was a significant response from the Spanish participants (22%) 
with a similar view.
Finding partners was one of the difficult and time consuming aspects of proposed 
collaboration, and many of the participants used previously established contacts (see 
Table 6.6). Overall, the survey showed a steadily emerging web of collaborative 
alliances, and it was from this web that many of the participants were able to secure 
partners, although some replies indicated the use of two or more sources even when 
already engaged in collaboration. In the case of the United Kingdom, 53 of the 
respondents found partner organisations through previous contacts, not necessarily 
originating from the Framework Programme, whereas only 15 of the Spanish 
participants did so. The picture here was one of relative inexperience on the part of the 
Spanish enterprises, shown in a reactive role rather than an active one of partner seeking. 
Out of the total 63 replies from the Spanish participants 45 were contacted by other
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interested partners. This did not, however, indicate a lack of interest in collaborative 
activity.
Table 6.6 finding partners
Total UK Spain
EC data base 16 7 9
National data base 2 n/a 2
Contacted by other partner 58 13 45
Other 68 53 15
n/a: not available
Only 7 of the UK and 9 Spanish participants used the EC data base set up by the 
Commission to provide information on enterprises willing to pursue collaborative 
activity. This is perhaps not so surprising since the data base only became operational 
well into the Third Framework Programme (1990-1994), and by the time this survey 
was undertaken the participants were only slowly becoming acquainted with it. The 
Commission has encouraged participants to use the data base as one way of overcoming 
the delays and bottlenecks associated with Brussels procedures.
6.3.2 the network pattern
The first BRITE-EURAM programme (1984-1987) funded projects with an average of 
2-3 partners. Since then the average has increased to 4 partners, with Table 6.7 
indicating 27 UK respondents and 30 Spanish involved in collaborative ventures of five 
or more participants. For smaller sized projects the pattern was similar for both 
countries, 14 UK and 11 Spanish participants were involved in projects containing four 
partners. Only 16 projects between the two countries contained two partners - the 
minimum required to form a transnational collaborative project.
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Total UK Spain
16 10 6
27 16 11
25 14 11
57 27 30
6 n/a 6
Table 6.7 number of partners
Two
Three
Four
Five or more 
Don't know
n/a; not applicable
When asked if they had collaborated with current partners previously, both Spanish and 
UK respondents answers suggested that many of the projects had been created on the 
basis of prior collaborative experience together. This is consistent with the findings 
from Table 6.4 and Table 6.6. The survey findings suggested that two thirds of 
respondents had collaborated with at least one partner before, and that 8% had 
collaborated with four or more partners previously (see Table 6.8).
Table 6.8 previous collaboration by 
number of partners
Total UK Spain
131 68 63
One 43 21 22
Two 20 12 8
Three 13 7 6
Four or more 11 8 3
Dont know 44 20 24
It is instructive to consider the choice of partners by nationality, and to see how far 
participating organisations are willing to go beyond the national boundary in search of 
partners. While this may be one measure of the degree of integration that has taken 
place, it is also a problematical one. There is often a tendency to engage in collaboration 
with partners in neighbouring countries, the familiarity and proximity sometimes being 
more important than other tangible factors.
But the pattern of collaboration also mirrored the flow of trade, and as shown below 
participants have been encouraged to include users or potential users of the new 
knowledge in the collaborative venture (see Table 6.11). France, Germany, Italy and
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Netherlands figured prominently as partners in the collaborative activities of the two 
countries surveyed.
Table 6.9 national origins of partners 
Country Mean
Belgium 1.33
Denmark 1.24
France 1.95
Germany 1.81
Greece 1.29
Ireland 1.20
Italy 1.41
Holland 1.70
Portugal 1.23
Spain 1.81
UK 1.91
A comparative analysis of the national origin and number of partners from each country 
confirms this, and Table 6.9 gives the mean score. The Spanish showed a strong 
preference for collaborating with Dutch, French and German partners, in that order. In 
the case of the UK participants, the pattern was not so concentrated. Although there was 
a strong preference for German, French and Italian partners. Table 6.10 shows 
organisations in the United Kingdom also collaborated to a greater extent with other 
domestic partners than was the case with Spanish participants.
Instead, the Spanish participants showed a strong European bias in the collaborative 
network. They were anxious to obtain a foothold in the European market, and at the 
same time to secure access to new technology unavailable at the domestic level. In the 
United Kingdom there was a stronger tradition of industry-academic collaboration, and 
many participants brought domestic partners with them with whom they had previous, 
sometimes long-standing, collaborative experience. Both countries showed little 
collaborative activity with the EFTA member countries, although the UK participants 
did collaborate to some degree with Swiss and Swedish partners.
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Table 6.10 Eurooean oartners
Total UK Spain
Belgium 17 11 6
Denmark 19 12 7
France 63 24 39
Germany 56 33 23
Greece 14 7 7
Ireland 12 8 4
Italy 33 16 17
Holland 60 11 49
Portugal 24 12 12
Spain 24 14 10
UK 73 48 25
The follow-up survey in September 1995 pursued this issue further, asking if national 
characteristics and cultural traits affected either the choice of partners or the success of 
the collaborative venture. Looking at the responses on a purely quantitative basis, the 
picture is somewhat mixed for the UK and Spain. Overall, the majority of respondents 
in the UK and in Spain considered that cultural traits and national characteristics did not 
have an effect.
Of the total respondents under the second survey, some 56% of the UK respondents 
affirmed that neither the choice of partner nor the success of the collaboration was 
affected by national characteristics and cultural traits, while 60% of the Spanish 
respondents said the same for partner choice. Although the degree of certainty among 
the Spanish was reduced when it came to considering whether cultural and national 
traits affected the success of collaboration - at this point respondents were evenly 
divided.
UK respondents were more inclined than the Spanish to identify particular national 
aspects which affected the collaborative process -
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'From my limited experience Germans have a different approach to research, the 
French always want their own way, the Spanish and Italians are very pleasant but 
never deliver on time',
French are necessary to get funds, but are the most independent. Germans most 
workmanlike',
'Southern EU nations take more than Northern partners in agriculture funds. There is 
no reason why the opposite cannot be the case for industrial funding',
'Compromises on ideal consortia are made to meet the rules on distribution o f funds. 
French and Italians tend to be nightmare to work with'.
Although Spanish respondents acknowledged national differences, they tended to 
accept such differences as inevitable -
'Partners bring the characteristics o f their national markets',
'National characteristics are especially evident at the conception o f the project. At the 
international level, what influences the success o f collaboration is the contract between 
the partners',
'At the national level, competitive interests can either help or block the conception o f  
the project'.
The replies in the second survey thus suggested that both Spanish and UK respondents 
displayed a strong degree of pragmatism, especially evident among those with a long 
experience of collaboration. One Spanish respondent suggested that what influenced 
choice of partners and success of collaboration was 'the competence and prior 
experience with such partners. Nationality/culture are irrelevant.'
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Long experience of collaboration prompted many to the belief that what was important, 
and more relevant, was common or complementary interests among the partners, rather 
than national characteristics - '/  believe success is due to the importance o f the project to 
the collaborators and the willingness o f the individual participants to achieve success'. 
One company with long experience of collaboration, British Aerospace, commented 
'British Aerospace has had a large number o f collaborative projects with many 
European and American partners, and not just under the BRITE-EURAM programme, 
and 'national characteristics’ do become apparent in the way companies operate'.
The overall impression established by this follow-up survey was that those engaged in 
collaboration recognised the cultural differences which affected the way partners 
operated, but that these differences were not major difficulties as far as either the choice 
of partners or the eventual outcome of the collaboration was concerned. But what was 
important was that partners clarified at the outset what they expected from each other, 
and from their joint efforts.
Development of a European network was facilitated by the Commission encouraging 
participants to include users of the technology in the collaborative project. From the 
beginning of the Third Framework programme gentle encouragement was replaced by 
exhortation. While it is not easy to establish if a partner is indeed, or will become, a user 
of the results of joint research, the results of this survey showed at least participants 
were aware of the conditions and of the need to preserve the market relevance of 
research results.
But in any event many respondents indicated they intended to go on to commercialise 
the results themselves, suggesting the market-led motives of many organisations 
carrying out research. For those organisations, the Commission provision regarding end 
users seemed superfluous.
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Table 6.11 collaboration with end user
Total UK Spain
Yes 117 64 53
No 9 4 5
Don't know 5 n/a 5
n/a; not applicable
On the other hand, many firms do not want to share the results of research effort with 
potential competitors. For some, the work was still far enough away fi*om the market to 
need further research and development, which would have to be financed somehow. 
The first survey suggested that although projects did include end users, this was done to 
conform to the requirements of the programme, rather than of the research projects 
themselves. It suggests, moreover, that the European Commission forced this provision 
as a way of widening the network further, while at the same time aiming to preserve the 
notion that the programme was market-driven.
Within Europe, a pattern of collaborative alliances has grown under the umbrella of the 
European Commission programmes, incorporating initiatives such as ESPRIT, 
COMETT, STRIDE, VALUE, CRAFT, and the EUREKA programme. Table 6.12 
shows the extent to which the partners under the BRITE/EURAM programme also take 
part in this network of technological alliances. Both countries are well represented in all 
the above-mentioned programmes, with a slightly stronger UK presence in all but the 
CRAFT programme.
Table 6.12 the Eurooean oroaramme
network
Total UK Spain
ESPRIT 45 25 20
EUREKA 44 25 19
COMETT 27 16 11
CRAFT 7 1 6
STRIDE 4 n/a 4
VALUE 11 6 5
Other 25 16 9
n/a: not applicable
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Spain has achieved a very high participation rate in the CRAFT programme, an 
initiative within the overall BRITE-EURAM programme, which was launched in 1992 
to assist smaller firms that did not have sufficient internal technical resources to take 
part in the larger programme but wanted, nevertheless, to engage in collaborative 
research. Under the first phase, a total of 195 projects were approved by the 
Commission, 32 of which were Spanish projects. By September 1993, one fifth of the 
total number of firms participating in the CRAFT programme were Span ish .The  
Commission claimed to have 1200 SMEs taking part in the programme in 1994, most of 
which had not previously participated in European research cooperation.^^
The European collaborative network has been strengthened by the creation of a layered 
structure of alliances that have grown up through the inter-linkage of different 
programmes both within the Framework Programme, and outside via the Eureka 
programme. The evidence of this survey lends support to the notion of integration 
through joint activities among private actors on a cross-national basis, and Table 6.12 
shows the degree to which respondents were associated with other collaborative 
programmes.
Further collaborative activities were conducted through a wider international network, to 
which many of the participating organisations were also linked. To a significant extent, 
the organisations most inclined to cross-border collaboration, over whatever spatial 
distance, were the ones most easily attracted to the European programme. While 
undoubtedly this inclination was evident in organisations regardless of size, in practice it 
was easier for the larger organisations, with greater resources and larger markets, to 
pursue cross-border research collaboration. The CRAFT programme therefore filled a 
vacuum in the network, which BRITE-EURAM had not been able to do, despite the 
particular encouragement given to SMEs by the Commission.
In the first survey respondents were asked if their organisations undertook other 
collaborative research at the international level, with a total of 76% responding in the 
affirmative (see Table 6.13).
243
Table 6.13 the international 
picture
Total UK Spain
Yes 100 56 44
No 24 10 14
Don't know 7 2 5
6.3.3 EC collaboration - motives and organisation
One of the main reasons for transnational alliances has centred around the need to 
achieve and sustain competitiveness, although it was frequently not identified directly 
as such by alliance partners. It is, however, a primary objective of the public policies 
directed at the support of alliances, and the BRITE-EURAM programme is no exception 
in this regard. Inter-firm cooperation was acknowledged by the Commission as a 
strategic instrument for medium-term and long-term corporate development in the 
context of EC programmes.
The complexities of transnational collaboration which were identified in chapter two 
make formal programmes such as the European Framework Programme an obvious 
attraction.*"  ^But public support will not eliminate all the difficulties in a collaborative 
relationship which often evolves organically and informally.*^
A key concern of the burgeoning literature that has appeared in the last five years on 
corporate alliances has been the necessity of situating alliances within the framework of 
a broader organisational strategy.*^ A variety of competitive pressures have prompted 
business firms to engage in cooperation, although joint activities also bring their own 
inherent risks. Alliances are inherently unstable and research has shown that two thirds 
of all alliances experience problems during the first two years, particularly in aspects 
such as leadership and finance.*^ International co-operation agreements need a stable
legal structure in which the parties are able to formalise the elements of industrial
^  18 property.
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Against this background, respondents to the first survey were asked whether their 
organisational strategy included collaboration at the European level, and to indicate the 
degree of strategic significance given to collaborative activity. Table 6.14 indicates the 
results, with the left hand side of the table showing the extent to which respondents 
regarded European collaboration as substantial, moderate, or a limited part of the 
organisational strategy. The right hand side shows the aggregated results for those 
respondents who also considered international collaboration as an element in the 
organisational strategy - with international defined as outside the remit of the European 
programmes.
There is a strong positive relation with European-level collaboration, and international 
R&D - the results show organisations also had important collaborative links at the 
international level.
Table 6.14 European and International R&D 
collaboration
European International
R&D
(UK+Spain)
Total UK Spain Yes No Don't know
131 68 63 100 24 7
Substantial 62 28 34 57 3 2
Moderate 37 21 16 30 6 1
Limited 28 16 12 11 14 3
None 4 3 1 2 1 1
Table 6.14 suggests that European research collaboration was a significant element in 
organisational strategy, and therefore part of the long-term planning of the enterprise. 
But to obtain a more balanced view it may be advisable to consider other aspects of the 
way collaboration is organised by the enterprises concerned. For instance, one 
indication of the potential strength of co-operative ties may be the degree to which other 
functional areas of organisations are brought into the collaborative project - in particular 
personnel from marketing, production, and finance.
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This would suggest the intention to continue the activities to the commercialisation 
stage - and mark a degree of integration over the long term. However, the results on this 
query present a less conclusive picture than that given to the query on organisational 
strategy. It would seem that while there is some involvement of personnel, other than 
those concerned with technical and research matters, there is still a functional distinction 
in the way R&D activities are organised.
There are, however, interesting differences between the two countries as Table 6.15 
shows. While both countries included marketing personnel in only 8% of the responses, 
production and finance personnel were involved to a greater extent by participants from 
Spain and the United Kingdom. However, the involvement of finance personnel was 
more important than production personnel in the case of the UK. The reverse applied to 
the experience of the Spanish participants, with more than twice the number of the 
Spanish participants opting to involve production personnel. In other words, the UK 
participants brought the accountants, while Spanish firms brought the technicians.
Table 6.15 involvement by
Total UK Spain
131 68 63
Marketing 11 3 8
Production 30 10 20
Finance 29 20 9
At least two of these 22 10 12
Don't know 45 28 17
The high figures given in the 'don't know/no response' category above are explained by 
the fact that for many participants the collaborative venture was purely a technological 
one, requiring the efforts and expertise of professionals in that area. A fiirther point to 
bear in mind is that where respondents were not leaders of the project they tended to 
concentrate on completing their agreed area of activity, and were not bothered about the 
involvement of others. This was particularly true in projects with a large number of 
partners.
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Over time collaboration patterns can become more complex, and R&D partnerships may 
develop into applied research and/or production agreements. The Commission has, in 
fact, set up mechanisms to enable technology transfer and commercialisation to take 
place, particularly through the VALUE and SPRINT programmes - as was shown in 
Table 6.12 above. Overall, the figures indicate only a moderate attempt to link up the 
collaborate research to the next stage of commercialisation. This is consistent, therefore, 
with the evidence from the survey presented here which suggests that organisations have 
some way to go in integrating the capabilities of the organisation into their collaborative 
activities.
At a very basic level strategy should be directed to maximising opportunity and 
minimising the risks to an organisation. Much of the efforts of the Commission have 
been directed at easing the difficulties and the cost of technological collaboration. One 
obvious difficulty was the risk of losing knowledge to a competitor - the free rider 
problem identified in economic theory applies with particular resonance to the 
development and ownership of technological knowledge. The latter determines who has 
competitive advantage, or at least potential advantage. These problems which could 
affect the success of collaborative agreements were covered by the Commission 
encouraging participants to make agreements covering intellectual property rights, and 
by the setting up of the European Patent Office.
Under the BRITE-EURAM programme all participants are entitled to ownership rights 
over the results of the collaborative activities in their respective projects. While the 
participants are encouraged, during the implementation and management phase of the 
programme, to establish such agreements, many are slow to do so. Various reasons 
were put forward by respondents for this, sometimes it was simply a case of delay on 
their part, but other times it reflected either a lack of concern over the value of the 
results, or a belief that national patent systems would provide an adequate safeguard. 
Table 6.16 shows the number of respondents who had negotiated intellectual property 
rights agreements with partners.
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Table 6.16 protection of research 
results
Total UK Spain
131 68 63
Yes 55 41 14
No 34 15 19
Not yet 36 7 29
Other/no response 6 5 1
Spanish respondents were junior partners in some cases of research collaboration, and 
were less concerned about the risks of losing the results to competitors. But there was a 
significant number of participants fi'om both countries that were less concerned about 
such risks than about the potential benefits that were expected and were slow to avail of 
the legal protection offered.
It is also true that respondents were of the view that the research being pursued, and the 
technologies being developed, were not 'cutting edge technologies', and they worried 
less about the threat of rivals. At the same time, when asked if such research would 
have been conducted in any event, only 9% of the total said yes. Out of the total number 
of respondents to the first survey, 70 replied that the research would not have been 
carried out without the support of the BRITE-EURAM programme, while 39 said it 
probably would (see Table 6.17).
Spanish organisations took a secondary part in the collaborative ventures, in terms of 
decision-making, division of responsibility and general direction of the collaborative 
work. Participation did, however, give the opportunity to gain experience of 
technological collaboration at the European level, and by the beginning of the 1990s 
Spanish industrialists and their academic counterparts were anxious to take a more direct 
role.^ ^
While the Spanish respondents did not regard intellectual property rights and the risk of 
losing the results of the research to competitors as seriously as the UK respondents (the
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participants do in fact take out a patent and a contract is prepared which gives equal 
access to the results for all the participants), there was a growing concern that results of 
Spain research was being transferred out of Spain through the country's participation in 
this and other programmes - a fact all the more unpalatable with the recognition that the 
Spanish financial contribution was not balanced by the results of their participation. At 
times there has been closer linkage by Spanish researchers and scientists with the 
industrial structures of other countries than with industry in Spain itself.^ ®
Table 6.17 would collaboration exist without 
BRITE-EURAM?
Total UK Spain
131 68 63
Yes 12 8 4
Probably 39 14 25
No 70 42 28
Don't know/no response 10 4 6
The results here are not conclusive. However, the analysis so far has built up a picture 
of a pattern of collaboration at various levels - while not in any way giving a clear view 
of the strength of such alliances. The follow-up survey revealed, however, a majority of 
the respondents from both countries with long experience of collaboration under the 
programme who declared themselves ready to undertake further collaborative projects. 
The second survey presented a more conclusive picture of support for continued 
collaboration under the BRITE-EURAM programme.
Alliances will continue so long as the benefits to the participants outweigh the costs, at 
the micro level. This is true also at the macro level involving member states and the 
European authorities, although obviously the costs and benefits are defined in a much 
broader sense. To-date, there has been no serious evaluation of the Framework 
Programme on this basis.
Respondents were asked to identify the benefits from collaborating in the BRITE- 
EURAM programme, and to rank the benefits in order of importance. The question was 
asked in the first survey, and in the follow-up survey conducted in September 1995.
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Table 6.18 shows the responses to the first survey, giving the positioning for the three 
most important benefits.
Table 6.18 benefits of collaboration
Total UK Spain
131 68 63
Interchange of ideas 106 64 42
Early access to technology 102 50 52
R&D costs reduced 88 57 31
Improved competitive position 83 49 34
Larger project/increased funds 77 57 20
Eiiminating duplication 72 48 24
Improved product completion 66 41 25
Development of standards 62 42 20
Knowledge of partners products/strategy 62 42 20
Mobility of personnei 54 40 14
Access to customers 49 36 13
Access to suppliers 45 32 13
Protection from foreign competition 44 31 13
It is interesting to note that the technological benefits, such as exchange of ideas, early 
access to new technology and lower R&D costs are significant for a large number of 
participants.^^
In the Spanish case, early access to new technology is rated higher than the financial 
benefits or the market-related benefits. For the UK respondents, the exchange of ideas 
was important for nearly all of the participants, while the financial benefits associated 
with reduced R&D costs or increased funds were relevant for over 80%. The UK 
respondents also regarded the benefit of collaboration as a way to influence the 
development of standards, with 62% of respondents including it in their top three 
compared to 32% of the Spanish participants.
Only 46% of UK respondents considered 'protection from foreign competition' in their 
top three, while only 21% of the Spanish participants did so. Of lesser importance, but 
nonetheless valuable, were improvement of the competitive position, mobility and 
exchange of personnel, and access to a supplier network. The variety of the response to
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this question reflects the different reasons firms have for collaboration - as an element in 
the long-term technology search or as a solution to short-term or temporary problems.
The responses of the participants highlighted a number of priorities, which are shown in 
Table 6.19 below. Of the respondents who indicated early access to new technology as 
the most important 38% were from the UK, while 62% of the Spanish affirmed this. On 
the other hand, of the total who saw the interchange of ideas as being the most important 
benefit from collaborating in the BRITE-EURAM programme, 75% were UK and 25% 
were Spanish.
The evidence suggests that UK participants were more confident of their technological 
capability, and wished to keep in touch with what was happening genera l lyTh is  
scanning activity would suggest that organisations sometimes place more emphasis on 
the tactical use of collaboration rather than as part of strategic policy.
A substantial number of UK respondents saw collaboration as a way of reducing the 
burden of R&D, although they also received financial support from the national 
government (these include universities which would receive substantial public funding 
in any event). From the total of 49 respondents who considered reduced R&D costs as 
the most important, 37 were from the UK and the remaining 12 Spanish.
That finance was an important consideration for the UK participants is confirmed by the 
response to the 'larger project or increased funds' option - the UK respondents 
considered this to be important, to a much greater extent than did the Spanish 
participants. As chapter four shows, the UK's position on the public financing of R&D 
shifted considerably during the past decade. The government persuaded the private 
sector to carry a greater share of the financial responsibility, while also persuading 
private enterprise to increase its participation rate in the European Community 
programmes.
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Table 6.19 benefits of collaboration - rank order 
UK Spain
1 Interchange of ideas Early access to new technology
2 R&D costs reduced Interchange of new ideas
3 Larger project R&D costs reduced
4 Improved competitive position Eliminating duplication
5 Early access to technology Improved product completion
6 Eliminating duplication Improved competitive position
7 Development of standards Larger project
8 Improved product completion Knowledge of partner strategy
9 Access to customers Access to customers
10 Knowledge of partner strategy Development of standards
To summarise, Spanish participants anticipated technological rewards from the BRITE- 
EURAM programme, whereas the UK respondents considered a broad range of 
competitive factors, including an improvement of the overall competitive position, 
better chance of product completion, and the opportunity to influence technical 
standards.
There is no doubt that the participants brought to the European collaborative programme 
expectations that reflected their national experience and context. For Spanish 
participants, coming from a less mature national technological system and eager to 
establish the competitive position of Spanish industry in the European market, research 
and technical advance was an important means of securing such aims. UK participants 
were more confident of their own technical capability, but saw in the programme a way 
to keep abreast of more general developments in European policy, in competitive 
changes, as well as an additional source of funding for research.
Has collaboration changed participants views of the benefits to be obtained from the 
programme? The follow-up survey attracted 53 responses from the UK and 40 from 
Spain, giving a lower response rate than the first survey three years earlier. Both 
national groups had a number of years experience of collaboration, 70% of the UK 
group and 65% of the Spanish respondents with six or more years. None of the UK
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respondents had less than two years experience, while four out of the forty Spanish 
respondents had between one and two years experience of European collaboration.
Several observations emerge from the perceived benefits of collaboration, in the light of 
this second survey. Interestingly, there was a consensus among both national groups as 
to the principal benefit - that of the interchange of ideas. The top two priorities, 
interchange of ideas and reduced R&D costs, were nominated by a significant number 
of both the Spanish and UK participants. While UK respondents did not change their 
view on the three main benefits, although the ranking of the second and third was 
reversed, there was a significant change in the attitudes of the Spanish participants 
regarding the technical benefits to be obtained from the programme. Early access to 
new technology, ranked number one in the first survey, was ranked fourth in the follow- 
up survey.
Also of interest, both groups ranked improved competitive position in the top four, even 
though a later question on the impact of the programme on the competitive position of 
European industry produced a very mixed, unfavourable response. It seems that 
perceptions differ, depending on the perspective taken. From an individual viewpoint 
taking part in the programme must, or ought to, improve the competitive position of the 
participant, yet from the general perspective of industry, there is no appreciable 
improvement. The attitude of the individual participants seemed to be 'i f  you are not in, 
you can't win.'
The result here is somewhat contradictory, but may perhaps be explained by the often 
subjective perception and interpretation of competitiveness. While the 1993 evaluation 
of the BRITE-EURAM programme suggested there was a positive contribution to the 
competitiveness of European industry, in terms of the direct effects such as market 
share, and the indirect effects (technology transfer, cohesive networks, improved 
internal knowledge and better organisational effects), the European Commission report 
on Science and Technology indicators for 1994 pointed to the lack of clarity pertaining 
to the definition of competitiveness - ‘the evaluations of some of the more industrially 
orientated Community research programmes have touched on the contribution of such
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programmes to industrial competitiveness. However, it was recognised that both the 
meaning of competitiveness and the part that R&D can play in increasing 
competitiveness were not well understood’ (p.257). Chapter one gave some indication 
of the variety of approaches to the concept, and suggested that emerging definitions 
favoured a dynamic view so that firms must continually pursue a constantly moving 
target in order to sustain competitiveness.
Therefore firms must engage in a process of behavioural change across the whole range 
of their activities, complementary to the collaborative activities under the European 
R&D programmes. For smaller firms without the internal capability and knowledge to 
do so, there will inevitably be a gap between expectations from the programme and the 
eventual outcome - as was indicated in the impact study evaluating the experience of 
Spain under the Framework Programme. Moreover, the effects of closer links between 
industry and universities can take time to emerge, particularly where such collaboration 
must nurture a whole new culture of cooperation among previously disparate groups - 
particularly so in the case of Spain.
In the meantime, the prize seems to be a combination of the financial inducements 
offered under the programme, and a more nebulous benefit of being at the centre of 
things, knowing what is happening, and remaining involved in an ill-defined 
competitive process. Ill-defined, because neither group rated in the top six more market- 
related commercial benefits such as improved product completion, or access to new 
customers, or to a supplier network. Table 6.20 shows the ranking of benefits, giving 
the top six, from the follow-up survey conducted in September 1995, with the original 
ranking from survey one given in brackets.
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Table 6.20 SURVEY II - benefits of collaboration (previous ranking in 
brackets)
UK
1. Interchange of ideas (1)
2. Larger project (3)
3. Reduced R&D costs (2)
4. Improved competitive position (4)
5. Eliminating duplication (6)
6. Access to new technology (5)
Spain
1. Interchange of ideas (2)
2. Reduced R7D costs (3)
3. Improved competitive position (6)
4. Access to new technology (1)
5. Larger project (7)
6. Eliminating duplication (4)
6.3.4 technology networks and integration
This section examines the extent to which the BRITE-EURAM programme has 
contributed to, or laid the ground for further integration. One measure of the success of 
EC research programmes in laying the foundations for a more integrated European 
industry could be the extent to which new intra-European partnerships are likely to form 
as a result of the learning experience of programme participants.^^ To what extent has 
the programme developed trust at a number of different levels? - at the organisational 
level in terms of confidence in its own ability to benefit from further collaboration, at 
the European level in terms of trust in the policy-making capability of the European 
Commission, and more generally in the benefits to economic actors of further intra- 
European technological collaboration.
Why should firms and other organisations wish to pursue further collaboration? While 
there is no doubt that a recognition by all parties of the potential gains to be secured 
from such a course of action is a general prerequisite for continued collaboration, this, 
alone, does not clarify the specific requirements needed to ensure success. Reference 
has already been made to the organic nature of collaboration, and it is this gradual
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process which contributes to learning by the organisation/"* The experience of 
successful collaboration, where all the parties have a positive perception of either 
qualitative or quantitative gain, establishes an important precondition for continued co­
operation.
The results of the first survey indicated that 71 out of the total of 131 respondents took 
part in the BRITE-EURAM for the first time, 32 from the UK and 39 from Spain. In 
most cases, however, research collaboration was focused on activities which they had 
previously carried out independently, rather than being a new departure (see Table 6.21).
Table 6.21 ^Europeanising' the research activity*
(Survey 1)
First BRITE-EURAM Prior activities
project
UK Spain UK Spain
Yes 32 39 48 32
No 33 23 17 20
Don't know 3 2 3 11
According to some studies, successful collaboration comes from established 
relationships which have evolved through careful nurturing.^^ Parties leam to co­
operate, and this leads to the expectation of fiirther collaboration.^^ In this case, 
respondents were asked whether they thought the initial participation would improve 
their ability to engage in collaborative activity in the future, and the question was posed 
again in the second survey. Table 6.22 presents the initial response made under the first 
survey to this question.
Table 6.22 improving collaborative 
ability
UK Spain
No 3 2
Slight improvement 43 20
Major improvement 17 32
Don't know 5 9
This time around, fewer people said participation did not improve collaborative ability. 
Overall, the responses indicated that participation in the programme had improved the
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collaborative ability, although the improvement was not in general regarded as a major 
one. The lack of change in the number of respondents regarding a major improvement 
from collaboration may be explained by the comment of one respondent, 'we already 
collaborate significantly so improvement will be slight'. Hardly anyone considered it 
had made no improvement, and those who were unsure the last time around were now 
prepared to consider some slight improvement. In general, respondents were willing to 
consider collaborating under the BRITE-EURAM programme again, and a significant 
number would collaborate with current partners. None of the respondents rejected the 
possibility of future collaboration under BRITE-EURAM, while participants in the two 
countries expressed similar levels of satisfaction with their current partners (see Table 
6.23).
Table 6.23 considering future collaboration 
(Survey 1)
in BRITE- with current
EURAM partners
UK Spain UK Spain
Yes 59 44 51 43
No n/a n/a 8 6
Don't know 9 18 9 14
n/a: not available
The question was repeated in the second survey. Again, none of the Spanish 
respondents said they would not consider taking part in a future programme, while two 
of the UK respondents said they would not consider a future BRITE-EURAM project as 
it was not worth the effort.' By far the majority of respondents in both countries said 
they would collaborate again with current partners, although there were reservations 
with some of them' or on the basis that there was an appropriate exploitation and 
marketing plan'.
The role of the Commission has been acknowledged to have been particularly 
important, directly and indirectly in enabling the SMEs to develop collaborative 
activities.^^ At the simplest level, the committees, review groups, and workshops and 
information days organised by the Commission allowed the participants to make
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contacts and develop cooperative relationships.^* Indeed, many of the respondents 
indicated that the information days offered them the opportunity to make contacts, and 
identify new partners.
At the same time the bureaucratic requirements associated with making applications for 
support, and for managing the collaboration over the lifetime of the project was 
perceived by the participants as one of the main problems associated with collaboration. 
Together with problems of finding the right partners, and managing the different 
expectations among collaborative partners, the bureaucratic requirements accounted for 
the most important problems identified by participants in both countries.
Different expectations among the partners was a more significant problem for the UK 
participants than for the Spanish. The substantial support and involvement of the 
Spanish national authorities, in particular the CDTI and the CICYT, provided a way of 
ironing out many of the problems and uncertainties which participating enterprises 
encountered. UK participants did not have this support, and tended to enter projects 
with much higher expectations.^^ This was confirmed by the responses to the issue of 
deciding where to locate the collaborative work, and the risk of results going to 
competitors.
Table 6.24 problems of collaboration - % of respondents 
Survey 1
Administration/paperwork 
Finding right partners 
Different expectations 
Intellectual property rights 
Absence of skilled personnel 
Language problems 
Fixing location of collaboration 
Greater risk of results going to competitors
In the second survey, respondents were asked to identify the problems in collaborating. 
In general, administration and finding the right partners proved to be ongoing problems, 
despite continued efforts of the Commission to deal with them. In the past three years.
UK Spain
88 68
71 62
76 41
66 29
57 29
50 33
46 35
54 25
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the Commission has attempted to speed up the application and administration process, 
and has established data bases with details of organisations interested in research and 
technological collaboration.
Respondents were again asked to rank each problem. If each ranked problem is selected 
according to the number of respondents who identified it by that particular ranking then 
a slightly different result appears for the two countries. Taking this approach, the 
outcome (for the top four only) is as follows:
SURVEY II
UK Spain
1. Administration Different expectations
2. Language Right partner
3. Different expectations Location of work
4. Absence of skilled personnel Absence of personnel
This outcome throws light on the specific problems that arise for collaborative actors 
operating in a particular institutional setting. The principal problem for UK participants 
continues to be that of administration, highlighting also the different approaches taken 
by the two governments towards assisting domestic organisations to operate at the 
European level. The principal problem for Spanish participants that emerges fi-om the 
second survey is that of different expectations on the part of participating organisations, 
marking a growing maturity for participants in cross-border collaboration as they seek 
higher returns and benefits from the programme.
Spanish organisations have, with a few exceptions, still to make significant inroads into 
the collaborative process, and particularly in terms of leading the projects, or at least 
taking a senior role. The tendency to treat Spanish participants as junior partners has 
been criticised by leading academics in Spain, and also by the respondents in this 
survey.^® As junior partners, Spanish organisations 'receive less of the work, and fewer 
funds'. In addition, many of them remain convinced that the programme is still biased 
towards large projects and large firms with the requisite resources to carry out the work.
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therefore discriminating against the typical Spanish firm. In the words of one Spanish 
respondent 'the programme is almost inaccessible for SMEs',
The absence of skilled technical personnel was highlighted as a problem in collaboration 
by both groups, often to the extent of preventing organisations from conducting the 
tasks allocated under the project contract. Although the number of researchers in 
Europe has grown over the past decade, including the number of researchers in industry, 
the growth has not spread evenly over countries or industrial sectors.^ ^ The importance 
of highly skilled technical staff as a factor in competitiveness has been recognised in 
recent years,^^ and a sufficient supply of qualified personnel remains an issue for both 
countries.^^
The strength of opposition to the Commission's administrative requirements was 
reflected in the response made by participants to the question how the Commission 
could provide more assistance. Over half the total respondents wanted an elimination of 
the delays in dealing with applications and accepting proposals. However, some 66% of 
the respondents considered that more funding from the Commission would offer the best 
assistance, and only 15% sought more direct involvement in managing the collaborative 
venture.
The results shown in Table 6.24 suggest the general preference is for a hands-off 
approach to collaboration by the Commission, once the partners have been found and 
the project commences. The participants do, however, regard the Commission as 
having the capability to counteract the difficulties of international technology 
collaboration that were identified in chapter two. Risk management and risk reduction 
are necessary roles, which the Commission can play to a more effective degree than 
national authorities.
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Table 6.25 how the Commission can help
Total UK Spain
131 68 63
More funding 87 44 43
Eliminate delays 68 44 24
Information on partners 39 15 24
Direct involvement in management 20 5 15
Help with standards 17 7 10
Other 17 16 1
Don't know 4 3 1
In the follow-up survey, the results showed a striking similarity with those produced in 
the first one, with greater financial support and the elimination of bureaucratic delays 
nominated by the majority (two thirds in both cases) of the respondents from the two 
countries.
Financial considerations were identified in chapter two as being of significance in 
decisions to engage in collaborative technological development. The rising cost of 
creating new technological knowledge, combined ^vith the need to sustain a competitive 
advantage has prompted firms to conduct joint efforts, even at the risk of losing 
competitive edge to rivals. In practice, many organisations considered the risk from 
rivals to be offset by the advantages of cross-border collaboration. The evidence 
presented so far suggests that participants were willing to continue Avith European 
cooperation, even when they questioned the contribution of the programme to 
competitiveness and innovative capability. Does this inclination by micro-level actors 
towards the European level mean, therefore, a shift away from interest representation at 
the national level?
6.4 Collaboration in the national context
For individual actors, the financial incentive was an important element in the decision to 
participate in European collaboration programmes. One of the principal ways that the 
Commission could further such collaboration at a practical level, according to the 
survey, is through providing greater financial support. Individual actors displayed a
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general acceptance of the international competitive pressures, and of the position of 
technological advantage in meeting these pressures.
It is true to say that such economic concerns allowed for a consensus among the micro­
level actor, a converging of belief in the advantage of European technological 
collaboration to them individually, while at the same time acknowledging that the 
BRITE-EURAM programme budget, and the Framework Programme in general 
represented no more than a drop in the ocean as far as dealing with the broader 
technology and competitiveness gap facing European industry.
The business community's apparent acceptance of the European Commission's political 
rhetoric on industrial competitiveness and technological collaboration was evident 
through its participation in the European programmes. But, equally apparent in the 
results of this survey, the business community did not shift all its political representation 
to the European level.
The national level remained important as a focus of political representation, and as a 
source of financial support. It was this national context which influenced the form and 
extent of 'européanisation' of the micro-level actors. National technology policies could 
support, or in some cases force, collaboration at the European level.
National authorities contributed to the R&D costs of many of the participants, with a 
total of 79% affirming that they received national support. From this total, 82% were 
from the UK and 75% of the Spanish participants received national funding. Table 6.26 
shows the extent of the national contribution to research costs.
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Table 6.26 national
% of % of total
R&D respondents
UK Spain
31-50% 9 11
21-30% 10 10
15-20% 9 10
10-14% 12 5
5-9% 10 11
<5% 13 24
The amount of financial support by the national government was not substantial in either 
country, but then neither could it be said that one source of financial support was 
tending to displace the other/"* In the UK, the government has been trying to encourage 
the private sector to fund more of the research and technology effort. The Spanish 
experience reflects a mix of the country's historic dependence on foreign investment and 
research, and the split between the industrial and academic sectors in the provision of 
research.
Respondents were asked to identify what proportion of R&D costs was covered by EC 
funds. Out of the 131 who replied to the first survey, some 32 indicated that EC receipts 
covered between 31% and 50% of the R&D budget, while 27 said it was less than 10% 
(see Table 6.27 below). It is difficult to get a precise picture on this, and many people 
involved in collaboration may not have complete information on their organisation's 
European collaborative activities, particularly given the trend towards greater 
decentralisation of organisational activities.
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Table 6.27 EC financial contribution to 
organisation's R&D costs 
% contribution to R&D Total number 
budget of
respondents
31-50%
Total
32
UK
11
Spain
21
26-30% 11 4 7
21-25% 9 6 3
16-20% 6 4 2
11-15% 13 8 5
3-10% 27 13 14
<3% 23 15 8
The follow-up survey asked participants whether they considered Community 
technology programmes and national technology programmes to be complementary, 
independent, similar or overlapping. It further asked if national programmes facilitated 
the participation in Community programmes.
Certain national differences emerged from the responses to the second survey. In the 
Spanish case, 60% of the respondents considered national and Community programmes 
were complementary, whereas just under 40% of the UK respondents thought so. Half 
of the Spanish respondents thought that national programmes facilitated the 
participation in European programmes, whereas only 20% of the UK responses did. A 
significant number of the UK respondents, 40%, considered that national programmes 
were independent of Community programmes, with 25% of Spanish respondents saying 
the same.
Despite the growing integration of many of these organisations into the European 
network, and their support for a continuance of European-level programmes, there is no 
indication that they consider European programmes should replace national initiatives.
At the national level, the organisations contacted through the first survey were already 
enmeshed in a domestic web of collaboration quite apart from their European 
collaborative activities, as Table 6.28 shows. Here again, certain national institutional
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features were evident. The UK domestic collaborative pattern was one which reflected 
long-standing activities between all the groups associated with research and 
development in both the private and public sectors, including closer industry-academic 
relations. The latter had its roots in the mission-oriented technological system of the 
1960s, and provided industrial and academic organisations with the necessary learning 
upon which to base fruitful cooperation.
Table 6.28 pattern of domestic 
collaboration
Total UK Spain
131 68 63
Business firms 81 52 29
Research centres 90 47 43
Universities 93 59 34
Other/don't know 14 4 10
In the Spanish context, collaborative research and development was more likely to take 
place among the research centres and universities, with the research centres particularly 
favoured. Universities tended to operate with a very traditional view of the proper role 
of a university, and this was reflected in their preference for basic science over applied 
and industrial research. As chapter five shows, universities still obtain much of their 
finances from central government, and have not faced the same financial and strategic 
pressures imposed on their counterparts in the UK, hence they have not made the same 
degree of effort to work with industry. At the same time, the historical dependence on 
imported technology or foreign direct investment meant there were areas of industry that 
had not taken the necessary steps to develop technological potential, and which would 
inevitably have taken them into closer contact with the universities.
Nevertheless, domestic collaboration was regarded generally to be of significance to 
overall research and development efforts in both countries, as Table 6.29 shows. The 
responses show a degree of coincidence between the two countries perceptions' of 
domestic collaboration. The pattern for the UK was one of greater inter-firm 
collaboration, although industry-academic collaboration is also common.
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Table 6.29 significance of domestic 
collaboration (% of respondents)
UK Spain
Substantial 43 37
Moderate 38 29
Limited 16 24
None 3 8
The evidence from Table 6.29 above, together with the views elicited through the 
follow-up survey, does not suggest that European level collaboration is slowly 
supplanting technological collaboration at the domestic level. But of particular interest 
was the limited involvement in European technological collaboration by interest groups 
or trade associations in both countries. The pattern that emerged from this study was of 
a large number of participants already established in networks, or anxious to become 
part of a collaborative network. From the total number of respondents to the first 
survey, only 18% indicated their decision to collaborate was influenced by trade 
associations or interest groups.
Interest groups are frequently more active in areas that are perceived to have an adverse 
impact on the interests of their members, and particularly in policy areas of a regulatory 
nature. There was no suggestion that European collaboration programmes were so 
perceived. At the level of domestic interest representation, there was little evidence of 
activity by industrial or sectoral interest groups in the formulation of the European 
technology programmes, so that the European Commission was left free to develop its 
own approach towards integrating the industrial and technological community.
The limited influence of organised interest groups is suggested by the number of 
respondents who indicated that they were not influenced by trade association or sectoral 
interest groups to collaborate in the programme - 99 out of a total of 131. The Spanish 
respondents were more influenced by trade associations than those from the UK.
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Total UK Spain
(%) (%) (%)
18 13 22
76 84 67
6 3 10
Table 6.30 role of interest groups in EC 
programmes (Survey 1)
Yes
No
Don't know
The follow-up survey asked whether trade associations and sectoral interest groups 
should play a more active role in the formulation and management of the BRITE- 
EURAM programme. A majority of the respondents from both countries, 52% in Spain 
and 58% in the UK were not in favour of this involvement. A number of reasons for 
this preference emerged from the responses and views of participants. For one thing, 
there was the fear that greater involvement of interest groups at either formulation or 
management stage could only add to the bureaucratisation, slowing down the 
implementation of the programme. Many of the respondents did not believe that their 
interests could be accurately represented by interest groups, and preferred to approach 
the Commission directly. This was particularly true in the case of the UK respondents. 
However, a number of respondents indicated that they would like to see greater interest 
group involvement in the formulation of the programme.
From the beginning, this vacuum in the political process associated with the European 
technology policy had been filled largely by IRDAC, and more immediately by the 
various arrangements developed by the Commission to assist the development of 
European collaborative alliances, including the information days, workshops, data bases 
and other means. In other industrial areas sectoral representation has significant impact, 
notably in information technology, telecommunications, and biotechnology. However, 
in this particular case, the policy covered such a broad range of activities affecting a 
number of sectors that sectoral representation was much less feasible.
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6.5 Conclusion
How has the experience of collaboration changed the participants? It seems reasonable 
to conclude that a degree of economic integration has occurred through BRITE- 
EURAM and the other initiatives under the Framework Programme. During 1994 
alone, a total of 706 new projects were signed under the BRITE-EURAM programme, 
involving 1836 participants.^^ The programme claimed in that year by far the largest 
number of projects and participants among all the industrial collaborative programmes. 
Can we conclude from the evidence that economic actors are transferring their 
expectations and demands to the central authority, in this case the European 
Commission?
The answer to this question is not such a straightforward one. The European 
Commission has played an important role in developing and managing an ever-growing 
network of European alliances, a fact which has been recognised by the organisations 
involved in such alliances. It provided both financial and non-financial resources to 
support a range of activities that are generally recognised to be complex and risky.
A stable legal structure was established which governs the various elements of 
international cooperation, including ownership of industrial property rights. This is an 
important requirement in international cooperation agreements, and one which cannot be 
provided under the national legal institutional framework.^^ The contract which governs 
the collaborative activities of projects provide the contracting parties with the ownership 
of the results.
The consistent emphasis on competitiveness in the development of the EC technology 
programme, and particularly the BRITE-EURAM programme, meant that the 
development and refinements tended to be designed to meet the needs of the economic 
actors. A frequently mentioned concern has been Europe's poor level of innovation and 
the inability to commercialise research results. This has been a problem for many 
individual countries, even those with high levels of R&D spending and the volume of 
research to match it. In the memorandum. Towards a European Technological
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Community, issued in 1985, the European Commission promised to deal with these 
issues through the creation of a European technological community, thus encouraging 
expectations among the industrial community that it would deliver innovative, 
commercial capability.
The Commission response has been made at several levels. At one level, it has 
encouraged the participation of potential users of the new technology in the 
collaborative venture, and Table 6.14 shows the general success that has been achieved 
in the case of the BRITE-EURAM programme. Arrangements made by the 
Commission to link the participants into related initiatives which promoted technology 
transfer and commercialisation (for example SPRINT and VALUE) also typified this 
concern with the needs of the market.
Actual programme management by the Commission served both as a way of 
counteracting the complexity and risks associated with cross-border research 
collaboration, and of bringing more organisations into the collaborative network. The 
Commission workshops, information days, data bases, and legal framework formed part 
of an enabling framework which national authorities could not offer, and which were 
necessary to the promotion of research and technological cooperation in a secure and 
stable environment.
Taking part in the programme gave the participants opportunities to develop 
technological knowledge, but also to develop collaborative ability - an important aspect 
in the post-Fordist, globalised production system where cooperation among firms has 
become commonplace, and often the key to the rapid technological and demand changes 
facing industries. The follow-up survey indicated that over 80% of the total number of 
respondents had attended one or two of the information days organised by the 
Commission, while over half of them made regular use of the Commission data base. 
Less than 10% of the total considered that the information provided by the Commission 
for participants was inadequate, 50% of UK respondents and 55% of Spanish 
respondents thought it was adequate, with the rest classifying it as good. In chapter one, 
it was suggested that the notion of loyalty, used in the neo-ftmctionalist analysis of the
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political process, was an inappropriate concept to apply to economic actors that operate 
in an increasingly globalised economy. Instead, borrowing from the literature on 
collaborative technology networks, the development of trust between the partners is a 
precondition for the success of what is by nature a long-term arrangement.
European collaborative programmes provided a framework under which such long-term 
arrangements could be fostered and through which the participants could build up trust. 
As the previous section 6.3.4 indicated, participants were willing to continue 
collaboration with their current partners. However, the existence of a transnational 
collaborative network of diverse participants does not by itself guarantee the output of 
qualitative research through the network; many of the members may play only 
superficial roles, thus limiting the beneficial spill-over effects, and the innovation 
effects. In the case of the European Community programmes this possibility may have 
acted as a limiting factor on the long-term integrative potential, as well as having little 
real impact on the level of the new technology.
Did such trust extend to a regard for the political authority of the European 
Commission? The European technology programmes were seen by economic actors as 
being a necessary response to the threat of international competitiveness, and the 
Commission was regarded as the appropriate authority to develop policy. However, the 
evidence from the survey does not suggest that expectations are being directed solely 
towards the central authority in Brussels. Instead, there has emerged a more complex 
set of expectations, some directed at the Commission, and some towards the national 
government.
The duality of the expectations stem from the actual nature of the collaborative 
experience involving the other partners, from the perceptions of the political process in 
which technology policy-making is developed, and from the role played by national 
authorities. The views and opinions expressed by the respondents, some of which are 
quoted in this concluding section, reflect this combination of actual experience, political 
process, and national institutional framework.
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Inevitably, cross-border technological collaboration has been more fruitful and 
productive for some of the participants than for others. Prior experience of 
collaboration, and the expectations about the actual benefits to be obtained were 
influential, as was the extent of technical expertise available, and the project 
management and nature of work undertaken by the collaborative team.
Long-term collaborative research was not generally favoured by participants, as funding 
might not be available to continue the work. As the British Aerospace respondent 
commented:
'one should not look on BRITE-EURAM as replacing strategic research Projects are 
generally ad hoc selections, there is no systematic approach to the final goal. 
Programmes (ie. projects) are short-term with no guarantee o f follow-up funding. In 
fact the existence o f previous projects tends to count against you. What has happened 
on a number o f our BRITE-EURAM projects that have been successful in themselves is 
that no follow-up funding could be obtained, the work has consequently lapsed and 
therefore the projects have been suspended. Ultimately there was no advantage since 
we have been unable to move them forward to the stage where we can take advantage. 
The 'lottery' ofproposal selection is no replacement for a decent long-term strategy. '
One respondent held the view that motivated end-users were key to success, but 
considered that the lack of financial support for exploitation was a big problem, 
recommending 'do not make EU contract research part o f your core business. Only 
participate in projects directly relevant to the core business. '
Participants were particularly concerned that the programme should support more 
applied research, and that the programme, or the Commission, should give greater 
support to the commercialisation of results. There is clearly an expectations gap here, 
since the Commission has always claimed the programme to be market-driven, yet it has 
also been constrained to support only pre-competitive research. Going beyond this, to 
support exploitation raises questions concerning not only the authority of the
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Commission but also the legitimacy on which it has operated since the technology 
programmes commenced. Also, there is the question as to how, properly, to support 
exploitation - it is the choice of organisations themselves as to whether to use results, 
and the Commission has confined itself to a publicising role as far as research results 
have been concerned.
A number of Spanish respondents pointed to the impact of the collaborative experience 
on national firms, particularly in terms of creating a ^European culture' in the 
organisation, learning to work in an international group, and 'reducing the inferiority 
complex o f Spanish industry'. But they were more sceptical than in the first survey 
about the technological benefits, and considered there was an imbalance as far as the 
country was concerned. The programme had not reduced 'the technological differences 
between countries or between large and small firms'.
There was a widely held view among Spanish respondents that the programme was not 
suitable, or accessible for small firms, and that it favoured to a greater degree basic 
research appropriate to large projects. Moreover, there was a belief that the uncritical 
government support for integration had left small firms without adequate interest 
representation, 'the abandonment o f national plans in favour o f the EU deprived SMEs 
o f R&D help. The administrative details are overwhelming, and the number o f approved 
projects too low. It is difficult to see how pre-competitive projects can help 
competitiveness '.
Project selection came in for a lot of criticism from both national groups, and the view 
of it as a lottery was widely shared. There was, said one respondent, 'a need for a better 
understanding o f the European decision-making process, and for greater 
complementarity between national and European programmes'.
The political process appeared to many to lack transparency. For one respondent 'the 
selection criteria, and the selection process needs to be more open and better defined. 
Nobody really knows who makes the decisions and some odd choices are made. There 
should be much more effort made to actually apply the results in practice under real
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conditions ie. more 'D' in the R&D'. Another respondent said of project selection 'this 
appears to be a lottery due to the social, economic and political aims which are equally 
weighted to the technical potential The proposal assessors are often inexperienced or 
plain wrong. Experts in a given fteld are required but any group must be prevented from 
dominating a particular field'.
The lack of transparency in the political process prompted many to the view that 
national government needed to be involved so as to protect the interests of national 
firms. For them, national identity does matter, and Europe is not just one area defined 
by its outer boundaries. Indeed the need for national government involvement was 
widely held among both groups. Many of the UK respondents were critical of the 
position taken by the government, and of the view that a more competitive position 
should be taken. From one, 'national government should make a bigger effort to 
support British businesses who are trying to participate in BRITE-EURAM. Currently 
the support received is minimal'.
Others suggested more government representation in Brussels to keep track of what was 
happening, and for the UK government to take a much more active role in the 
formulation of the programme so as to ensure that national industrial interests were 
catered for. Again, there was a keen appreciation among both groups regarding the level 
of support for research in other countries, and a feeling that their own government 
lagged behind 'in terms o f the way French government looks after industrial interests'.
Thus, in a spirit of competitive rivalry, economic actors directed expectations towards 
the national authorities in the two countries surveyed. As one UK respondent 
commented 'do not expect EU research programmes to substitute for a decent, national 
policy on applied research'. Another said 'because the current level o f funding o f 
national programmes in the UK is pathetically inadequate so there is no choice but to 
look for EC support. National government should look for a level playing fteld. The UK 
government is too strict in the application o f rules re other countries. It shouldn't use 
EC as only option to get out o f supporting UK industry'.
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For the Spanish government, 'the lesson is to judge the return on investment'. It should, 
said one respondent, 'note the help other governments give national firms'. A number 
of the Spanish respondents were concerned that the programme did not adequately 
reflect industry needs. It was 'still too far removed from applied work, and needs more 
participation from industry'.
To conclude, the evidence from the survey showed that there was not so much a transfer 
of loyalty from the national level to the supranational as a sustained multi-layered 
approach contingent on the strategies of the participants, the national systems of 
innovation and political structures, and the prevailing cultural environment.^^ Interest 
representation has changed somewhat from the way it was viewed by the early neo- 
functionalists, with groups and parties having different capabilities to exert influence at 
national or supranational level. Observation of the developments under the BRITE- 
EURAM programme would indicate that the influence exerted by interest groups has 
changed considerably, and that the nature of the political pressure exerted depended on 
the structure within each of the countries under consideration.^*
Organised business interests were less influential in the development of the 
programme,^^ or in harnessing the support of the participants. The political process 
which the European Commission had put in place, including the Industrial Research and 
Development Advisory Committee, the widespread net of technical advisors, and the 
claimed bottom-up approach to what was supposedly a market-driven programme, was 
not adequate to ensuring that the interests and expectations of economic actors were 
being met. Perhaps somewhat ironically, the globalised nature of economic activity, and 
the competitive and technological pressures force a reappraisal of the role of national 
government in representing domestic interests. This is true particularly as regards 
technological matters since many such issues related to technology and innovation stem 
from national institutional systems.
Domestic technological collaboration continued to be an important part of 
organisational strategy in the two countries surveyed. But the general absence of 
organised business interests in the political process of European technology policy­
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making, or at the very least its minimal input in both the UK and Spain, ensured that the 
business community retained belief in the role of the national authorities.
The dichotomy identified earlier, a belief in the benefits of the European policy at a very 
individual level combined with a lack of belief in European policy to contribute more 
generally to competitiveness, found a broader reflection. This was in the dichotomy 
based on functional and political interests. By broadening the European network the 
European Commission was not only building up political support at the European level, 
but also extending the net to include those who did not feel represented by the process 
that the Commission was developing, and who therefore wanted to retain more national 
representation.
The degree to which functional links eventually lead to spill-over will be influenced by 
the political processes at the national as well as the supranational level, and the 
perceptions and activities of government and non-govemment actors at the national and 
sub-national level have a part to play. The following chapter considers the nature of the 
political processes operating at both the national and the supranational level, and 
evaluates the extent of interaction between them. In the European integration process 
there is no guarantee of close interaction between hierarchical interests, but it may be 
possible for the European Commission to mediate between interests. But, as the 
concluding chapter of this thesis argues, mediation by the supranational authority alone 
cannot secure an ongoing process of political integration.
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CHAPTER 7
TOWARDS A TECHNOLOGICAL COMMUNITY
The European Community's technology policy entered its second decade when the 
Fourth Framework Programme (1994-1998) was finally agreed to by the European 
Parliament and the European Council on 26 April 1994.* Technology policy has 
consistently received the broad support of the business and scientific communities, and 
the member state governments throughout Europe, a support which seemed even more 
secure with the ratification of the Fourth Framework Programme.
Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for the success of the policy was the way in which it 
was linked by the European Commission to the pursuit of competitiveness. This 
objective was at the heart of national government economic programmes during the 
1980s and right through to the present decade, and it also struck a chord with the neo­
liberalism of the time which favoured the market as the most efficient allocator of 
resources, including technological resources.
Although the Framework Programme, and the specific programmes, represented a form 
of public intervention even the staunchest neo-liberal had to accept that the intervention 
essentially was an enabling one, facilitating the spread of technological alliances rather 
than channelling huge amounts of public fimds into firms. The overall Framework 
Programme budget never rose above 4% of the member states R%D expenditure, and 
most of the collaborative projects attracted matching private sector funds.
A second reason for the success of the technology policy relates to the management role 
adopted by the European Commission in the evolution and development of the policy. 
This chapter puts forward the view that there were deficiencies in the national 
institutional system, and in the supranational system of interest representation which the 
European Commission attempted to remedy through the implementation of the BRITE- 
EURAM programme.
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Chapter three concluded that through the BRITE-EURAM programme, the Commission 
established an institutional system which facilitated the participation of actors around 
the Community, enabling them to by-pass national government, and which compensated 
for the unrepresentative nature of supranational interest groups. The programme 
encouraged a culture of industry-academic cooperation, and the spread of this culture on 
a cross-border basis, even if sometimes with mixed results. The Framework Programme 
itself encouraged national governments to become more conscious of technology policy, 
of deficiencies in the national policy, and of'best practice' models.
7.1 Returning to the national domain - Spain
7.1.1 Economic adaptation
Looking at the operation of one of the European collaborative programmes and the level 
of participation in it by the two member states, it seemed clear that existing national 
structures had different capabilities to undertake European collaborative R&D. The 
evidence in chapter three indicated a much higher level of participation in European 
programmes among UK firms than was the case with Spanish enterprises, although the 
Spanish authorities have made strenuous efforts to redress the balance, with some 
degree of success, as was shown in chapter six.
For Spain, the decade of the 1980s was one characterised by policies of modernisation 
and liberalisation. Modernisation was a political goal, and liberalisation one of the 
means of reaching it. European integration, supported by the broad mass of the Spanish 
people, was another means of achieving this political goal. According to the Deputy 
Prime Minister, Adolfo Guerra, Total insertion into Europe...has been a central point of 
reference for the Socialist government'.^
The modernisation programme begun under the direction of the Minister of Economy 
and Finance, Miguel Boyer, was launched with the view that as the prospect of 
European integration loomed, Spanish industry needed to change in order to become
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more competitive. It included therefore plans to restructure large areas of the industrial 
economy, moderating the wages of workers, and liberalising the economic institutions. 
Economic policy thus came to the fore during the 1980s, following a decade when 
economic matters had to take a back seat as the political forces set about restoring 
democracy after the death of Franco in 1976. The approach taken in the economic 
programme, like that towards European integration, placed the government very firmly 
in the driving seat. It was perhaps ironic that in restoring economic matters, the political 
forces and processes often took centre stage leaving the private economic actors on the 
sideline. Certain aspects of the institutional system can help to explain why this 
happened.
In particular, there was a greater acceptance of state responsibility to regulate the 
economy in the wider public interest and to intervene in business through support for 
R&D, training, investment and so on. The large bureaucracy was one of the legacies of 
Francoism, and the large state sector continued throughout the 1980s, although coming 
under increasing pressure. Many parts of this bureaucracy were staffed by an elite that 
was keen to drive the modernisation process forward, and who were very pro-European 
in their outlook.
The bureaucratic elite differed in certain respects from their UK counterparts. While the 
latter tended to employ civil servants with a liberal arts education who worked as 
generalists, Spanish civil servants tended to have specialist degrees, in law or 
economics. Such different backgrounds influenced the respective approaches to work, 
the UK often accused of being gifted amateurs with a pragmatic approach who were 
unable to interpret situations in a broader framework,^ while the technical expertise of 
Spanish civil servants was applied in a more formal, structured way follovdng the rules. 
The latter approach may sometimes result in a neglect of the practicalities of a situation 
as technocrats react to a situation at a high level of abstraction. This has sometimes 
been a problem in the Spanish case.
It was a problem when it came to developing the technological system during the 1980s. 
A very ambitious technology plan, comprehensive in scope and detail was introduced
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through legislative decree to coincide with accession to the European Community. But 
the plan failed to provide adequately for the diffusion of technology. The network of 
technology transfer organisations, known as Oficinas de Transferencias de Resultados 
de Investigacion (OTRI), was set up by the government with offices in all the 
universities, but without adequate consideration of the traditional industry-academic 
gap.
Historically, Spanish industry devoted a very small amount of resources to research, and 
had for long depended on imported technology which was often brought into the 
country through direct foreign investment. Under these circumstances there was little 
pressure on industry to turn to the university sector as a source of innovation and 
technological knowledge. Universities tended to see themselves in a traditional, 
classical role, and were regarded with suspicion by the business community as far as 
their likelihood of contributing to applied research was concerned.
For a long time there was, similarly, little pressure on Spanish universities to turn to the 
industrial sector as a source of finance for their research activities, as universities were 
increasingly forced to do in the United Kingdom. While the UK government was 
rolling back the boundaries of the state, and attempting to shift the funding of research 
from the public to the private sector, the state continued to be a major player in the 
Spanish economy during the 1980s. In the university sector, expanding student numbers 
and the continued guarantee of public support for their research activities meant Spanish 
universities were not forced to look to the private sector for funding.
Despite these historical differences, the bureaucratic elite were willing to promote a 
culture of collaboration between the sectors which would extend beyond the domestic 
level to the European Community. While the technocrats exhibited a high degree of 
professional and technical expertise, they also were strongly committed to European 
integration and highly market-oriented."* The Centre for Industrial Technological 
Development (CDTI) and the Ministry for Industry and Energy were keenly supportive 
of European integration, and had strong links with Brussels bureaucrats.
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The Spanish authorities sought to integrate the national technology programmes with 
the European Framework Programme/ On the domestic front, national programmes 
were intended to serve several objectives - to improve the technological base and at the 
same time to prepare Spanish firms, and public organisations for participation in the 
European technology programmes/ There was a gradual increase, from the second half 
of the 1980s in the levels of participation of public research organisations and 
universities in the European programmes, as Table 5.4 showed.
Spanish industry also raised its profile in the European programmes, with the very 
active encouragement of the national authorities. However, Spain was unable to shift 
the responsibility for research funding to the private sector to the same degree as other 
member states (see Table 5.3). Nonetheless, the participation of industry, universities 
and research centres in the European programmes was helping to link the Spanish 
technological system to the European system.
However, the particular links being created had certain weaknesses. For one thing, such 
ties were unable to address the fundamental problem of diffusion of technology 
throughout the economy generally and throughout industry characterised by small- and 
medium-sized firms.^ The latter were the least able to invest in R&D, and hence had 
technological deficiencies which larger enterprises avoided. Larger firms were often 
linked to foreign multinationals, themselves a source of technology.
Partly because of the large number of small- and medium-sized firms, with the 
associated technological problems identified in the previous paragraph, Spanish 
participants occupied subordinate positions in the European collaborative projects. This 
had the effect of reducing the technological benefits of participation, and prompted a 
demand from academic observers for corrective measures by the government.*
But there were many, including the government, who believed that additional benefits 
could accrue in the form of the higher European profile that participation in EC 
programmes brought, and by attracting foreign capital investment, especially in such 
industries as automobiles, industrial equipment, electrical machinery, chemicals, and
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non-metallic mineral manufacturing.^ BRITE-EURAM offered opportunities for 
technological development to those sectors of industry that were considered to represent 
Spain's best chances for competitive advantage - particularly machinery, equipment, 
electronics, and parts for aircraft and cars. As Table 5.12 showed, it was the programme 
from which Spain derived the largest share of budget out of all the industrial research 
programmes.
However, the country could have benefited more, and at an earlier stage, if the 
modernisation programme had been able to achieve the changes to domestic structures 
promised in the Socialist government pronouncements following its arrival in office in 
the early 1980s. Instead of directing concerted attention to innovation and diffusion 
structures at the grassroots level, the government embarked on a top-down approach 
which was increasingly used in the second half of the 1980s to prepare the Spanish 
economy for economic and monetary union.
Macro-economic policy was directed instead to entering the European Monetary System 
and to maintaining the peseta Avithin the system. This outcome had the support of the 
Spanish Central Bank, which the governor, Mariano Rubio, described as 'the 
culmination of a long opening up process of the Spanish economy towards Europe.' 
During its first presidency of the European Community, in the first half of 1989, the 
prime minister, Felipe Gonzalez declared his support for economic and monetary 
union. Twelve months earlier, the Economy Minister had predicted that the peseta 
would become part of the ECU before 1990.^^
The overwhelming support of the central government, and of the central bank and big 
business for this type of economic policy overshadowed other areas where economic 
policy could have been directed towards effecting change in the innovation and 
diffusion structures. For a time, Spain experienced unprecedented levels of economic 
growth, partly spurred by rising levels of foreign direct investment and partly by 
buoyant consumer demand. All this confirmed the expectations of the Spanish 
government and the business community that European integration was good for 
Spain.
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There was a similar view among Spanish society that European integration was a good 
thing in the years following accession. The broad-based consensus that existed for 
European integration suggested no obvious need to change the existing institutional 
structure. Any change might, indeed, have induced uncertainties across the different 
interest groups, and threatened the very consensus that underpinned the government 
programme.
The Socialist government which came into office in 1982, under Felipe Gonzalez, was 
returned in three consecutive general elections, although the last one with a reduced 
majority, thus adding a degree of stability to the government p r o g r a m m e . T h e  
Socialists were, like their Conservative counterparts in the United Kingdom, able to 
enjoy an uninterrupted spell in office to pursue their agenda towards modernisation and 
European integration. Although Spain followed similar macro-economic policies to 
those of the UK in order to meet the convergence criteria for economic and monetary 
union, there was no attempt to pursue the type of institutional change which marked the 
Conservative government's agenda. Nor were there pressures from below to do so.
By 1991-92 this consensus was breaking down, as growth rates declined and economic 
activity stagnated while unemployment rose above the EC average. With the number of 
firm closures and rationalisation cuts increasing, and the level of foreign direct 
investment in decline, the Spanish government had to find some way to retain popular 
support for the European integration drive. And it had to do so quickly, as Europe 
considered the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.
7.1.2 Political adaptation
The solution was found through the Spanish government's demand for a Cohesion Fund 
to support investment in infrastructure and environmental projects in the four poorest 
member states of the EU with a view to promoting their convergence to the average EU 
level. This the government successfully obtained at the Edinburgh summit in December 
1992, and by a more trenchant attitude towards Europe. Having become a net
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contributor to the Framework Programme by this time, the authorities adopted a more 
stringent approach in evaluating the costs and benefits of the programme for the country.
In a submission on the Fourth Framework Programme, the government called for more 
specific weight to be given to the BRITE-EURAM programme, and to those areas 
within it that dealt with modernisation of traditional industry. It also acknowledged that 
raising the European profile of Spanish industry, and of its researchers, and plugging 
into the Community network would not be enough to improve the value of human 
capital and the level of skills throughout the broader economy generally.The expected 
benefits of participation should extend beyond network building to the structural 
development of the economy and society. Narrow market-based factors were 
supplemented by broader institutional factors.
The authorities also focused more effort on deepening the participation of domestic 
industry in the European programmes, particularly that of the small- and medium-sized 
firms. One consequence of this focus was to enlarge the participation of those firms in 
the recently-introduced CRAFT programme, which very soon saw the highest 
proportion of participants coming fi-om Spain. At the invitation of the Spanish 
government, IRDAC undertook a presentation to Spanish SMEs during the course of 
1993, in order to improve the knowledge and awareness of European technology 
programmes among these enterprises.^^
The Cohesion Fund was intended to alleviate the costs of adjustments necessary to meet 
the convergence criteria for economic and monetary union. After protracted 
negotiations by the Spanish government during the course of 1992, the European 
Council finally agreed a package at the Edinburgh summit. The position adopted by the 
government during the negotiations did not mean that it was turning its back on the 
European vision, but that it regarded the package as essential to bringing the vision 
closer to reality. The Fund would secure the continued political legitimacy of the 
government's objective, and retain the support of the regions.
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Regional disparities had continued, despite the prosperity generated by European 
integration. Some of the regional authorities were anxious to exert a greater level of 
autonomy, particularly in regard to relations with the European Community.^^ By the 
beginning of 1993, ten out of the seventeen Autonomous Communities had regional 
offices in Brussels, which the central government tolerated if the offices were there just 
for lobbying purposes, or to obtain information for the region. But the central 
government prohibited them from conducting a representative function, which it 
considered as being incompatible with the Constitution.
The more independent regions conducted their own regional technology policies, 
particularly the Basque country and Catalonia,^^ and were anxious to see an increase in 
the economic powers of the European Community, especially towards the financing of 
less developed regions, the promotion of technological innovation, and regional 
investment projects.
However, the central government continued to have some influence over the amount and 
direction of research funding for two reasons. While the transfer of new powers to the 
autonomous communities enabled the regions to take some responsibility for developing 
technology initiatives, they did so with central funding. Regional research centres have 
a remit to carry out research to support technological development in certain sectors, but 
it is coordinated in the National Plan, through the General Council for Science and 
Technology chaired by the Minister for Education and Science. The General Council 
contains representatives from the regional authorities, and facilitates a two-way 
relationship in which the regions can determine their own research needs while the 
regional R&D programmes draw on the National Plan funds. Regional priorities can be 
recommended for both new regional programmes and for amendments to national 
programmes, but they depend upon the funds being provided by the national authorities.
The regional dependence on the central government is further aggravated by the 
continuing regional disparities that exist in Spain.^  ^ The effect of this is to ensure that 
the regions retain close dependence on the central government for financial and other 
support. This is no less the case where the regions receive substantial payments under
287
the European Structural Funds. In any case, the provisions for regional participation in 
European decision-making are still somewhat inadequate.^"  ^ While Spanish regions are 
anxious to increase and strengthen direct links with the European Commission, it is 
clear that the socio-economic structures in the regions are ill-adapted to the European 
market - of particular relevance in this context are the levels of technological innovation, 
the labour force skills.^^
7.2 UK technology policy - ideology vs. market?
7.2.1 The policy vacuum
Unlike the Spanish case, much of the drive towards European integration came from the 
grass roots. The government, concerned though it was with industrial competitiveness, 
adopted a much more hands off approach to both technology policy generally, and to 
European technology policy in particular. In chapter four it was noted that the 
government had made direct attempts to keep the Framework Programme budget within 
what it considered to be acceptable limits, while industrial enterprises were free to make 
their own approach to the European Commission. But, in an indirect way European 
technological developments had an effect in the eventual introduction of the 1993 White 
Paper on Science and Technology.
The state of UK manufacturing industry had given rise to debate and concern for several 
decades.^^ For some, it was a case of decline, notably in the volume of production and 
in the share of world manufacturing output.^^ From a share of 17% in 1960 to 10.6% in 
1970, it fell to 7.5% in 1984 to revive slightly towards 8.5% in 1990.^  ^ Industry 
appeared unable to match the productivity levels in other European countries, combined 
with low levels of investment in manufacturing generally.
The policy towards manufacturing was set by the limits of the free market ideology that 
infused much of the government thinking and its actions from the time the Conservative 
government took office in 1979. The prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, lent her name 
to the ideology that was to retain its influence after her departure in 1990. Thatcherism
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was intent on a complete change in the institutional and conceptual framework - a total 
reliance on the market, even in matters affecting infrastructural investment, and 
technological development.
In the area of research and development the government sought to shift the financial 
burden to the private sector, and to encourage market-driven research with the objective 
of improving the competitive position of UK industry. In addition to attempting this 
switch to private funding of research and development, public research centres and 
universities were exposed to sweeping changes which affected both the nature of their 
activities and the financial resources that enabled those activities to be conducted in the 
first place.
When the Science and Technology White Paper was finally introduced in May 1993, it 
gave particular emphasis to the importance of technology for wealth creation. The 
White Paper stated the intention to harness the intellectual resources of the science and 
engineering base to improve economic performance and the quality of life. It intends, in 
future, that decisions on priorities for support should be much more clearly related to 
meeting the country's needs and enhancing the wealth-creating capacity of the
.29country.
The wholesale embrace of neo-liberalism that Thatcherism epitomised had a 
contradictory side to it. This was in terms of the frequent rejections of the voice of 
industry, and the encouragement given to financial capitalism which more readily 
conformed to the precepts of Thatcherism. Undoubtedly, the growing power and 
influence of the City within government circles overwhelmed the interests of other 
sectors of the business community. Manufacturing in particular suffered from the 
unbalanced division of influence, and policies such as deregulation and privatisation 
aggravated this as the benefits flowed more to the interests of big capital and the larger 
corporations.
There were many ways in which government ignored the voice of industry. One case in 
point concerned the Central Policy Review Staff, which was set up in 1970 comprising
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members from industry, civil service, the City and the academic community to advise 
the cabinet on policymaking and to provide a forum for generating new ideas, which 
was disbanded in 1983. This think tank represented an early attempt to extend business­
like attitudes into government policy making, and was headed by Victor Rothschild who 
lent his name to the 1971 White Paper on government's role in research and 
development.^^
The unit specialised in analysing domestic issues in the international context, of 
particular relevance during the 1970s, yet it was unable to maintain influence with 
government even during that period. During the 1980s there was little use made of this 
unit, despite its expertise and industrial connections. The image of the Central Policy 
Review Staff also did not fit with the prevailing notions of Thatcherism, being regarded 
with disdain as exemplifying the political identity of an earlier period, particularly that 
of an academic leftist tendency.
The change in govemment-industry relations prompted one commentator to observe 'the 
relationship between the two has not been between two partners pursuing generally 
shared goals, as could be said to be the case in Japan. Rather, it has often been 
characterised by mutual mistrust and misunderstanding. Government's withdrawal from 
some of its relationships with business has not solved this problem. Indeed, in some 
respects, it may have compounded it by undermining some of the mechanisms which 
had developed to improve contacts between business and government.'^*
It seemed indeed that ideology took precedence over the market, or at least over certain 
markets. A national technology policy, of the type being developed by the European 
Community, was less likely under such conditions. The government's reply to concerns 
about the technology gap between Britain and other major competitors, particularly 
regarding the technical and research deficiencies in industry and education, was to press 
for further liberalisation and de-regulation.
The early 1980s saw some attempts at technology policy, with initiatives such as the 
Alvey programme, but increasingly there was an unwillingness on the part of
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government to provide the financial support for science and technology. Towards the 
end of the decade, and particularly fi-om 1992 onwards the government was talking in 
terms of specific efforts which the business community itself needed to make to improve 
competitiveness rather than emphasing specific publicly supported technology 
programmes. Government spending on the science base, as a proportion of GDP, fell 
fi-om 0.37% in 1978 to 0.28% in 1995. Looking at international comparisons of 
government fimding of R&D by socio-economic objectives, the picture is rather mixed. 
In 1993 for example the UK government provided 8.6% for industrial development 
compared to Germany’s 12.7%, France 7% and Italy 16.3%. The UK government 
spent 22.3% of the R&D budget on advancement of knowledge and the largest share, 
42.5%, on defence. By contrast, the share of other countries R&D spent on 
advancement of knowledge was Germany 51.4%, France 31.9%, Italy 46.4%; France 
allocated 33.5% of the budget to defence, Germany 8.5%, and Italy 6.5%. UK business 
interests were completely fi-ee to look towards the European technology programmes for 
financial support.
UK industrial interests were well represented in all of the European industrial research 
programmes, as noted in chapter three. Large companies were particularly attracted to 
the ESPRIT programme, while BRITE-EURAM offered opportunities to the smaller 
firms, and to the public and private research organisations. The government's Annual 
Review of Govemment-fimded R&D for the year 1992 noted that the amount of 
research contracts by UK enterprises had increased significantly over the course of the 
Second Framework Programme, with Table 7.1 below showing the total number 
concluded up to that point in time.
That this pattern developed was less the result of a concerted action by the central 
authorities to promote it than a drive by UK industry to be at the centre of things. 
Manufacturing industry had become much more export intensive during the 1980s, and 
attained higher levels of profitability in doing so. Between the years 1981 and 1990, 
manufacturing output increased on an annual basis, and by the end of this period was 
30% higher in real terms.^^ During the same period, exports increased in volume terms 
by 62%. Hughes (1993) reported that profitability in the manufacturing sector had risen
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by 34% in real terms between 1979 and 1990. The Single Market Programme had 
drawn the attention of the business community to the greater role played by Europe in 
national policies generally, and to the potential commercial opportunities it offered.^^
Table 7.1 UK and European
collaborative links 1992
Beigium 362
Denmark 354
France 1557
Germany 1298
Greece 329
ireland 227
Itaiy 659
Luxembourg 4
Holland 640
Portugal 218
Spain 493
UK 824
Source: Annual Review of
Government-funded R&D 1992, P
70.
The strength of industrial interest in the European programmes has continued. Under 
the Third Framework Programme, the UK had engaged in a total of 5668 collaborative 
links during 1994. Only Germany and France exceeded this, with 6874 and 6719 
contracts respectively.The corresponding figure for Spain was a much lower 3120 
contracts. Undoubtedly, the capacity to undertake technological collaboration depends 
not only on the degree of national government support but also on the internal capability 
of the enterprises with potential interest in collaboration, the degree of sophistication of 
the industrial sector, and the size of the country.
The UK government's preference for a very loose approach to technology policy was 
clearly evident in the lack of any attempt to identify particular technologies, or sectors
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for technological development. A comparison of the submissions made by the UK and 
Spain towards the negotiations for the Fourth Framework Programme is instructive in 
this regard.^^
Under the BRITE-EURAM programme, the Spanish government had lodged a series of 
concerns in respect of particular areas:
• Basic and traditional materials - improvements in quality and in processes.
• Advanced materials - construction, optics, composites.
• Recycled materials and raw materials.
• New technologies for traditional industry.
• Prenormative research.
• Design, manufacture and management of the product life cycle.
• Integrated projects - in areas such as textiles, machinery.
The UK submission concentrated on technologies of general application:
• Clean manufacturing
• Noise reduction
• Energy saving technologies
• Advanced materials and processing
• Aeronautics.
The inclusion of aeronautics reflected a long standing sectoral interest which still 
retained influence with the Department of Trade and Industry.^^ The DTI also regarded 
the BRITE-EURAM programme as complementing its own efforts to encourage new 
materials technologies, and it supported the emphasis that BRITE-EURAM gave to the 
area of design and advanced technology in manufacturing processes. However, the 
department devoted comparatively fewer resources to the programme than its Spanish 
counterpart. Instead, it contracted out the work of publishing the programme, as well as 
other activities associated with the programme implementation, all of which were 
conducted directly by the Spanish ministry.
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7.2.2 Filling the vacuum
When the White Paper on Science and Technology was published in May 1993, it was 
welcomed by the business community on the basis that it at least raised the profile of 
science and technology on the government agenda, and the emphasis that the document 
gave to applied research was commended by industrialists although less so by the 
science community.^^ Chapter four examined the thrust of the White Paper, so this 
section is confined to considering the rationale for the White Paper, and the potential 
synergy with European policy.
Drawn up by the Office of Technology, then situated in the Cabinet Office but from 
mid-1995 in the DTI, the White Paper did not suggest an immediate change of strategic 
direction.^^ It did, however, propose a number of institutional changes - the re­
organisation of the research councils, the newly-named Council on Science and 
Technology (formerly ACOST) to take greater responsibility for forecasting, and the 
announcement of the technology foresight programme to identify key technologies 
expected to play a major role in underpinning industrial development and growth.^^
But even here the emphasis was on the involvement of industry so as to target public 
research funds in the direction of technologies closely aligned to the needs of industry - 
where 'this country could and should benefit from the application of technology 
foresight, not only as a means of gaining early notice of emerging key technologies but 
also as a process which will forge a new working partnership."^^
In giving explicit emphasis to the role of S&T in wealth creation, the White Paper 
stressed the need to strengthen links between the scientific community and business - 
but the White Paper did not discuss the possibility of setting up technology transfer 
channels along the lines of the Spanish OTRI, or the German Frauenhofer Institutes 
Although the science and technology minister, William Waldegrave, indicated the poor 
ability of UK business to innovate, the government's unwillingness to seek more active 
involvement in the system won the day. Among the UK technology community 
proposals were put forward however to adopt the German model in the UK, under the
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name Faraday Institute. By the time the White Paper was introduced, however, some of 
the limelight had been stolen by the earlier initiatives and declarations of the DTI, 
including the setting up of the Industrial Competitiveness, followed later by two white 
papers on competitivesss.
The White Paper stressed the commitment to strengthening the UK's international and 
European links. At the international level, in particular, the minister urged the scientific 
community to build and maintain close ties with researchers in Japan and other parts of 
Asia - thus offering a coherence to technological activities and industrial activities that 
have strong connections with that part of the world, and complementing the high 
volume of Japanese investment in the UK.
While the government reiterated its support for UK participation in European 
programmes, it identified a distinct division of responsibility for both government and 
the participants. The former's role should centre on ensuring a 'strategic' balance 
between domestic and European programmes, while industry and the academic 
community should take a bigger role in formulating submissions to the European 
Commission as to the future content and direction of European research collaboration.
This approach by the UK government contrasts significantly with the Spanish 
government's more direct involvement in preparing submissions to the Commission, and 
the greater willingness to identify particular sectors or technologies for support. The 
White Paper sought to bring the different actors in the UK innovation process closer 
together, whilst distancing government from what was regarded essentially as a market- 
led activity.
It is too early to judge the ultimate impact of the technology foresight programme on the 
technological system in the United Kingdom. As noted in chapter four, the fifteen 
panels made their reports in the spring of 1995, and it will take a certain amount of time 
for the proposals to be incorporated into the research and technology programmes of the 
national technology community. Nevertheless, a number of observations may be made.
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Technology foresight involved setting predictions regarding the likely future demand for 
certain technologies, based upon a broad consultation process, spanning the widest 
possible range of industrial, scientific and technological viewpoints. The method is one 
long favoured by the Japanese government and adopted by other European member 
states during the 1980s. One of the attractions of the method for the UK was that it 
encouraged greater consideration by the business community of the future developments 
in technology and the likely impact on their activities, and in prompting greater 
interaction among a variety of groups with a common interest in technological 
development (even if for different ends) it could strengthen the links of the technological 
community. A similar outcome is much desired in the Spanish case, but the idea has not 
as yet been taken up.
However, while the European Commission has taken a leadership role in technology 
management, the UK government retains its non-interventionist position, leaving the 
financing and the leadership to industry. The outcome is a bias towards applied research 
rather than basic research.^* Despite this bias, the CBI gave technology foresight a very 
lukewarm reception, suggesting that there is a lack of clarity in the foresight objectives' 
and 'a  perception of it as a mechanism for moving money around the Research 
Councils.'"^^
These recent policy developments in the UK retained much of the neo-liberalist ideals in 
the sense that the 1993 White Paper, and the technology foresight programme, adopted 
the principle of letting the market decide on the allocation of research and technology 
resources. Why then did the government decide to introduce a technology policy, after 
such a long period with no formal policy?
It certainly was not the case that the government feared the encroachment of European 
technology policy on the national circumstances. The White Paper had endorsed the 
European programmes, 'the government believes that an important benefit of 
Community membership is the access which it provides to European-wide research 
collaborations.' On the other hand, the position of manufacturing had changed by the
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early 1990s, manifested through falling output, reduced employment, and a deficit in the 
manufacturing trade balance.
The inter-twining of cause-effect relationships add to the difficulty of trying to explain 
the deterioration in manufacturing at this period. Government inflationary policy forced 
adjustment costs onto the domestic economic sector, particularly manufacturing. UK 
manufacturing had to protect the export markets through a sustained battle with 
competitiveness, and the only way to do so in the absence of exchange rate adjustments 
was by cutting labour costs. In addition to this policy-induced decline of manufacturing, 
there was another explanation which centred upon a secular decline which the neo­
liberal programme of liberalisation and de-regulation had failed to halt.
In the period since 1979 manufacturing employment fell significantly, and the sector's 
share of GDP also declined. Between 1979 and 1983, 20% of the labour force in 
manufacturing disappeared, and over the longer period 1979-1992 manufacturing 
employment fell by 2.6 million."^  ^ The most serious decline probably occurred at the 
beginning of the 1980s, but was obscured by the revenue from North Sea oil which gave 
a buoyant balance of trade. From the mid-1980s, the decline in oil revenues revealed 
the poor trade balance in manufacturing which continued through to the 1990s in ever- 
worsening trade figures.
Industrial competitiveness has been a recurring concern of the UK government, and was 
mostly dealt with through macro-economic policy in the 1980s. However, in the early 
1990s some extra contribution was called for as the economy continued in recession. 
Constrained by policy and conviction from increasing public spending, the two white 
papers on competitiveness and the technology white paper could be seen as a response 
to a situation which called for a more constructive approach than had been tried up to 
that point.
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7.3.1 National interest representation
Whatever the general reservations on European integration held by the UK government, 
it gave tacit approval to the European technology programmes. But as the national 
technological community was to experience, the government was less ready to take a 
more active part in the programme implementation. As the results of the survey 
presented in chapter six show, not all the UK and Spanish organisations were persuaded 
to take part in European technology collaboration on the basis of national interest 
representation. The United Kingdom respondents had the highest figure for non­
national representation. While the style of government had an undoubted influence on 
this figure, there are other factors that arise in an examination of the two national 
contexts.
In particular the structure of business interest representation at the national, and at the 
supranational level influenced the degree to which sectoral interest groups were 
involved in the formulation of both BRITE-EURAM and the Framework Programme. 
The argument presented here is that business interest representation was not sufficiently 
strong at either the national or the supranational level to act as a focus for technological 
demands of the members.
The hierarchical nature of the Framework Programme itself determined different levels 
of interest representation, and this was sustained by the management approach adopted 
by the European Commission. For instance, national governments tended to be more 
directly and actively involved in the negotiations on the Framework itself, leaving the 
constituent programmes to intermediate and lower level interests. National 
governments' primary concerns were with the level of the budget allocated to the 
Framework Programme, rather than the substantive content or the strategic direction of 
the policy."^
As far as European technology policy was concerned, there appeared to be a rather steep 
learning curve attached to business interest representation. Although policy had been 
developing since the early 1980s, business interests still operated at a very disaggregated 
and uncoordinated level. It was only in the area of information and communication
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technology, sectors dominated by large multinational organisations and concentrated
#
production, closely linked to national interests, that interest representation had reached a 
high level of sophistication/^
Across manufacturing industry generally, the diversity of business representation at both 
national and supranational level made for an unbalanced focus in representing interests. 
Technological concerns were relevant only in so far as they contributed to 
competitiveness, and defence of market share. Often business interests were focused on 
legislation of a regulatory nature that impinged on, or restricted companies' activities.
The peak business associations, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and 
Confederacion Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE) in particular suffered 
fi*om the diversity of membership, which often hindered a common opinion being 
reached."^  ^ Nevertheless, the two organisations maintained strong support for European 
integration even before the entry of their respective countries into the European 
Community, and maintain long-established offices in Brussels.
During the period under study, these two organisations faced quite different conditions 
governing their relations with their respective governments. In the UK, the CBI found 
itself somewhat left out in the cold (until 1992 with the return of Heseltine to the DTI) 
while the Institute of Directors, much smaller but more influential, found favour with 
the Conservative govemment."^^ CEOE is recognised under Article 7 of the Spanish 
Constitution, and receives subsidies fi'om the Spanish government."^* Despite this 
apparently privileged position for the business association, CEOE did not always take 
full advantage of it, and was regarded as weak by some of its members."^^
Part of the explanation for this weakness could be attributed to the structure of the 
organisation - it comprises a large number of sectoral and regional associations, which 
often cannot find grounds for common agreement. The regional associations, with 
whom many business firms were more closely affiliated, tended to direct their demands 
to local or regional authorities, while small firms felt excluded firom the process. 
Several delegates at the 1992 Seville conference organised by the European
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Commission expressed their lack of knowledge of the strategies and motivations of the 
CEOE, exhibiting a degree of apathy to this nationally-organised business association/^
In Spain, small- and medium-sized firms have not been able to develop a strong voice, 
nor a coherent national well-orchestrated campaign for their particular interests. One 
vehicle which might have provided this role, the Spanish Confederation of Small and 
Medium Firms (CEPYME) was incorporated into CEOE in 1980.^^
The Confederation of British Industry has involved itself with research and 
technological issues at various levels, and the Technology and Innovation Committee of 
the CBI meets quarterly. The Committee makes submissions to the Framework 
Programme, and also made a submission to the Technology Foresight programme 
launched under the supervision of the Office of Science and Technology. Although CBI 
has a clearer policy on technological issues than its Spanish counterpart, it was not 
confident that it could exert much direct influence at the European level as far as 
European technology policy was concerned.
At the domestic level, CBI has come to acknowledge that the decentralised approach 
adopted by the government brought its own problems. In particular, the government's 
unwillingness to impose direction on the growing number of technological networks has 
hindered its use of the DTI's innovation unit to establish inputs into business.
CBI has also been concerned at the tendency for each government department to go its 
own way, which merely has the effect of confusing people in the marketplace.'^^ In 
general, the business community did not have faith in the DTI to represent its interests, 
and considered it to be unable to stand up against the pressures from Whitehall, and 
particularly from the Treasury with the latter’s preference for a high interest rate policy 
to control inflation when business favoured lower rates to encourage investment. John 
Banham, Director of the CBI from 1987-1993, commented that 'the department seemed 
ineffective in preventing inflationary own goals being scored by players elsewhere in 
Whitehall and lacked the detailed understanding of how key sectors of the economy 
would be affected by particular measures.'^"^
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National sectoral associations made little direct impact on the formulation of either the 
Framework Programme, or the BRITE-EURAM programme for a variety of reasons. 
Within manufacturing, many sectoral associations were slow to engage in the European 
political dialogue on research and technology, although there were significant 
exceptions in other issue areas.
Sectoral associations were more closely involved in the BRITE-EURAM programme at 
the implementation stage, either information gathering on behalf of their members, or 
making contacts with European Commission officials and counterpart associations firom 
other member states at the information days and workshops organised by the 
Commission. Despite the proliferation of sectoral associations, one study of these 
groups concluded that it has not been possible to develop 'a  single cohesive association 
managing substantial diversity and possessing a de facto monopoly of representing the 
sector concemed.'^^
More importantly, the European Technology programme was 'sold ' on the basis of the 
intention to promote generic technologies that could be appropriated on a cross sectoral 
basis, and sectoral associations have not proved themselves adept at representing 
interests on a cross-sectoral basis. Instead, they have tended to take a narrow 
perspective on the extent of interest representation that is appropriate to their brief. This 
is particularly true in the case of nationally-based sectoral associations. Inevitably, the 
results of the survey reported in chapter four indicated that much of the collaboration 
undertaken by the participants was with firms in their own sector.
The BRITE-EURAM programme targeted a range of sectors, many with low to medium 
concentration levels, which tended to weaken the influence of sectoral representation. 
Some of the larger participants, in sectors such as the car industry, aerospace, chemicals, 
and computers were in a position to make direct representation to the European 
Commission.^^ However, the Commission itself has stressed from the beginning the 
multi-sectoral nature of the BRITE-EURAM programme, implicitly discouraging
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sectoral representation, and putting primary emphasis on the Industrial Research and 
Development Advisory Committee (IRDAC) to put forward the industrial interest.
At the same time the national peak associations have been either unable or unwilling to 
act for a sectoral interest, or indeed for a combination of sectoral groups.^^ The 
Confederation of British Industry recognised, with its opening of the British Business 
Bureau in Brussels in 1991, the need for greater representation of sectoral interests. 
However, the Bureau's role is essentially one of information gathering, and with its very 
small staff (three) it is unlikely to be able to make a significant impact.
Where CBI found itself in disagreement was in the national government's concentration 
on budgetary matters, to the exclusion of any attempts to influence the nature and 
direction of European programmes on technology development.^* It was much less 
concerned with the way the government undertook promotional and informational 
campaigns on the technology programmes.
Both UK and Spanish sectoral groups have been slow to address interest representation 
at the European level, the Spanish particularly so. Many UK sectoral groups have really 
only taken Europe into consideration in terms of interest representation in the past three 
to four years, and to an even lesser degree in Spain. The Engineering Employers 
Federation, one of the more competent of the UK sectoral associations at the European 
level, has suggested that 'what is needed is better effort by sectoral groups to build links 
comparable with those already achieved with the DTI.'^^
Some sectors do not need representation through an interest group, particularly where 
concentrated production is the principle feature of the i n d u s t r y o r  an emerging high 
technology sector which organises a European level interest group, such as bio­
technology. Where a proposed policy is not regarded as a threat to members' interests, 
nor takes the form of a regulatory measure, there may be little impetus towards active 
representation.
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Technology policy is sometimes seen in this light, and all the more so when the policy 
does not fall into the 'picking winners' category. Sectoral interest groups were less 
inclined to publish policy statements and position papers on technological issues than on 
more general matters. The UK Engineering Employers Federation was a good example, 
publishing a rather comprehensive report on industrial policy in 1992, but avoiding 
technology policy despite widespread acceptance of a link between competitiveness and 
technology. At the supranational level, business interest groups were more inclined to 
take a direct position on technology matters, and were involved in the European policy 
formulation process through the Industrial Research and Development Advisory 
Committee and, less directly, other European-level groups.
7.3.2 Supranational interest representation
The creation of a European technology community called for a political process where 
interests were represented at different levels. In the earlier technology policy 
experiments, the failure of policy to adequately meet all the interests involved, and to do 
so fairly, was one of the causes of failure. During the 1980s, the Framework 
Programme sought to counteract this political deficit through a broadening of the 
participant base at the grass roots level, and at the supranational level through the 
establishment of IRDAC.
IRDAC was in many respects an artificial construct, created to establish the legitimacy 
of the European Commission's activities. The question must be asked why it was 
necessary to create such a committee, given that business interests appeared to be 
adequately represented by UNICE. The latter had indeed developed as a competent 
political actor, and was accepted as such by the European Commission and by the 
national affiliate employer organisations.
In Spain, the employers association CEOE had supported the government in the drive 
towards European integration, and was anxious to 'europeanise' business activities as 
well as upgrading the technological input of manufacturing production. In the years 
following accession, the association did accept that UNICE could represent national
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industrial technological interests at the Brussels level, but not to the exclusion of the role 
which the Spanish government could play in the process.^^
In the UK, the Confederation of British Industry liked to keep in tune with what was 
happening at the Brussels level, but accepted that UNICE could do more to actively 
represent the interest of national industry in this policy area. It was much less sanguine 
when it came to what were regarded, in the British case at least, as contentious issues - 
particularly the Social Dialogue, working time, consultation and worker 
representation.^^
The peak associations by their very nature comprise a diversity of membership, taking 
in as they do industrial interests which cover a broad spectrum, at both the national and 
the supranational level. Given this diversity, it can be very difficult for these 'umbrella' 
organisations to represent a common interest. Even with the issue of research and 
technology, which could be regarded in the most functional sense, raises a myriad of 
concerns and interests - affecting finance, industrial processes and products, capabilities, 
education and training, to name but a few.
Many interest groups still organise on national or sub-national lines, and even then 
sectoral representative abilities differ significantly.^^ The previous section identified the 
inability of the business community to create a broad-based, representative association 
capable of uniting the diversity of interests at either the national or supranational level.
IRDAC provided the answer to the question of diversity, it represented the composite' 
voice of industry in matters of research and technology. The members were appointed 
in a personal capacity from among the most influential group of industrial leaders 
throughout Europe, and included as well representatives from the European-level peak 
associations.
There was an assumption in creating this elite group that it could represent the common 
interests of European industry in matters of research and technology. To what extent
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was the assumption that industrial technological interests exhibited a degree of 
commonality justified?
It may not have been justified at all. However, the European Commission largely 
ignored the question as technology policy began to develop. Instead, it concentrated on 
generic technologies that could have applicability throughout large areas of industry, 
and which secured immediate and wide support for the Framework Programme. 
UNICE accepted the idea of generic technologies at the Community level, and 
continued this support through to the Fourth Framework Programme.^ The European 
Parliament has supported the generic technologies focus of the Framework Programme 
from the beginning, with the Energy, Research and Technology Committee rejecting 
any sectoral bias in the technology programme. The Committee has also given a strong 
endorsement to the socio-economic activity in the Fourth Framework, another long­
standing interest of the Parliament.^^
The European Round Table, a European-level interest association, proved more anxious 
to set out its views on European technological development than the national 
associations. In particular, it emphasised the importance of much closer collaboration 
between industries and universities, pointing out 'the advanced materials revolution will 
impose major changes on European industries and on the R&D sector. The new 
technologies will need to be introduced into the strategic planning of industrial 
companies at a much earlier stage. R&D centres will need to have a greater critical size 
to reduce the "luck" element, while researchers will have to be much more "dialogue 
oriented" if they are to work alongside producers.'^^
The consensus that existed on developing generic technologies combined an 
unwillingness on the part of the European Commission and the European Council to 
promote sectoral policies of any kind. Concorde, Airbus, and the ELDO and ESRO 
projects of the 1960s and 1970s were sectoral collaborative projects with mixed results, 
based on conflicting national technological priorities and the threat of an uncontrollable 
financial burden. The second time around the Commission sought to avoid all of this, 
and to minimise the sectoral representations at the European level.
305
The European Commission preferred a general consultative approach to technology 
policy formulation, inviting views from a wide cross-section of largely independent 
individuals, scientists and industrialists, rather than sectoral representation. Since there 
was initially little discussion or critical analysis of how technological advance might 
affect individual industrial sectors it was not so surprising that the policy process could 
develop through the political process set in motion by the European Commission.
7.4 Conclusion
The limited involvement of sectoral groups in the process of community building partly 
reflected the style of policy formulation adopted by the Commission. But at a more 
general level, the Community sought to avoid or at least minimise sectoral support. At 
the national level, an encroaching neo-liberal agenda variously followed by member 
state governments meant that sectoral intervention was regarded as anathema to the 
creation of a competitive market.
The creation of a technology community was dependent on the establishment of a wide 
base, not just in terms of general political support but also in terms of greater numbers 
of participants to the programmes. The evidence presented in chapter two, and in 
chapter six from the results of the survey suggested that the strategic planning by 
participants was concerned with market-related objectives, rather than simply 
technological strategies to be pursued at the European level.
European technology policy was presented as a market-based programme, helping to 
secure the grass roots support for collaborative programmes. However, there was not a 
simple change of attitudes and expectations on the part of these actors. They were 
linked to the emerging European Community through the efforts of the European 
Commission and through their participation in collaborative projects, and at the same 
time to a national institutional structure. It was through the adaptation of the 
institutional structure that the changes in attitudes, expectations and behaviour were 
effected.
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From the national perspective, the process of establishing this political community 
depended upon the institutional structure already in place. In the United Kingdom there 
was a lack of technocrats in the central government with a 'European' vision, willing to 
take an active part in assisting national interests to secure representation at the European 
level. The political community was created through a more decentralised process, 
through the academic community, the House of Lords Committee, and the research 
organisations acting as elites driving the process, supported in a general way by the 
business community.
Spain had a government with a clear view of how European integration could contribute 
to the modernisation of the country, and the technocrats with a European vision. The 
country had the intellectual resources at the level of central government, but it lacked the 
technical and specialist resources of a mature innovation structure, so that in order to 
take an active part in the process some degree of institutional adaptation was necessary.
The supranational elites made an important contribution to the integration process, and 
particularly so in the area of European technology policy, as the activities of IRDAC 
indicated. But this study suggests that while the supranational elites were largely 
unchallenged in the area of technology policy, they were only loosely connected to the 
national institutional structure which ultimately determines the strength of technological 
activity.
The position of the supranational elites in the national/supranational structure of interest 
representation, inadequately incorporated into the national institutional structure 
suggests possible veto points' in the development of the integration process. The 
following chapter attempts to identify where such “veto points'" might occur to obstruct 
integration through European technology policy.
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CHAPTER 8
THE TECHNOLOGY COMMUNITY - AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROCESS
This concluding chapter looks at the nature of the community that has been created 
through the BRITE-EURAM programme, and considers whether the outcome 
constitutes a robust community. Some ten years in existence, the European 
technological community can be said to have a certain degree of maturity and stability. 
It is a natural point of departure, therefore, to want to consider whether the members of 
this club can, or indeed would want to achieve more than merely creating technological 
links to qualify for a share of the European Commission Framework Programme budget.
What is clear from the research so far is that a hierarchical community has been 
evolving, including within its multi-layered structure actors at the grassroots, at the 
national and the supranational level, and that the European Commission played a key 
role in the gradual development of this community. Not only was the supranational 
authority a major political actor in the process, it was facilitated in expanding its 
position through the legislative changes associated with the Single European Act and the 
Maastricht Treaty.
The hierarchical community is one which exhibits a degree of unevenness that is partly a 
reflection of the individual nature of national institutional structures, and partly a 
response to these differences. Each national institutional structure has its own particular 
dynamic through which integrative pressures appear, and which determines the degree 
to which interests are directed towards the supranational level.
Through European technology collaboration an overlapping structure has been created, 
linking economic actors in a collaborative web which connects with the domestic 
structures in an intermittent fashion depending on the broader technological capabilities 
of each national structure. Perhaps the real truth of the matter is that the political actors
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took the easy way towards the creation of a technological community - by adopting a 
politically safe goal of industrial competitiveness and a programme with an immediate 
aim of bringing in as many actors as possible.
The size of the community, rather than its quality, was guaranteed by packaging the 
programme in terms of its promised contribution to competitiveness. At best, 
governments would support a political agenda that coincided with the national agendas. 
Industrial firms, not naturally tending towards alliances for purely technological 
purposes, could be persuaded to participate for the financial support, and broader 
indirect commercial benefits. The thesis has so far concentrated on outlining the 
development of the political process initiated by the European Community to establish a 
technology community, and chapter three provided an ex post evaluation of the extent to 
which this was achieved in terms of the number of alliances and the geographic spread 
throughout the EU. In the next two sections, a different form of assessment is made by 
starting from the political objectives behind the programme. The following section 
looks at the emerging goal of cohesion and takes an ex ante view of the possibility for 
creating a political community around this particular goal.
8.1 Assessing the cohesive potential
The major responsibility for economic and social responsibility lies primarily vvdth the 
Structural Funds, but as a Commission report evaluating the effects of technology policy 
on economic and social cohesion issued in 1992 noted 'technology policy must also 
interact and contribute, in order to foster the cohesive impact of Community actions in 
all fields.'^ In it’s evaluation, the report identified a number of conditions the existence 
of which would denote economic and social cohesion. The set of conditions do in fact 
provide a very useful bench mark against which to evaluate the BRITE-EURAM 
programme, and some of them are highlighted here -
• isolation of scientific and technological communities is being reduced, especially in 
the case of Less Favoured Regions
• disparities in RTD capabilities and the backwardness of Less Favoured Regions are 
being reduced
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• an overall harmonious development of the EC RTD system, is being brought about, 
including the involvement of enterprises, research centres and universities, resulting 
in benefits for all regions
• an overall climate of trust and understanding is being built in the EC RTD system, 
based on mutual interest, and through actions based on commonly accepted 
standards and procedures
• the Framework Programme, along with other instruments, is contributing to 
strengthening scientific and technological infrastructure and potential through all 
parts of the Community,
• coordinated RTD actions between the EC and national authorities are being 
implemented leading to an efficient cooperative effort in RTD across the 
Community.
How does the BRITE-EURAM programme measure up on the basis of this set of 
criteria? The answer has to be that it does not measure up at all well. In chapter three, 
section 3.6, the existence of a core-periphery in the emerging pattern of alliances was 
identified, which in fact reflects more general patterns of core-periphery in the economic 
activity and economic development of the European Community. The Framework 
Programme in general, and the BRITE-EURAM programme, is still overwhelmingly 
dominated by the larger member states, with their more mature technological systems 
and advanced technological capability.
Out of all the European industrial collaborative programmes, the BRITE-EURAM 
programme is the one with the most potential for changing this, and the one most suited 
to doing so. The reason is that the other programmes, ESPRIT and RACE, are 
essentially single-sector programmes, in areas where large size operations tend to 
dominate, while BRITE-EURAM is multi-sectoral, ostensibly targeting areas where 
smaller operations tend to proliferate. However, under the Second Framework 
Programme, SMEs represented only 22% of the total participants, and 21% of the 
project co-ordinators in BRITE-EURAM.
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The programme evaluation reports have tended to adopt a more positive view of the 
BRITE-EURAM's contribution to economic and social cohesion than the one taken 
here. For instance, the evaluation of the BRITE-EURAM 1989-1992 (under the Second 
Framework Programme) concluded, and without further evidence, that it has helped 
increase Europe's cohesion by facilitating international partnerships, with all its benefits. 
It is highly unlikely that those benefits would have been attained if the research had been 
funded by purely national institutes. Less favoured regions are well represented in the 
projects, although they tend to be represented more by universities than by commercial 
enterprises.'^
More realistically, the evaluation report went on to suggest that the programme might be 
trying to meet a number of objectives, which were fundamentally incompatible. In 
particular, the declared intention of the Commission to support SMEs to a greater extent 
through the programme might not be feasible in the context of the aim of promoting pre- 
competitive research, rather than near-market activities that may be closer to the 
interests of the SMEs.
Furthermore, the objective of cohesion may not be compatible with a policy which has a 
mandate to select collaborative projects on purely scientific and technical merit. A more 
general, but no less relevant point, was that the total programme budget available was 
very much inadequate to the task of developing the technological skills of Europe's two 
million SMEs.
In fact, the evaluation report went on to make a number of policy recommendations that 
would take the programme even further away fi’om meeting the economic and social 
cohesion criteria set out above.^ It recommended that the programme should move back 
to a more pre-competitive phase, and to adopt stricter application of pre-competitive 
criteria. In addition, it advocated increased emphasis to be given to generic technologies 
with a greater share of the funding going to strategic as opposed to purely applied 
research. Under these circumstances SMEs would, if not excluded altogether, find it 
difficult to engage in long-term collaborative research with their comparatively limited 
resources and the need to realise profit potential at the earliest point possible. The panel
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did, however, recommend that the Commission should explore ways to extend the 
CRAFT programme to meet the needs of the small- and medium-sized firms.
There was no immediate sign of the European Commission to heed this advice 
regarding support for pre-competitive research. A 1993 evaluation study of completed 
projects under the BRITE-EURAM programme noted a greater focus on applications- 
oriented research, with a drop in the average time-to-market between 1992 and 1993.^
Another independent report evaluating the economic effects of the BRITE-EURAM 
programme on European industry, the BETA report prepared by the Bureau d'Economie 
Théorique et Appliqué at the Université Louis Pasteur in Strasbourg, noted that SMEs 
faced challenges in participating in the European programmes - the lack of resources to 
evaluate technical needs, to define R&D plans, to find partners in other countries, and to 
study the technical feasibility of an idea before getting involved in a major R&D 
project."  ^ The study covered a statistically representative sample of fifty completed 
projects, and found that fully integrated companies were best placed to benefit fi-om the 
projects, and this often did not include SMEs.
The BETA report concluded that only the small- and medium-sized companies that 
actively conducted research in the industrial sectors covered by the BRITE-EURAM 
programme held a technological and market monopoly in a niche which, the report 
observed, was invariably lost to larger companies that entered the niche.
Undaunted by the nature of this advice, the European Commission identified 
strengthening economic and social cohesion as one of the objectives of the current 
BRITE-EURAM programme, with a number of strategic aims including the 'increased 
involvement of manufacturing SMEs in European RTD thereby developing links with 
other enterprises and to better manage their resources.'^ There is no doubt that it 
continues to see a major responsibility in enlarging the technology community, and that 
widening the base at grassroots level remains as much a priority in 1995 as it was ten 
years earlier.
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Linked to this is a further responsibility of the European Commission, to foster 
cooperative capability and to strengthen those cooperative links created. One of the 
lessons from the BRITE-EURAM programme, and which was reiterated in the 
successive evaluation studies, was that the effective exploitation of the results from 
collaboration depended upon clearly stated strategies for exploitation being established 
by the partners at the outset. From 1994, the Commission adopted a more stringent 
approach to project proposals, rejecting those which did not have strategies for 
exploitation of the results included as part of the research proposal. In support of this 
approach, it has also promised stricter evaluation at the mid-term and final assessment of 
projects in pursuance of higher standards of cooperation.
Many of the UK and Spanish participants surveyed for this research confirmed that the 
collaborative ability of the organisation had improved through participation in the 
programme. For a few with widespread prior experience, the programme made only a 
marginal impact, but there were no negative responses to this question. In the case of 
many of the Spanish organisations, the programme made a very positive contribution to 
collaborative capability.
Participants did not hold the same positive view of the programme's cohesive potential. 
On this issue the views were mixed, reflecting partly the particular experience of each 
individual organisation in the programme, or the perception of the political process 
operating generally, or the national circumstances within which the participants 
operated.
Some United Kingdom participants suspected the European Commission of deliberately 
channelling funds to the southern member states through the choice of projects. Many 
respondents from both countries considered that the overall level of funds available 
under the programme was insufficient to make any real impact on economic and social 
cohesion. While Spanish respondents considered the programme brought a number of 
benefits in general, they were overwhelmingly in agreement that it could not bridge the 
gap between the member states with advanced technological systems and those 
countries that lagged behind.
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Against the criteria set out above, at the beginning of this section, the survey evidence 
does not support the view that the programme has strong cohesive potential. A 
significant number from the two countries regarded the programme as making little 
impact on innovative capability. Despite this conclusion, however, there was continued 
interest among the respondents in the programme, and most expressed a belief in 
pursuing further collaboration under the programme.
Chapter six noted the contradictory expectations of respondents from the programme, 
particularly as regards the impact on innovative capability and on competitiveness. 
Despite the doubts concerning the programme's contribution to innovation, there was a 
large number who considered that BRITE-EURAM could contribute positively towards 
industrial competitiveness. The following section examines the basis for this belief.
8.2 The issue of competitiveness
Industrial competitiveness has been a recurring concern of national governments and the 
European Commission for most of the 1980s and the 1990s. The member state 
governments adopted various and often conflicting strategies to promote the strength of 
domestic industry against international competitors, in both the domestic and foreign 
markets. At the national level, the type of strategies pursued was influenced by a 
number of factors, including the prevailing overall economic strategy and the room for 
manoeuvre allowed within it, the philosophy of the government, and the particular 
domestic industrial circumstances.
With a varying array of measures, from de-regulation and privatisation, to support for 
research and technology, measures to cut labour costs, or to improve productivity and 
investment, there was one common element which bound the governments together. 
This was the belief that industrial competitiveness was key to broader economic welfare 
and growth.
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While falling industrial competitiveness was not a new problem, during the 1980s 
governments could not use the traditional methods such as industrial subsidies, 
devaluation and so on. They were constrained from doing so by shifts in economic 
thinking away from the traditional means, and by the constraints of European 
Community membership. Furthermore, the counter-inflationary macro-economic 
policies practised throughout many of the member states of the European Community 
during the decade threw into sharp relief the policy vacuum in other areas of economic 
management, which most were content to see filled by European Community initiatives.
European technology policy was in a sense filling the vacuum, and the goal of industrial 
competitiveness secured the support of the member state governments. But the policy 
pronouncements of the European Commission never made explicit precisely how 
technology policy would secure the goal of industrial competitiveness, merely that it 
would. From the 1985 memorandum on creating a technological community through 
the various Commission proposals concerning the successive Framework Programmes, 
a precise definition of competitiveness was avoided. The mere use of 'the rhetoric of 
competitiveness' was enough to allay even the fears of the most anti-European of the 
national governments concerning the Community proposals. ^
However, even a cursory examination of the definitions in use suggest that the European 
Commission's technology policy proposals were in reality likely to have little immediate 
and direct links to competitiveness. In addition there was no agreed definition among 
economists, and in fact those definitions that were in use centred on the nation state, 
rather than on a supranational political community in the course of being established 
(see section 1.3).
Traditional definitions centred upon relative cost and price differences, based upon 
variables such as money wages, productivity, and the exchange rate. Changes in any of 
these measures are taken to reflect movements in a country's competitive position vis-a- 
vis other countries.
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One widely-accepted definition of competitiveness concerned the ability of a country, 
under market conditions, to produce goods and services which meet the test of 
international markets, while simultaneously maintaining and expanding the national real 
income over the long term / Michael Porter's definition started firom the question of 
national competitiveness but is then turned into an examination of the role of the 
national environment in influencing firms' competitiveness within a sector. His analysis 
identified four sets of national attributes which interact as a system and exert influence 
on firms.
These were the factor conditions, demand conditions, competitive conditions, and 
relations between an industry and its business partners (or what Porter described as the 
related and supporting industries). Factor conditions comprised the characteristics of the 
labour force and infrastructures, while the demand conditions referred to the nature, size 
and level of sophistication of the home market. The pattern of national demand was an 
important contributing factor in the innovation process. Of the other two sets of 
conditions, one related to the analysis of competition within sectors. In particular, the 
structural characteristics and firms' strategies, with the strength of rivalry between 
companies, was identified as being a strong incentive to competitiveness. The other set 
of conditions took into account the whole process of production and distribution in the 
analysis of competitiveness. Taking examples from Japan and Italy, Porter argued that 
strong and efficient relationships with suppliers and distributors was a competitive asset, 
and were increasingly important to achieve innovation.
European technology policy was not framed in the extremely comprehensive manner of 
the Porter model, which offered a combination of issues in an inter-related system.* 
Instead, technology policy was much less precisely formulated, in the context of a 
generalised fear that the member states together were losing out to competitors rather 
than in terms of more particular indicators. Under the Single European Act, article 13 Of 
paragraph 1 stated the Community's aim shall be to strengthen the scientific and 
technological basis of European industry and to encourage it to become more 
competitive at the European level.' The specific programmes then went on to encourage
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the cooperation of firms, universities and research centres in pre-competitive research - 
where it is difficult to apply specific indicators of competitiveness.
In the light of this preference for non-specific indicators, it is perhaps not so surprising 
that evaluations of European technology policy tended to stress general achievements, 
such as the restored confidence in European capabilities and the growth of cooperation 
between firms.^ The evaluation of the BRITE-EURAM programme (1989-1992) 
reflected this avoidance of specific indicators of industrial competitiveness, in 
concluding "the relationship between investment in BRITE-EURAM and the expected 
increase in turnover, which participating companies will obtain from the application of 
the results of supported projects is substantial'(p.91).
The same evaluation report suggested that competitiveness of a firm was determined by 
many factors, other than technology, and proceeded to cite the impact that collaborative 
research had on the quality of the research, enhanced international status of a firm 
engaged in collaborative research, and the improved organisational effects. At the level 
of specific programmes, the evaluations were often less concerned with the potential 
contribution to industrial competitiveness, which had not in any event been defined by 
the European Commission, than about improved programme management and 
implementation.
Perhaps the clearest proof of the European Commission's use of the rhetoric of 
competitiveness came in an admission made in the first European Report on Science and 
Technology Indicators, published in 1994, where it admitted 'it was recognised that both 
the meaning of competitiveness and the part that R&D can play in increasing 
competitiveness were not well understood.' The failure of policy makers to address the 
connection meant the impact of the Community research on the competitiveness of 
European firms is more difficult to assess.'^^
Even before this public admission of failure, it had become clear that industrial 
competitiveness needed a more direct and sustained comprehensive policy. This began 
to emerge on several fronts - a study commissioned by the European Commission to
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identify the concepts and approaches relevant to an assessment of the impact which the 
research programmes had on competitiveness reported in 1993, and a White Paper on 
industrial competitiveness was published in the following year/^
The report on concepts and approaches suggested that any evaluation of the impact on 
competitiveness had to take account of evolutionary processes which differ across firms, 
and are reflected in a number of dimensions, including knowledge, skills and artifacts. 
The conclusions of the report highlighted the complexity of effecting technical change, 
and the extent to which it is dependent on wider technological capability.
In particular, the conclusion that skills development made an vital contribution to long­
term competitiveness, and the means of exploiting and of disseminating the results of 
research point towards the importance of national institutional structures, and their 
capability or otherwise of contributing to long-term competitiveness. To-date, national 
policies have addressed skill and human resource development to a much greater extent 
than European policy, although the White Paper on industrial competitiveness is 
attempting to redress the balance somewhat.
However, the Fourth Framework Programme introduced new obligations on evaluation, 
as a much-enlarged budget was agreed for a wider set of activities. The 1995 Annual 
Report on RTD activities represents one aspect of this new evaluation approach, giving 
for the first time direct financial evidence of the benefits from a Commission 
programme, when it revealed that on average 1 ECU invested in research under the 
BRITE-EURAM programme generated 6 ECU of potential economic impact within five 
years of project completion.
8.3 Supranational technological interest
By the 1990s there appeared to be a certain convergence of ideas among the 
supranational elites regarding the basis of competitiveness. The generally accepted, but 
ill-defined, view that technology was linked to competitiveness was replaced by the 
belief that competitiveness depended on the broader institutional framework. In
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particular, the educational and training environment, the financial structure, and the 
relationship between the creators and users of new knowledge all combined to have an 
impact on industrial competitiveness/^
The principal concern of this thesis is whether the evidence points towards a 
supranational technological community. Several of the supranational interest groups - 
UNICE, ETUC, European Round Table - took an increasing interest in European 
technology policy. Although each made independent contributions to the formulation of 
policy, much of their respective concerns were channelled through the organisational 
permanent representative on the Industrial Research and Development Advisory 
Committee (IRDAC).^"*
The committee had broadened its remit beyond industrial research to provide a number 
of opinions on the contribution which qualitative strategies such as education and skills 
development could have on competitiveness. ^  ^ A new stage in the integration process 
was reached when this broader remit was formally ratified by a decision of the 
Commission in September 1995, thus allowing IRDAC powers to examine broader 
strategic issues of technology policy.
In a report on strategic fundamental research published in 1992 the committee sought to 
encourage more focused Community support for basic research, relevant not only to 
industrial needs but also the needs and demands of society. The opinion of IRDAC 
was that all R&D programmes should contain an element of education and training.
One of the members of IRDAC, David Giarchardi, in an interview conducted for this 
research, supported the idea of a European industrial policy 'provided it was adequately 
debated', but doubted that a sectoral approach would work as the many examples of 
failure in this area exemplified. The committee was ready to encourage a policy which 
would support 'leading edge technologies at the frontier of knowledge, which will 
determine major developments of the whole economic fabric.'
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None of the other supranational groups offered any serious criticism of the European 
dimension to technology policy, or questioned its contribution to competitiveness. Nor 
did any of them challenge the role of the European Commission. The European Round 
Table had been involved in policy development since the first ESPRIT programme, and 
UNICE considered that in the absence of the Framework Programme 'research and 
development efforts would be very sca tte red .'.
A paper prepared by UNICE on the management of the European technology 
programmes concluded that while some decentralisation in management was desirable, 
'such delegation must not include responsibility for decision-making tasks relating to 
defmition of ...the content and themes of a programme...which must remain the 
exclusive domain of the Commission.'The problem, according to UNICE, lay with the 
fact that not enough effort had been directed towards selecting priorities, a view also 
heldbyE R T ^
Balancing its natural concern with competitiveness, UNICE also supported the view that 
qualitative factors such as education and skills had an important contribution to make in 
this area, in the context of additional investment ...in infrastructure, in particular in rail 
transport, air traffic control, information networks and education.'^^ European 
technology policy could best serve the needs of industry through its support for pre- 
competitive research, but UNICE advocated the need for industrial relevance and the 
use of an exploitability' criterion when assessing projects.^^
Fearing that the Maastricht Treaty had forced a change of emphasis on technology 
policy, giving a stronger voice to non-industrial interests, UNICE moved to keep 
competitiveness at the top of the agenda.^^ In addition to the publication of a detailed 
report on the factors which determined competitiveness, the organisation proposed a 
Competitiveness Council, along the lines of the American model.
However, the idea proved unacceptable since it was regarded by UNICE members as a 
potential competitor, and more immediately as increasing the amount of bureaucracy at 
a time when UNICE itself was actually trying to reduce the bureaucratic burden on
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business.^"  ^ A similar proposal was made by the European Round Table, which 
advocated that the status of the council should be set by a decision of the European 
Council?^
The European Trade Union Confederation sought to establish the priorities of 
technology policy in a broader societal context, proposing that the Fourth Framework 
Programme should meet the needs of society as well as those of European industry It 
concluded 'that the door opened by the Maastricht Treaty, through the extension of 
research to cover social considerations and the provisions ensuring that the RTD
Framework Programme should no longer be geared exclusively to increasing
companies' competitiveness, needs to be pushed further.
Can it be concluded from the apparent newly emerging consensus regarding
competitiveness among the supranational interest groups that there has been an 
upgrading of interests, providing the conditions for further integration? In his view of 
the integration process, Ernst Haas regarded the development of supranationality as a 
cumulative pattern of accommodation in which the participants refrain from
unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by means of 
compromises upgrading common interests.'^*
Supranationality is, however, only one part of the process. The evidence from the 
research conducted here suggests that supranational interests need to have some base 
and to be linked to their micro-foundations in order for the process to move forward. 
More generally, community building requires the broadest possible base of support at 
the grass-roots level so as to establish the legitimacy of the political integration. 
Without this, supranationality will be little more than another platform for ideas. Ideas 
have to find a practical expression through a broad institutional structure. In the context 
of European technology policy, a hierarchical structure proved unable to adequately 
represent all the interests, or to link the different levels in a constructive way.
The elite groups at the European level observed this division of responsibilities between 
national and supranational level, with the resulting vacuum being filled through the
326
programme management and implementation by the Commission. UNICE, the 
industrial interest organisation, was less concerned with the specific programmes than 
with the general emphasis of the Framework Programme.^^ This left the way fi*ee for the 
Industrial Research and Development Advisory Committee to represent industrial 
interests within the Community.
Yet neither organisation was well equipped to do so - UNICE as an 'umbrella' 
organisation with a diversity of membership had difficulty finding a common reference 
point in regard to the variety of technological needs of its members, and preferred 
instead to concentrate on more general issues where consensus was possible. IRDAC 
was intended to be the best alternative, with its mandate to represent industrial research 
interests. However, its mandate came fi*om the European Commission, not European 
industry, and the members were appointed in their personal capacity. In addition, these 
members came fi*om the leading corporations within the Community, and appreciated 
the benefits which membership of the committee could bring, but without necessarily 
having a keen appreciation of the technological needs of all areas of European industry.
Despite the growth of interest representation at national and supranational level with a 
few sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, particularly adept at supranational interest 
representation, the business community has been unable to achieve a common voice on 
a great many issues. This general lack of unity, combined with a tendency among the 
large corporations to engage in individual representation left the way open to the style of 
community building adopted by the European Commission in the BRITE-EURAM 
programme. IRDAC established the legitimacy of the programme presented by the 
supranational authority, while the Commission instituted a variety of means whereby the 
grass-roots level participants could gain direct access to Brussels.
The development of European technology policy through the Framework Programme, 
with the constituent specific programmes, saw debate or argument often concentrated on 
the former rather than the latter. This was fi*equently the case with the BRITE-EURAM 
programme. Consequently, while seeking the views of a large body of independent 
experts throughout the Community in the formulation of the programme, who
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responded in a personal capacity, the Commission had more influence over the 
constituent programmes.
From the Second Framework programme, the Commission could with some confidence 
regard 'adoption as a formality' as far as BRITE-EURAM was concerned.^® It partly 
benefited in this respect from the perception held by some that the specific programmes 
were regarded as 'relatively technical', giving the Commission freer rein.^^
A final point may be made at this point regarding supranationality. The European elites 
concentrated their efforts on influencing technology policy at the European level, 
avoiding any depth of interaction with national groups that might allow national systems 
to help shape supranational policy. The acknowledgement that national systems differ, 
for historical and social reasons' conditioned their approach.^^ However, in the context 
of technology policy a clearer understanding of such differences and of ways to 
overcome them could be of use in devising a technology policy that would both 
facilitate economic and social cohesion and improve the technological base.
Reference has already been made to the hierarchical nature of interest representation 
which partly explained the low level of interaction between supranational and national 
interests. An additional factor centred on the neo-liberal ideology, which supported the 
market as the efficient allocator of technological resources while at the same time 
respected the sovereignty of national governments and national institutional systems.
8.4 Bringing back the national level
In its memorandum on creating a technological community, issued in 1985, the 
Commission promised that one of the means by which it intended to create this 
community was through the coordination of national technology policies. It failed to do 
this in the ten years since then. Partly, the failure is attributable to the fact that each 
country is still convinced that they can do it on their own'.^  ^And, in part, the fault lies 
with the European Commission itself which opted not to take on the coordination role.
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Instead, the Commission chose a policy which would create a community by linking the 
economic actors throughout the Community on the basis of decentralised technological 
efforts conducted through collaborative projects. It was a programme that reflected the 
market bias, and an early introduction to the value system inherent in the Single Market 
Programme that was to coincide with the emerging European technology policy. And, 
linking the technology policy to the political agenda of competitiveness ensured the 
similar widespread support that the Single Market Programme received around the 
Community.
While it may be suggested that competitiveness was merely a political goal manipulated 
by the Commission to justify the technology programme, to encourage participants, and 
to keep the national governments happy, such a view must also take into consideration 
the actual conditions of European industry at the time. There was some basis for the 
view that the technological basis of European industry was in need of improvement and, 
as chapter two showed, industry was clearly reluctant to do anything about it unaided. 
The market failure thesis applied to technical change has a long and respected 
pedigree.^"^
European technology policy developed, therefore, with the Commission as leader and 
the co-ordinator of economic actors, and with a strong market bias. It was presented in a 
form which suited the neo-liberalist tendencies that were gathering strength in the 
member states of the Community.
However, the context which has been sketched out above had the result, intended or 
otherwise, of locking in the policy to a particular trajectory of development that was 
tacitly supported by national governments. This was to a market-based programme of 
technological cooperation, which has yet to make a significant impact on technological 
and structural change through promoting the use and diffusion of new technologies. 
The issue of industrial competitiveness continues to be a matter of political concern 
among the authorities at the European and national level, as indeed does the issue of 
economic and social cohesion.
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The political nature of the competitiveness concept was underlined once again by the 
European Commissioner responsible for research, education and training, Edith 
Cresson, at the annual BRITE-EURAM conference held in Vienna in October 1995, 
when she stressed again the fact that Europe spends less than its competitors on research 
- 2% in Europe compared to 2.7% in the United States, and 2.8% in Japan. A similar 
agrument was used to launch Europe’s technology policy in the early 1980s. She 
identified a number of steps needed to overcome the impediments to industrial 
competitiveness, including greater cooperation between industry and research to 
overcome the traditional compartmentalisation of the scientific world and the industrial 
sector, a concentration of resources and efforts on specific priorities.
An obvious omission was that the supranational policy interacted poorly with domestic 
institutional structures. In a Green Paper on Innovation, the result of an initiative by 
Edith Cresson, and the Commissioner responsible for industrial affairs, 
telecommunications and information technology, Martin Bangemann, and adopted by 
the Commission on 20 December 1995, the need for coordination with national systems 
was identified with the paper identifying thirteen lines of action to improve innovation 
and hence industrial competitiveness.
The Spanish and UK systems exemplify in many respects opposite ends of the 
technology system spectrum, and were chosen for study partly on that basis. In the UK, 
a mature technological system developed fi*om its early mission-oriented style to a much 
more market-oriented system, driven partly by the government's desire to shift the 
burden of financing research to the private sector. It has a long tradition of openness to 
foreign technology, something which has continued to the present time, with a 
significant increase in foreign direct investment during the 1980s which brought high 
technology investment.
The dependence on foreign technology, and the influence of the mission-oriented 
system left their mark on domestic industry, particularly in the reluctance or inability of 
large areas of industry to conduct research and to innovate. The United Kingdom shares
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with Spain the burden of a large number of small- and medium-sized firms with a 
limited capacity for technological development/^
The weakening of the mission-oriented system did not lead to a more diffusion-oriented 
one. For a long time, SMEs received little public support for technological development 
and diffusion. The survey results in chapter six indicated a large number of UK 
industrial respondents who engaged in European collaboration in order to acquire 
technological expertise, a finding corroborated by other research.^^ The government 
policy of shifting the financial responsibility for R&D onto the private sector was a 
significant factor, also, in encouraging both private and public organisations to engage 
in European technology collaboration.^^
In addition to the perceived lack of government support for technological development, 
and a lack of leadership in respect of the European Community technology programmes, 
it was left to other actors in the system to raise both the profile of research and 
development and of the European programmes in particular. The House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology played a prominent role in this regard, as did 
the public research bodies.
With a strong tradition of industry-academic collaboration, the universities were eager to 
take part in the European programmes and further encouraged by government public 
spending cuts. This tradition remained with a continued high level of domestic 
collaboration, which was noted in the preceding chapter seven. UK firms maintained a 
strong position in the European Framework Programme from the early days, however 
this was not enough to secure domestic industrial competitiveness. The government 
was eventually forced to address the problem directly in 1994 with the publication of a 
White Paper on Industrial Competitiveness, and a further one in 1995.
Spain had, like the UK, a long history of dependence on foreign technology which was 
encouraged by the modernisation policies of the Franco regime in the 1960s. The 
dependence continued in the 1980s, with a high level of foreign direct investment 
following Spain's accession to the European Community. In the Spanish case, the gain
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was in the area of mature industries with low to medium technology. It was the Spanish 
government which provided the leadership on European integration, and in the 
modernisation of the technological system following membership of the Community.
Modernising the technological system, and modelling it on the lines of the European 
Community system, was part of an overall effort by the government in the reconversion 
and restructuring of the domestic industrial system. It was not linked, as traditional 
mission-oriented research tended to be, to national security. However, the government- 
initiated changes were grafted on to the existing system, rather than offering a complete 
overhaul.^*
The result was continuing weaknesses in innovation and diffusion, and the weak links 
between industry and the academic community exacerbated the difficulties in 
technological development. When the university technology transfer network (OTRI) 
was established, its initial problem was the divide that existed between the two sectors, 
and the lack of knowledge regarding its potential on the part of industry.
A more general problem lay in the fact that the changes to the technological system that 
were brought about by government decree did not address the deep-rooted structural 
deficiencies.^^ The authorities recognised the problem regarding technological diffusion, 
and considered that the European Framework Programme could be one of the means of 
reducing the deficiencies in the domestic industry.
In its submission to the Fourth Framework programme, representatives put forward the 
national case that 'the Spanish government is deeply concerned by recurrent stimuli in 
favour of the so-called vertical programmes (or integrated projects) designed to support 
certain industrial sectors which can result in a relative decrease of the effort devoted to 
horizontal diffusive technologies.'"^^
The national authorities provided the leadership for participation in the European 
technology programmes, supported by the large, often foreign-owned multinationals. 
But most of the domestic industry was ill-prepared, either by accident of history or
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inherent industrial characteristics, to fully avail of the opportunities offered by the 
European policy.
8.5 Conclusion
The mode of interaction between national technological systems and the European 
institutional system provides a necessary link in the integration process. The 
examination of the process that operated between the two levels offers a contribution to 
integration theory, by highlighting the need to consider not simply questions of issue 
linkage, with the consequent package deal negotiation that is involved, but also the 
institutional system within which actors operate.
The quality of the institutional system within which actors operate, can act as a force for 
integration, or equally as a brake upon it. By restricting our attention to the institutional 
changes at the European-level, it is possible to neglect the fact that actors are also 
embedded in a local system that both affects their behaviour, and often their capacity to 
exert influence. More generally, the interests and motives of economic actors are 
expressed through a multi-level institutional system, which has a spatial element, 'within 
which interaction occurs. It is not only difficult but also unrealistic to expect an 
integration process where there is a simple uni-linear transfer of loyalties, and 
expectations."^^
Theoretical analyses of the integration process which focus on particular elements, such 
as the role and authority of the supranational institution, or of the national government, 
or the power and influence of elite groups give only a partial analysis of the process. 
Such approaches may also serve to obscure the real limitations and perhaps overshadow 
possibilities for progress.
National governments have not always acted to the detriment of the integration process, 
and various analyses have shown that during the 1980s states recognised the benefits to 
integration as a means of solving common problems."^  ^ While approaches which 
concentrate upon the role of elite groups in the process have certain merit as explanatory
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tools, and the early 1980s technology policy reflects this fact, it has also come to be 
recognised that elite groups cannot always secure the broad base of support which the 
integration process ultimately needs.
Moreover, the difficulties of integrative measures which do little to integrate the national 
and supranational institutional systems become even more evident in the particular 
context of a European technology policy that seeks to add economic and social cohesion 
to the political goal of competitiveness. The institutional changes brought about by the 
Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty will contribute little to the integration 
process without a consensus on, and a clear defmition of all the political goals. But 
mostly, it will require an integration of the national and supranational institutional 
systems, not just the creation of a European network of mainly large firms.
8.5.1 The hypotheses reviewed
This thesis has been concerned with aspects of the new diplomacy in the European 
context, and in particular with the interaction between private actors, national 
governments and the supranational authority of the European Commission in 
technological collaboration. It is now time to return to the hypotheses that were put 
forward in the first chapter, and to consider the extent to which these hypotheses are 
supported by the evidence of the research.
Two hypotheses were put forward for testing against the empirical evidence. The first 
hypothesis was that national institutional capability is a key determinant in the 
integration process.
The evidence of this thesis supports the hypothesis. It was found that in both countries 
examined the motivations and expectations of actors were shaped by the institutional 
structure in which they operated, and not simply by the decisions of the supranational 
authority. The neo-functionalist prediction of an integration process that was driven by 
changes in attitudes, expectations and demands of economic actors, and a re-direction 
towards the central authority did not materialise in quite the straight-forward way that
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the theory implied. There were changes in attitudes and expectations certainly, but 
frequently the result was an adaptation of the domestic institutional system towards the 
European model.
A particular set of domestic circumstances giving rise to its own peculiar configuration 
of interests influenced the integrative pressures in each of the countries studied. In the 
UK, the national government played only an indirect role, but the policy of cutting 
public spending on research and technology and more general approach to public 
resources and private technological activities had the effect of switching the attention of 
domestic interests to the European level. European technology policy, as presented in 
terms of the battle for competitiveness and operated on the basis of broadly neo-liberal 
principles, represented no threat to the national government ideology. Unlike the 
European technology policies of the 1960s and 1970s, there was no challenge to 
national security, or anything that would oppose the often-stated purpose of cutting 
public spending.
In the technological system that was evolving under the government ideology of the 
1980s, integrative pressures were exerted through the private economic actors, and the 
public organisations with responsibilities or interests in this area. With a more mature 
technological system, the country was able to attain a much higher participation rate in 
the European technology programmes than Spain, despite the latter’s strong leadership 
role of the government and the widespread support for European integration throughout 
Spanish society. Technological capability was therefore key to the extent of integration 
actually achieved, and in large measure such capability is determined by the domestic 
institutional system.
Spanish support for integration was not matched by the technological capabilities of 
domestic industry and its ability to fully avail of the opportunities for European 
technological collaboration. Despite the ambitions and aspirations of the government, 
and a strong leadership drive towards European integration, it was not enough to bring 
the same level of participation in the European programmes that the large member states 
had attained. By 1994, it was evident that not enough had been done over the course of
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the 1980s to create a modem technological system, and European integration only 
served to underline this fact. Therefore, the government announced in 1994 a series of 
measures to establish a technological infrastmcture to be put in place over a four-year 
period.
What has emerged from the study of these two member states was that expectations did 
not flow uni-directionally towards the centre. Actors were affected by changing 
interests in a complex interaction with other groups, and the result was the creation of a 
multi-level structure with actors articulating interests at the different levels, from the 
local to the supranational level.
The second hypothesis was that the nature of the community formed was influenced by 
underlying ideology and ideas, creating in the case of European technology policy a 
market-based community. The corollary to this hypothesis is that unless the upgrading 
of common interests can be experienced at all levels in the institutional structure it is 
impossible to create a real and lasting community.
The early view of sectoral integration as being inherently expansive cannot be accepted 
with certainty, but neither can one which relies upon the role of elites in a political 
process, if they are not perceived to represent the interests of a broad range of groups 
affected by the political processes that ensue. Economic actions and economic 
pressures, the original source of integrative pressures, occur as part of a broader set of 
social relations within an institutional stmcture. For instance, technology creation 
depends on the capability that the education and training systems provide, the provision 
for patent protection, and for a secure framework under which to conduct the necessary 
long-term research.
The second hypothesis raises more general issues regarding the integration process, and 
how neo-functionalist theory sees the process. Integration would proceed, the theory 
suggested, on the basis of the purely functional and technical. What has emerged from 
this research is that the functional and technical, like all economic activities, are not 
isolated from the political and social relations of which they are a part. The notion of an
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integration process centred upon the functional can only be sustained if the common 
interest is expressed in terms of what is essentially the lowest common denominator. 
Any attempt to upgrade the common interest will come face-to-face with the reality of 
the broader political and social relations that surround economic activities.
And it seems likely that any effort to take the integration process forward demands more 
than the leadership of the supranational authority. Equally relevant to the question of 
spill-over are the ideas which underpin the political process, and which give it 
momentum. Ideas also play a significant role in determining the path of integration, and 
the actors that will be involved, as well as the issues upon which integrative pressures 
are exerted.
The development of European technology policy is illustrative in this regard, where the 
objective was the creation of a technological community to foster the competitiveness of 
European industry. Competitiveness proved to be a unifying idea, but it also 
circumscribed the strategies, issues, and interests that would be considered, locking the 
community into a particular path of development.
By linking technology policy with competitiveness, policy inevitably took on a market- 
oriented bias, even when policy was in practice confined to pre-competitive activities. 
The formulation of policy was, despite the proclamations of the European Commission, 
essentially a top-down process which was then supplemented by a series of management 
activities to incorporate a wider number of actors. The Industrial Research and 
Development Advisory Committee (IRDAC) fitted into this structure - hand-picked by 
the Commission, with a brief to put forward the views of industry, but with only tenuous 
links to national institutional systems.
Is there a European technological community? The answer has to be in the affirmative, 
and the empirical findings of this research support this conclusion. There is a very 
active community of interests engaged with technological issues at the supranational 
level, complemented at the micro-level by a strongly integrated network of collaboration 
that has strengthened over the course of the past decade. But it is a technological
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community based around the narrow pursuit of competitiveness, managed by a 
supranational institution which upholds the market ideal. It is acknowledged that 
competitiveness and economic performance and growth are still greatly dependent on 
technology.'^^
As the early part of this chapter indicated, there is also some evidence of convergence in 
the views held by the supranational elites concerning what should be done to improve 
the competitiveness of European industry. But a convergence of elite views may not be 
enough to sustain a spill-over into other areas, and the difficulties arise when trying to 
identify the strength of this community.
But spill-over needs a broader base - an institutional system encompassing societally- 
based actors and interests beyond the confines of the market. Society's interests over a 
wide area are affected by technological development, and political integration has to 
recognise this reality. To date it has not done so, opting for a community based around 
a common interest in competitiveness and one that consequently represented the lowest 
common denominator. The introduction of economic and social cohesion is a challenge 
to this community, and to the ideas upon which it has developed.
8.5.2 Avenues for further research
Several observations may be made arising firom the research presented here. One 
observation concerns the nature of technology policy generally. The European policy 
has been developed with very simple objectives, principally securing and retaining 
industrial competitiveness through a stronger technological base. But technology has an 
increasing and pervasive impact on society and economy both for good and ill. Despite 
the large amount of work conducted in recent years on the processes of technical 
change,"^ the results have been slow to filter through to public and political debate. A 
debate such as this could provide a useful input into future European technology policy, 
and indicate ways in which policy could develop so as to achieve economic and social 
cohesion. The argument that technological change creates a positive impact on
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employment has not it would seem been won, and there is much scope for a technology 
policy that could improve the position of European employment."^^
The second observation centres upon the nature of theoretical debate on European 
integration. Despite the widespread interest in the process and the number of different 
approaches that have been adopted, there are in many respects very little differences 
between them. Similar elements feature throughout all - principally the role of the state 
as a significant actor, the supranational institution, and the power struggles and 
bargaining strategies of key players. Very little attention is given to the impact of 
integration processes on actors and institutions that fall outside the neo-realist fi-ame of 
analysis. With growing scepticism over the democracy deficit in the European Union, it 
would seem like a good time to extend integration research to consider the impact of 
integration on social relations within and between member states.
The final observation may present a greater difficulty for integration theory. Many 
analyses of the integration process, including this one, have adopted an essentially short 
term perspective to examine the processes that led to a particular outcome, reflecting 
perhaps the dominance of researchers fi*om the area of political science that have 
captured the topic. It could prove more fiiiitful to extend the time fi*ame of analysis, a 
possibility which becomes more feasible as the European Union advances in maturity. 
Taking a longer term perspective, and using alternative disciplinary approaches, could 
offer valuable insights into integration that have been obscured by the political science 
approach.
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APPENDIX 1 Third Framework Programme 1990 -1994 (MECU)
I ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES
1. Information and communication technologies 2490.84
- Information technologies 1516.68
- Communication technologies 548.46
- Telematics systems 425.7
2. Industrial and materials technologies 996.93
- Industrial and materials technologies 839.52
- Measurement and testing 157.41
II MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
3. Environment 581.17
- Environment 464.35
- Marine sciences and technologies 116.82
4. Life sciences and technologies 831.6
-Biotechnology 184.14
- Agriculture and agro-industry research 373.23
- Biomedical and health research 149.49
- Life sciences and technologies for LDCs 124.74
5. Energy 1052.37
- Non-nuclear energies 259.38
- Nuclear fission safety 230.67
- Controlled nuclear fission 562.32
III MANAGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL 
RESOURCES
6. Human capital and mobility 581.13
Centralised action for dissemination and optimisation of 66
results
6600
Note: the initial agreed budget for the Third Framework Programme 
was 5700, with 900 MECU added on, bringing the overal total 
allocated to 6600 MECU.
Source: Research and Technological Development Activities of the European Union 
Annual Report 1995, COM (95) 443 (Brussels).
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APPENDIX 2
Fourth Framework Programme (1994-1998) MECU
ACTIVITY 1 - RTD and DEMONSTRATION 10686
PROGRAMMES
I Information and communication technoiogies 3405
1. Telematics 843
2. Communications technologies 630
3. Information technologies 1932
li Industrial Technologies 1995
4. Industrial/materials technologies 1707
5. Standardisation/measurement/testing 288
iil Environment 1080
6. Environment and climate 852
7. Marine sciences and technologies 228
IV Life sciences and technoiogies 1572
8. Biotechnology 552
9. Biomedicine and health 336
10. Agriculture and fisheries 684
V Energy 2256
11. Non-nuclear energy 1002
12. Nuclear fission safety 414
13. Controlled thermonuclear fusion 840
Vi Transport 240
Vil Targeted socio-economic research 138
ACTIVITY 2 COOPERATION WITH THIRD 540
COUNTRIES
ACTIVITY 3 - DISSEMINATION OF RESULTS 330
ACTIVITY 4 - TRAINING AND MOBILITY OF 744
RESEARCHERS
TOTAL 12300
(In April 1995 the European Commission proposed a 7% increase in the allocated 
funds to cover the recent enlargement of the EU)
Source: Research and Technological Development Activities of the European Union 
Annual Report 1995, COM (95) 443, Brussels.
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APPENDIX 3
RTD activities 1994 - selected programmes; new projects 
(contracts signed under the Third Framework Programme)
BRITE-
EURAM
ESPRIT RACE
Total EC contribution (MECU) 261.05 249.2 46
Number of projects 706 178 25
Number of participants 1836 983 223
Average participants/project 2.6 5.5 8.9
Average number M.S./project 2 3.1 5.1
Average EC contribution (MECU) 0.37 1.4 1.84
M.S. = Member State
Source: Research and Technological Development Activities of the 
European Union Annual Report 995, COM (95) 443 (Brussels).
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APPENDIX 4
Changes in RTD priorities between Framework
programmes
(% of total budget)
Framework Programmes
Information/communication
1
1984-87
25
ii
1987-91
42
iii
1990-94
38
iV
1994-98
28
technologies 
industriai and materiais 11 16 15 16
technoiogies
Environment 7 6 9 9
Life sciences and technoiogies 5 7 10 13
Energy 50 22 16 18
Transport 0 0 0 2
Socio-economic research 0 0 0 1
internationai cooperation 0 2 2 4
Dissemination of results 0 1 1 3
Human capital and mobility 2 4 9 6
Total (%) 100 100 100 100
Total (MECU) 3750 5396 6600 12300
Source: European Report on Science and Technology Indicators, 1994 
(CEC, Brussels)
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APPENDIX 5
Survey questionnaires
BRITE/EURAM PROGRAMME 
SURVEY 1
Please circle letter (s) corresponding to appropriate responses and return to:
Mary Farrell 
77a Evering Road 
London N16 7PR
Tel 0171 241 4591
1. How did your organisation become involved with the BRITE-EURAM 
programme?
A. Response to the European Commission (DG XII)
B. Response to national ministry circular
C. Approached by other interested party/participant
D. Our organisation initiated a proposal
E. Other
2. How did you find your partner organisations?
A. EC data base
B. National data base
C. Partners contacted us
D. Other
3. Is your organisation
A. An industrial firm with more than 500 employees
250-499 employees 
150-249 employees 
50-149 employees 
0-49 employees
B. A research centre
C. A university
D. Other _____
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4. To what industrial sector does your organisation belong?
A. Aeronautics B. Construction C. Ceramics/glass
D. Electronics E. Engineering F. Food/drink
G. Leather/footwear H. Pharmaceuticals I. Robotics
J. Textiles/clothing
K. Other (please specify)_______________________________
5. To what industrial sectors do your partners belong?
A. Aeronautics B. Construction C, Ceramics/glass
D. Electronics E. Engineering F. Food/drink
G. Leather/footwear H. Pharmaceuticals I. Robotics
J. Textiles/clothing
K. Other (please specify)___________________________
6. Is this your first project under the BRITE-EURAM programme?
A. Yes B, No C. Don't know
7. How many organisations are involved in the project (not including you)?
A. Two B. Three C. Four D. Five or more
E. Not certain
8. What are the national origins of the partners (please indicate the number of 
partners corresponding to each country)?
A. Belgium ( ) B. Denmark ( ) C. France ( )
D. Germany ( ) E. Greece ( ) F. Ireland ( )
G. Italy ( ) H. Luxembourg ( ) I. Netherlands ( )
J. Portugal 0  K. Spain ( ) L. United Kingdom ( )
M. Austria ( ) N. Finland ( ) O. Norway ( )
P. Sweden ( ) Q. Switzerland ( )
9. Had you previously collaborated with any of the partners participating in your 
BRITE-EURAM project?
A. Yes B. No C. Don't know
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10. With how many of your previous partners had you previously collaborated?
A. One B. Two C. Three 
D. Four or more E. Don't know
11. To what extent does your organisational strategy include collaboration at the 
European level?
A. Substantial B. Moderate C. Limited
D. Not at all
12. Does your organisation undertake other collaborative Research and 
Development at the international level?
A. Yes B. No C. Don't know
13. Does your organisation receive national/provincial government funding for 
R&D?
A. Yes B. No C. Don't know
14. Does your organisation participate in any of the following EC programmes?
A. ESPRIT B. EUREKA C. COMETT
D. CRAFT E. STRIDE F. VALUE
G. Other
15. Does the project also involve marketing/production/finance personnel from 
your organisation?
A. Marketing only B. Production only C. Finance 
D. At least two of these E. Don't know
16. Does the collaborative project include the participation of a potential user of 
the new technology?
A. Yes B. No C. Don't know
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17. What level of support and guidance has the national ministry provided in 
setting up this project?
A. Substantial B. Moderate C. Limited
D. None
18. After this BRITE-EURAM project is completed, would your organisation 
consider collaborating with your current partners again to pursue 
commercialisation?
A. Yes B. No C. Don't know
19. Do you think your organisation will improve its ability to engage in 
collaborative activity as a result of the experience in the BRITE-EURAM 
programme?
A. No B. Slight improvementC. Major improvement 
D. Don't know
20. Do you think your organisation may participate in other BRITE-EURAM 
projects in the future?
A. Yes B. No C. Don't know
21. What are the benefits you believe your organisation will receive from this 
BRITE-EURAM collaborative project? (Please rank in order of importance, 
choosing as many as are appropriate, with 1 being the most important)
1 2  3
R&D costs reduced * * *
Early access to new technology 
or knowledge
Better chance of product completion * *
Larger project or increased funds * * *
Mobility/exchange of personnel * *
Knowledge of partner's product or 
strategy
Access to supplier network 
Protection from foreign competition 
Influence on development of standards 
Access to customer network *
Interchange of ideas 
Elimination of duplicated R&D efforts
*  *  *  
*
*
*  *  *
*  * *
*  *  *
*  *  *
*  *  
*  *  *
*  *  *
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Improvement of competitive position
22. What were the major problems involved in collaboration under the BRITE- 
EURAM programme? (Please rank in order of importance, choosing as many as 
are appropriate, with 1 as the most important)
1 2 3
Finding the right partners * * *
The administration and paperwork
of the project * * *
Language problems * * *
Different expectations among partners * * *
Intellectual property rights * * *
Greater risk of results going to
competitors * * *
Fixing the location of the collaborative
work * * *
Absence of skilled personnel * * *
23. Would your organisation engage in this collaborative research without the 
support of the BRITE-EURAM programme?
A. Yes B. Probably C. No D. Don't know
24. Did your organisation carry out any of these activities prior to the project?
A. Yes B. No C. Don't know
25. Approximately what proportion of your organisation's R&D costs will be 
covered by EC funds?
A. 31-50% B. 26-30% C. 21-25%
D. 16-20% E. 11-15% F. 6-10%
G. 3-5% H. <3%  1. Other
26. Approximately what proportion of your organisation's R&D budget is covered 
by national government contributions?
A. 31-50% B. 21-30% C. 15-20%
D. 10-14% E. 5-9% F. <5%
G. Other
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27. Did you and your partners negotiate intellectual property rights or licensing 
agreements?
A. Yes B. No C. Not yet
D. Other
28. How could the Commission provide more assistance to participants under the 
BRITE-EURAM programme? (Circle as many as you consider important)
A. Provide more information about partners
B. Provide more direct involvement in managing the collaborative project
C. Eliminate delays in accepting projects
D. Provide more help with norms and standards of technology
E. Provide more funding
F. Other
29. Was your organisation's decision to collaborate influenced by trade 
association/sectoral interest group opinion?
A. Yes B. No C. Don't know
30. (I) Does your organisation engage in domestic (national) R&D collaboration 
with any of the following?
A. Business firms B. Research centres C. Universities
D. Other_____________________
(II) Is this collaboration
A, Substantial B. Moderate C. Limited
D. None
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PROGRAMA BRITE-EURAM 
ESTUDIO 1
Se mega ponga un circulo alrededor de la letra o letras que corresponden a las respuestas 
pertinentes y devuelva este impreso a:
Mary Farrell 
77a Evering Road 
London N16 7PR 
England
Tel. 0171 241 4591
1. ^Como empezo su organizacion a interarse por el programa BRITE-EURAM?
A. En contestacion a la Comision Europea (DO XII)
B. En contestacion a la circular del CDTI
C. A través de la iniciativa de una parte/participante interesado
D. Nuestra organizacion sometio una propuesta
E. Otra_______________________________________
2. ^Como localizaron a sus organizaciones socias?
A. Base de datos de la CEB. Base de datos nacional
C. Socios se pusieron en contacte con nosotros
D. Otra
3. Su organizacion es
A. Una firma industrial con mas de 500 empleados
250-499 empleados 
150-249 empleados 
50-149 empleados
0-49 empleados
B. un centre de investigacion
C. Una universidad
D. Otra
4. ^A que sector industrial pertenece su organizacion?
A. Aeronautica B. Constmccion C. Ceramica/vidrio
D. Electronica E. Ingenieria F. Robotica
G. Alimentacion/Bebidas H. Cuero/Calzado
I. Farmacéutico J. Textiles/Confeccion
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K. Metal-mecânico L. Otro
5. que sector or sectores industriales pertenecen sus socios?
A. Aeronautica B. Construcciôn C. Cerâmica/vidrio
D. Electronica E. Ingenieria F. Robotica
G. Alimentacion/Bebidas H. Cuero/Calzado
I. Farmacéutico J. Textiles/Confeccion
K. Metal-mecânico L. Otro
6. ^Se trata este de su primer proyecto bajo el programa BRITE-EURAM?
A. Si B. No C. No se sabe______________________
7. ^Cuântas organizaciones estân interesadas en el proyecto (sin incluir la suya)?
A. Dos B. Très C. Cuatro D. Cinco o mas
E, No se sabe con certeza
8. ^Cuâles son las nacionalidades de los socios (y cuântos socios de cada pais)?
A. Bélgica( )  B. Dinamarca( )  C. Francia()
D. Alemania( )  E. Grecia( )  F. Irlanda()
G. Italia( )  H. Luxemburgo()  L Espana()
J. Holanda( )  K. Portugal ( )  L. Inglaterra()
M. Austria( )  N. Finlandia( )  O.Noruega()
P. Suecia( ) Q. Suiza ( )
9. ^Ha colaborado anteriormente con cualesquiera de los socios que participan en 
su proyecto BRITE-EURAM?
A. Si B. No C. No se sabe
10. ^Con cuântos de sus socios actuates ya habia colaborado anteriormente?
A. UnoB. Dos C, TresD. Cuatro o mas
E. No se sabe________________________________ ____
11. ^Hasta que limite su estrategia de organizacion incluye colaboraciôn a un nivel 
europeo?
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A. Importante B. Regular C. Limitado
D. Ningùn
12. ^Colabora su organizacion en empresas de colaboraciôn para la Investigacion y 
el Desarrollo a un nivel intemacional?
A. Si B. No C. No se sabe
13. ^Recibe su organizacion financiaciôn del estado nacional para la Investigacion 
y el Desarrollo?
A. Si B. No C. No se sabe
14. ^Participa su organizacion en cualesquiera de los programas siguientes de la 
CE?
A. ESPRIT B. EUREKA C. COMETT D. CRAFT
E. STRIDE F. VALUE G. Otro
15. ^Requiere también el proyecto la participaciôn del personal de 
marketing/producciôn/financiero de su organizacion?
A. Marketing solamente B. producciôn solamente
C. Financiero D. Por lo menos dos de éstos
E. No se sabe
16. ^Incluye el proyecto de colaboraciôn la participaciôn de un posible usuario de 
la nueva tecnologia?
A. Si B. No C. No se sabe
17. ^Qué nivel de ayuda y de orientaciôn ha proporcionado al establecer este 
proyecto:
()E1 CDTI
( ) Asociaciones profesionales de investigacion 
( ) Oficinas de transferencia de resultados de investigacion 
( )Otras?____________________
A. Importante B. Regular C. Limitado
D. Ningùn
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18 .1A la fînalizaciôn del proyecto BRITE-EURAM, considerana su organizacion 
colaborar de nuevo con sus actuales socios para proseguir la comercializacion?
A. Si B. No C. No se sabe
19. ^Cree que su organizacion mejorara su capacidad para participar en 
actividades de colaboraciôn como resultado de la experiencia en el proyecto 
BRITE-EURAM?
A. No B. Una ligera mejora C. Una gran mejora
D. No se sabe
20. ^Cree que su organizacion participara en el futuro en otros proyectos BRITE- 
EURAM?
A. Si B. No C. No se sabe
21. ^Cuales son los beneficios que en su opinion cree que percibirâ su organizacion 
de este proyecto de colaboraciôn BRITE-EURAM? (Se ruega lo clasifîque en orden 
de importancia, escogiendo cuântos sean pertinentes, clasificando el 1 como el mas 
importante, 2 importante, y 3 el menos)
1 2 3
Reducciôn en los costes de
Investigacion y Desarrollo * * *
Acceso râpido a nueva tecnologia
o conocimiento * * *
Una mejor oportunidad de fmalizar
el proyecto * * *
Un mayor proyecto o un aumento de fondos * * *
Rotaciôn/intercambio de personal * * *
Conocimiento de los productos o
estrategia del socio * * *
Acceso a la red de proveedores * *
Protecciôn de la competencia extranjera 
Influencia sobre el desarrollo 
de las normas
Acceso a la red de clientes * * *
*
*  *  *
*  *  *
*  *  *Intercambio de ideas 
Eliminaciôn de una duplicaciôn de
esfuerzos en I+D * * *
Mejora en el campo competitive *  *  *
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22. ^Cuales fueron los problemas principales que surgieron en la colaboraciôn 
bajo el programa BRITE-EURAM? (Se ruega los clasifîque en orden de 
importancia escogiendo cuântos sean pertinentes, escogiendo el 1 como el mas 
importante, 2 importante, y 3 el menos)
1 2 3
Encontrar los socios idôneos/estranjeros * * *
La administraciôn y papeleo del proyecto * * *
Problemas lingüisticos
Las diferentes expectativas entre
* * *
los socios * * *
Los derechos de la propriedad intelectual 
Un mayor riesgo de que los resultados se
* * *
transmitan a los competidores 
La fijaciôn de la ubicaciôn del trabajo
* * *
de colaboraciôn * * *
Ausencia de personal especializado * * *
23. ^Participariâ su organizacion en esta investigacion de colaboraciôn sin el apoyo 
de BRITE-EURAM?
A.Si B. Probablemente C. No
D. No se sabe
24, ^Llevô a cabo su organizacion cualesquiera de estas actividades, antes del proyecto? 
A, Si B. No C. No se sabe
25. ^Aproximadamente, que proporciôn de los costes de Investigaciôn y Desarrollo 
de su organisaciôn se cubrirân por los fondos de la CE?
A. 31-50% B. 26-30% C. 21-25% D. 16-20%
E. 11-15% F. 6-10% G. 3-5% H. < 3%
I. Otro
26. ^Aproximadamente, que proporciôn del presupuesto de Investigaciôn y 
Desarrollo de su organizaciôn esta cubierto por aporciones del estado nacional?
A. 31-50% B. 21-30% C. 15-20% D. 10-14%
E. 5-9% F. <5% G. Otro
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27. ^Négocié su organizacion y sus socios derechos de la propriedad intelectual o 
contratos de licencia?
A. Si B. No C, Todavia no
D. Otro
28. ^Cômo podria proporcionar la Comision mas ayuda a los participantes bajo el 
programa BRITE-EURAM? (Ponga un circulo alrededor de cuântos considéré 
importante)
A. Proporcionando mas informaciôn sobre los socios
B. Proporcionando una participaciôn mas directa en la gestion del proyecto de 
colaboraciôn
C. Eliminando los retrasos en la aceptaciôn de los proyectos
D. Proporcionando mas ayuda con las normas y estanderes de tecnologia
E. Proporcionando mas financiaciôn
F. Otro
29. ^Influyeron las opiniones de alguna asociaciôn comercial/grupo de interés 
sectoral en la décision de colaboraciôn por parte de su organizaciôn?
A. Si B. No C. No se sabe
30. (I) ^Participa su organizaciôn en la colaboraciôn nacional sobre la 
Investigaciôn y Desarrollo con cualesquiera de las siguientes entidades?
A. Empresas comerciales B. Centros de investigaciôn
C. Universidades D. Otros
(II) ^Esta colaboraciôn es
A. Importante B. Regular C. Limitada
D. No existe?
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BRITE-EURAM programme 
Survey of participants - Part II
Please circle the appropriate response and return to:
Mary Farrell 
77a Evering Road 
London N16 7PR
1. How many years has your organisation participated in the BRITE-EURAM 
programme?
**1-2 years ** 2-4 years ** 4-6 years ** 6 or more
2. How has collaboration under this programme benefited your organisation? 
(Please rank in order of importance, choosing as many as are appropriate, with 1 
being the most important and 3 the least)
1 2 3
R&D costs reduced * * *
Early access to new technology 
Better chance of product completion 
Larger project or increased funds 
Mobility/exchange of personnel 
Knowledge of partner's product 
or strategy
Access to supplier network 
Protection from foreign competition 
Influence on development of standards
Access to customer network * * *
*  *  *
* *
*  *  *
* * *
*  *  *
* * *
*  *  *
*  *  *
*  *  *
* * *
Interchange of ideas 
Elimination of duplicated R&D efforts *
Improvement of competitive position
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3. What were the major problems involved in collaboration under the BRITE- 
EURAM programme? (Please rank in order of importance, choosing as many as 
are appropriate, with 1 as the most important and 3 the least)
1 2 3
Finding the right partners * * *
Administration and paperwork
of the project * * *
Language problems * * *
Different expectations among the partners * * *
Intellectual property rights * * *
Greater risk of results going
to competitors * * *
Fixing the location of the
collaborative work * * *
Absence of skilled personnel * * *
4. Should the BRITE-EURAM programme be extended to cover:
- fundamental research *
- applied research *
- design of prototypes *
- development of new processes *
- development of new products * 
-training *
- quality control *
5. What lessons can you draw from the experience of European technological 
collaboration?
What are the lessons for business generally?
What are the lessons for national government?
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6 (A) Do you think that, in general, Community technology programmes and 
national technology programmes are:
- independent *
- complementary *
- similar *
- overlapping? *
6 (B) Do national programmes facilitate/promote the participation in Community 
programmes?
yes * no* don't know *
7. How would you classify the information provided by the Commission for 
participants?
inadequate * adequate * good *
8. How many workshops or special sessions organised by the Commission for 
participants have you attended?
none * 1-2 * 3-4 * 4 or more *
9. After this BRITE-EURAM project is completed, would your organisation 
consider collaborating with your current partners again to pursue 
commercialisation?
yes * no * don't know *
10. Do you think your organisation will improve its ability to engage in 
collaborative activity as a result of the experience in the BRITE-EURAM 
programme?
no * slight improvement * major improvement * 
don't know *
11. Do you think your organisation may participate in other BRITE-EURAM 
projects in the future?
yes * no * don't know *
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12. How could the Commission provide more assistance to participants under the 
BRITE-EURAM programme? (Tick as many as you consider important)
■ provide more information about partners 
provide more direct involvement in managing 
the collaborative project 
eliminate delays in accepting projects 
provide more help with norms and standards 
of technology 
provide more funding
13. Should trade associations/sectoral interest groups play a more active role in (i) 
the formulation (ii) the management of the BRITE-EURAM programme?
yes no don't know *
14. Do cultural traits/national characteristics affect:
choice of partners? yes * no *
success of collaboration? yes * no * 
comments
don't know * 
don't know *
15. In your opinion, has the BRITE-EURAM programme made a positive impact 
on:
the competitiveness of European industry? 
the innovative capability of industry?
16. Do you have any further comments on the impact or future development of the 
BRITE-EURAM programme, or the European technology policy in general?
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PROGRAMA BRITE-EURAM 
ESTUDIO DE LOS PARTICIPANTES - PARTE II
Se ruega ponga un circulo alrededor de las respuestas pertinentes y devuelva este 
impreso a
Mary Farrell 
77a Evering Road 
London NI 6 7PR
1. ^Cuântas anos ha participado su organizacion en el programa BRITE- 
EURAM?
1-2 anos * 2-4 anos* 4-6 anos* 6 o mas *
2. ^Cuâles son los beneficios de la colaboraciôn BRITE-EURAM para su 
organizaciôn? (Se ruega lo clasifîque en orden de importancia, escogiendo cuântos 
sean pertinentes, clasificando el 1 como el mas importante, 2 importante, y 3 el 
menos)
1 2 3
Reducciôn en los costes de 
Investigaciôn y Desarrollo 
Acceso râpido a nueva tecnologia 
Una mejor oportunidad de fmalizar
el producto *
Un mayor proyecto o un aumento de fondos 
Rotaciôn/ intercambio de personal 
Conocimiento de los productos o 
estrategia del socio
Acceso a la red de proveedores *
Protecciôn de la competencia extranjera 
Influencia sobre el desarrollo
de las normas * * *
Acceso a la red de clientes *
Intercambio de ideas 
Eliminaciôn de una duplicaciôn 
de esflierzas en I+D 
Mejora en el campo competitivo
* * *
* * *
*  *
*  * *
* * *
* * *
*  *
* * *
*  *  
* * *
*  *  *
*  *  *
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3. ^Cuâles fueron los problemas principales que surgieron en la colaboraciôn bajo 
el programa BRITE-EURAM? (Se ruega los clasifîque en orden de importancia 
escogiendo cuântos sean pertinentes, escogiendo el 1 como el mas importante, 2 
importante, y 3 el menos)
1 2 3
*Encontrar los socios idônos estranjeros * *
Administraciôn y papelero del proyecto * * *
Problemas lingüisticos * * *
Las diferentes expectativas entre los socios * * *
Los derechos de la propiedad intelectual * * *
Un mayor riesgo de que los resultados se
transmitan a los competidores * * *
La fijaciôn de la ubicaciôn del
trabajo de colaboraciôn *
Ausencia d personal especializado *
*  *
* *
4. iQué otro(s) aspecto(s) deberia cubrir el programa BRITE-EURAM?
- investigaciôn fundamental *
- investigaciôn aplicada *
- desarrollar prototipos *
- desarrollar procesos nuevos *
- desarrollar productos nuevos *
- formaciôn *
- controlar calidad *
5. ^Cuâles son las lecciones de la colaboraciôn tecnolôgica europea para su 
organizaciôn?
para la industria?
para el gobiemo?
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6 (A) ^Cree que en general los programas tecnolôgicos europeos y los programas al 
nivel nacional son
independientes *
o complementarios *
o parecidos *
o coïncidentes? *
6 (B) ^Cree que los programas nacionales facilitan o contribuyen a participar en 
los programas europeos?
Si * No * No se sabe *
7. ^Como clasificaria la informaciôn diseminado por la Comision para los 
participantes?
inadecuada * adecuada * bien *
8. cuântos coloquios/jomadas informativas organizados por la Comision para 
los participantes ha asistido?
Ningun * 1-2 * 3-4 * 4 o mas *
9. lA  la finalizacion del proyecto BRITE-EURAM, colaboraria su organizacion de 
nuevo con sus actuales socios para proseguir la comercializacion?
Si * No * No se sabe *
10. ^Cree que su organizacion mejorara su capacidad para participar en 
actividades de colaboraciôn como resultado de la experiencia en el proyecto 
BRITE-EURAM?
No * Una ligera mejora * Una gran mejora *
No se sabe *
11. ^Cree que su organizaciôn participara en el futuro en otros proyectos BRITE- 
EURAM?
Si * No * No se sabe *
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12. ^Cômo podrîa proporcionar la Comision mas ayuda a los participantes bajo el 
programa BRITE-EURAM? (Ponga un circulo alrededor de cuântos considéré 
importante)
- proporcionando mas informaciôn sobre los socios *
- proporcionando una participaciôn mas directa
en la gestiôn del proyecto de colaboraciôn *
- eliminando los retrasos en la aceptaciôn
de los proyectos *
- proporcionando mas ayuda con las normas y
estandares de tecnologia *
- proporcionando mas financiaciôn *
13. ^Deberîan las asociaciones comerciales/Ios grupos de interés sectoral jugar un 
papel mas importante en (i) la formaciôn (ii) la direcciôn del programa BRITE- 
EURAM?
Si * No * No se sabe *
14. ^Influyen las caracteristicas cultural nacionales en la selecciôn de socios?
Si * No * No se sabe *
en el éxito de colaboraciôn?
Si * No * No se sabe *
Por ejemplo:
15. ^Cree que el programa BRITE-EURAM ha hecho un impacto positivo en:
(i) la competividad de la industria europea?
Si * No * No se sabe *
(ii) la capacidad innovativa de la industria?
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Si * No * No se sabe *
16. ^Tiene Ud. otra opinion sobre el impacto o desarrollo del programa BRITE- 
EURAM, o la polftica tecnologia europea en general?
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